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ABSTRACT
The Morrill Act was the political telos of numerous
rhetorical messages calling for pedagogical changes in
higher education.

This study examines the role of prudence

in four of them.

The method is a mode of textual criticism

that attempts to capture the bifurcated sense of rhetorical
invention:

The immediate rhetorical situation, and the

cultural grammar that constrains the rhetor performatively.
The author illustrates how the relevant rhetorical
strategies/gestures within each text and the text's textual
context pointed to a certain conception of prudence.
Historically, the author argues that the struggles between
different notions of prudence impacted political,
pedagogical action.

Theoretically, the author reflects on

the nature of prudence in relation to the rhetorical canons,
agent, purpose, and audience.

The study contributes to a

broader understanding of how prudence emerges in rhetorical
action.

vi
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CHAPTER
THE

A
CALL

ONE

RHETORICAL INQUIRY INTO
FOR PRACTICAL HIGHER EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION

During the nineteenth century, the lack of widespread
"practical" higher education motivated many of those
concerned with this issue to rise up and plea for industrial
and agricultural pedagogy.

In 1850, for instance, President

Francis Wayland of Brown reported that American higher
education failed to offer applicable courses of instruction
that the populace needed and desired.

In 1851 Jonathan

Baldwin Turner, speaking to an agricultural convention in
Granville, Illinois, argued for a college of agriculture and
industry.

In 1857 Justin Smith Morrill, a Vermont

Representative, proposed a bill in Congress to donate public
land to states and territories for the purpose of
establishing agricultural and mechanical colleges.

Speaking

on behalf of the Agricultural College Bill, Morrill
proclaimed,

"There has been no measure for years which has

received so much attention in the various parts of the
country as the one now under consideration"
Globe, 1858, p. 1692).

(Congressional

Morrill's bill passed through

Congress in 1858, but President Buchanan vetoed it.

After

revisions, amendments, and a presidential election,
President Lincoln signed the bill into law on July 2, 1862.
There is no question that the consequences of this
original Land Grant College Act, or "Morrill Act" as we
often call it, were monumental.

It apportioned to each

1
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state thirty thousand acres per senator and representative
it had in Congress under the 1860 census.

The law required

states to sell the land and reap interest from the receipts
for the purpose of endowing, supporting, and maintaining a
college of agriculture, though not excluding scientific,
classical, and military studies.

Thus, it generated

unprecedented diversity in the curriculum, brought higher
education to the working classes, and placed classical
academics and vocational instruction under the same roof.
Perhaps most importantly, it also gave the general public a
new lust for learning by democratizing higher education and
making the practical learned.
The Morrill Act was the political telos of numerous
rhetorical messages calling for pedagogical changes in
higher education.

By rhetoric, I mean the communicative art

that seeks to induce an audience to feel, reason, and
perceive in a certain way.

Rhetoric, in the Aristotelian

sense, is finding, in the contingent world, the
opportunities for persuasion.

More specifically, the

persuasive efforts resulting in the Morrill Act, working
alone and together, demonstrate the important role of
prudence in the invention of public argument.
difficult word to define.

Prudence is a

One function of this dissertation

project is for me to come to terms with what prudence means
and how it works.

At this juncture, let me define prudence

as practical and appropriate orchestration of persuasive
possibilities, and practical, appropriate political conduct

2
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in light of situational limitations.

While rhetoric is the

art of strategic inducement toward a certain way of feeling,
reasoning, and perceiving, prudence is an implicit— often
explicit— underlying manner of appropriate and practical
discursive practice and political conduct.

We should

particularly note, too, that prudence relies on rhetorical
performance for its existence.
Performance is thus another important word I will use
throughout my dissertation.

There are many different

perspectives on what performance means.

For instance,

Pollock (1998) suggests that
performance is primarily something done rather than
something seen.
It is less the product of theatrical
invention or the object of spectatorship than the
process by which meanings, selves, and other effects
are produced (p. 20).
Pollock turns to speech act theory to make the point.
"performative" speech act "does" something.

This kind of

speech act is "action in the form of representation"
20).

A

(p.

Take, for instance, the idea that the short phrases

such as "I do" and "I now pronounce y o u ..." in a marriage
ceremony actually generate meaning; the words make the
marriage so.

In brief, this is one way to look at

performance.
However, the above description of performance is one I
do not aspire to.

There are hints here and there that the

scholars I depend on for understanding prudence mean
performance in that "doing" way.

Nevertheless, those

scholars do not fully articulate what they themselves mean

3
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by performance.

Thus, I cannot assume that they in fact

adhere to the sophisticated slant on performance as depicted
above.

By performance I simply mean a stylized repetition

of some tradition of rhetorical action through gesture,
figures of speech, and the like.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, ARGUMENTS, AND STUDY RATIONALE
My dissertation seeks to analyze specific rhetorical
efforts that I suggest were vital to the eventual passing of
the Morrill Act.

I will examine one text that promoted the

traditional, literary college, the Yale Report of 1828, but
then focus on several texts that advanced the general
notions of the Morrill Act.

I will analyze a report by

Francis Wayland, a speech by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, and
two of Morrill's speeches in Congress on behalf of the
measure.

I seek to understand the role of prudence in each

text.
I have many questions that I will address.
group them into three general questions:

We can

1) Primarily,

given the rhetors I examine, what sense of prudence did they
each offer and how did they symbolically actualize or
achieve that notion of prudence?

Along the same lines, was

such an idea of prudence linked to any communal tradition(s)
of prudential thinking?

2) Considering the idea of textual

context, what vision of the past, present, and future did
each rhetor project, and what sense of prudence did that
develop?

3) What was the effect of the implicit view of

4
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prudence within each text— did it help or hinder the
rhetorician's persuasive efforts?
Historically, I argue that the changes occurring
within nineteenth century American higher education were
generally a struggle between diverging conceptions of
prudence in rhetorical action.

Specifically, I suggest that

Morrill supplied a confused notion of prudence that helped
frame the way his contemporaries received his "act, " and it
touches us today in higher education as we struggle with
curricular fragmentation and an unsteady mission.

I also

contend that prudence helps orchestrate rhetorical
invention.

A sense of prudence is, in part, a wrestling

with strategic calculation and display.

A sense of prudence

also helps govern the tie between rhetorical form and
persuasive content.

What is more, a sense of prudence

guides the aesthetics of politics.

I also argue that

prudence is both situational and cultural.

Thus, to study

prudence says something about the complicated relationship
between a rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical
situation, and between the persuasive text and its broader
cultural context.

Further, a discursive text might have two

ideas of prudence in tension.

Further, I argue that

prudence changes as communal notions of ethos change, and
that there is always a representation of prudence within
rhetorical action.

Finally, however, I also suggest that

prudence is, echoing Wilson (1998), open to different
interpretations.

5
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Additionally, I assume that the process of creating
rhetorical discourse is a social process of grappling with
and organizing a multiplicity of communal, rhetorical
conventions alive only in rhetorical discourse.

Certain

communal, rhetorical traditions, like standards of
prudential thought, depend on specific ideational patterns,
argumentative arrangement, stylistic devices, word choices,
and rhetorical organization.

I suggest that a rhetor must

always use some tradition of prudential thinking, even if
the particularized sense of prudence is somewhat novel.

It

is impossible, I believe, to invent an entirely new way of
prudential thinking.

In persuasive texts, rhetors also

encode their prudential outlook through certain implicit
and/or explicit conceptualities, or visions, of temporal
reality.

Rhetoric about educational policy almost always

depicts some temporal vision and depends on it.

Finally,

the sense of prudence alive in rhetorical discourse is a
pivotal test of the rhetoric's successfulness.

Successful

rhetors are those who best help their audience(s) along to a
certain way of prudential seeing.
My study is important for several reasons.
Historically, the study of prudence gives us an illustration
of how different modes of prudence facilitated and or
inhibited certain ways of thinking about nineteenth century
pedagogical policies.

This study gives us a rhetorical

insight into the institutional structure of nineteenth
century American colleges and universities, and their

6
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contemporary off-springs.

Hariman (1997) thinks that the

study of historic public address “can identify and resolve
problems of historical interpretation that are themselves
the result of depending on an insufficient understanding of
the role of pubic talk in the political culture of the
period"

(p. 165).

Interests and ideas of a political and

pedagogical culture work within communicative practices and
contexts.
Theoretically, and as I mentioned, this study helps us
better grasp the role of prudence in rhetorical invention.
Thus, it also forces us to grapple with important issues
surrounding the persuasive process.
canons.

We must look at the

We must look at the relationships between delivery

and invention.

We must struggle with the relationship

between rhetorical form or organization and argumentative
content.

We must turn to the relationship between style and

political action.

Again, prudence is, at base, an

underlying discernment of practical, appropriate rhetorical
response or invention that helps shape appropriate judgment
and action.

Because prudence lives within rhetorical

efforts, it is a valuable concept when attempting to better
understand the project of rhetorical invention and the other
basic rhetorical canons in a practical, variable world.
Additionally, the study of prudence helps us understand
the complicated relationship between a rhetorical text and
its immediate rhetorical situation, and between the
persuasive text and its broader cultural context.

7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Jasinski

(1997), in an effort to recover the bifurcated mode of
rhetorical contextualization described in 1925 by Wichelns,
suggests that both an immediate exigency (Bitzer, 1968) of a
rhetorical situation, and a broader, public, cultural sense
of context influence a rhetor and his or her agency.
Jasinski (1997) says that "the text is positioned as an
outgrowth of context; context does not simply surround or
contain the text but permeates or saturates the text as the
result of an organic process of emergence and development"
(p. 200) .

The study of prudence helps develop this

dialectic because it necessitates a struggle with both the
immediate situation, and the broader, rhetorical traditions
emerging out of the larger context.

The study of prudence

appreciates the instrumental approach to rhetorical
invention, but also the deeper comprehension of the "birth"
of a rhetorical text from a widened, cultural source.
Further, the study of prudence helps us better realize
the nature of the rhetorical agent and rhetorical purpose in
persuasive discourse.

The ethos of a rhetor often helps

convey an idea of prudence, and communal norms of selfness
often sanction a rhetorical ethos.

Further, in the

traditional, neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical
practice and interpretation, a rhetor comes to a situation,
establishes an ethos and purpose, and invents the persuasive
message.

This is not the entire story, however.

Jasinski

(1997) thinks that the "individual authorial agency is
decentered in the act of textual production as intentions

8
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are 'refracted.' through the spectrum of languages and voices
that the author seeks to organize"

(p. 215) . Thus, the

study of prudence recounts how a persuasive author invents
him or herself rhetorically, but also how an author might be
prudentially purposive and strategic simply by imitating a
broader, cultural grammar.

My point is that communal norms

of prudence might also help establish the rhetor's
discursive purpose.
Finally, I think the study of prudence might illustrate
the important role of the audience as powerful decoders of
prudential, or not so prudential messages.

We might say, in

light of Hall's (1980) description of dominant, negotiated,
and oppositional readings, that prudence is a site of
interpretive struggle.

Again, repeating Wilson (1998),

prudence is a contested space of legitimacy rhetors try to
fix or stabilize in their discourse.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Because of the nature of my study as a theoretical and
historical exploration of rhetorical discourse, I think it
is essential to establish a narrative tying together the
important historical moments that helped impel my research
texts to life.

I also think it is indispensable to describe

a historical account of the transformations in rhetorical
theory and discourse during the nineteenth century.

The

changes emanating from and through the nineteenth century
rhetorical/communication culture are themselves affected by
persuasive efforts and rhetorical training.

9
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Historical Narrative
During the colonial period and early American
independence, American higher education was for the elite.
It was for boys from refined families.
classical and literary.
Greek and Latin.

Education was

Students would learn things like

Also, though colonies and states normally

donated land for colleges, the federal government, once
established, had no federal policy of higher education:
Obviously, in a period in which the traditions of the
state rights and the practices of frontier
individualism were so determining, there was lacking
sufficient sentiment of centralization and
socialization to make possible federal initiative in
educational policy involving the fixing of standards
(Ross, 1942, p. 8).
Everything was up to individual states and institutions.
Some colleges and universities began providing
scientific courses during the late eighteenth century and
early nineteenth.

For instance, Princeton started using a

chemical apparatus and telescope during the tenure of
President William Smith in 1815.

However, it is important

to understand that the general public saw scientists as
charlatans.
states,

Scientists were too mysterious.

Ross (1942)

"In the popular view, as reflected in fictional and

sensational news portrayals, there was much mystery, not to
say magic, connected with the scientist and his laboratory"
(p. 10) . The liberal or classic educators staved off any
major educational innovation, especially in scientific
application to agriculture; though there were some novel
teachings here and there.

10
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The teaching of the classical curriculum held strong
during the early nineteenth century.

Instead of promoting

new practical and vocational courses based in scientific
advancement, English model colleges required courses in
"Evidences of Christianity" and "Moral Philosophy."

While

most colleges kept with their literary traditions and
perpetuated the innate purity of the Christian soul,
students rebelled.

They rebelled not only because of the

religious rigidity of most colleges, but the lack of
curricular innovation and innovative teaching.
Progressive voices were gaining volume.

Jefferson's

experiment at the University of Virginia, which opened in
1824, was a notable progressive move.

Rudolph (1965)

explains that "at the University of Virginia every student
was a free agent" (p. 126).

Yet, Butts (1939) says that the

only choice a student really had was which school or schools
to enter, and the order and time that student might take
specific courses (pp. 95-96).

Moreover, lack of funding

halted Jefferson's plan of opening a school of agriculture.
Even still, the Virginia experiment represented the most
comprehensive democratic ideal of American higher education
framed through the philosophical and political conceptions
of freedom, individuality, and practicality (p. 96).
Other unique institutions opened as well.

The founding

of the Rensselaer Institute in Troy, New York, was a
significant moment in the rise of technical and practical
education.

Also started in 1824, the purpose of the

11
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institute was to qualify teachers to teach the sons of
fanners and mechanics the application of experimental
chemistry, philosophy, and natural history to agriculture
and manufacturing.
forward.

It helped the progressive educators move

The idea of fitting a higher education to the

wants of the many was in the wind.

Even Harvard toyed with

an elective system.
In 1828, the conservative old school reacted against
practical curricular reform in higher education when James
L. Kingsley, a Yale professor of classics, and Yale's
President, Jeremiah Day, gave Yale their famous Report on a
Course of Liberal Education, known today as the "Yale

Report."

It was, as it is now, an important defense of

classical, literary education and the learning of ancient
languages.

However, despite its conservative edge and

literary trench, Yale supplied instruction in scientific
application starting in 1847.

Also in 1847, Harvard opened

its Lawrence Scientific School.

The ball of science

practicality was rolling.
As the classical curriculum still ruled the colleges of
the nation, the industrial revolution and its momentum
increased, forever changing the national mind-set. Ross
(1942) thinks that the industrial revolution also had a
profound impact on higher education:
In its broadest scope and truest aim, this movement to
apply the findings of the new sciences and the
technique and organization of the new education to the
changing business and social order marked the most
socialized phase of the educational awakening (p. 15).

12
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Utilitarian, pragmatic voices invoked visions of individual
wealth and advancement, especially in Francis Wayland.
Francis Wayland's 1850 report to Brown University's
corporation is one of the most famous attempts to re-make
higher education to fit with the dominating progressive
American scene of commercial individualism.

Though the

"ordinary" farmer and mechanic still shrugged at the notion
of science, it was clear that the old-line, classical
curriculum was out-dated because, for one reason,
enrollments were decreasing markedly.

According to Wayland

(1850), American colleges, like Brown, were somewhat empty
because they did not offer courses the populace desired.
However, the plight for the farmer and mechanic seemed to be
the plight of the middle class educator, not the true
farmer.

Ross puts this idea succinctly when he says that

"The typical farmer...was governed by established tradition
which...reconciled him to a fatalistic acceptance of the
inscrutable and unmodifiable manifestations of nature" (p.
18).

Farmers wanted farms, not degrees, and not necessarily

scientific innovation.

Even so, Wayland's report

represented the changes in pedagogy that had occurred, and
were continuing to occur, in the country's colleges and new
German-styled universities.
The most influential regional drive for agricultural
education came in Illinois.

The Illinois movement,

spearheaded by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, had more impact on
the Morrill Act than any other state or regional movement.

13
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In 1851, Turner provided a plan for an industrial college
that assumed a society split into two major factions, the
working class and the professional class.

For the working

class, he longed for an institution that joined a modified
technological education with the exhibitional nature of
agricultural societies.
had British roots.

In a way, this Illinois movement

Agricultural displays were very popular

in medieval England, and animal breeding and food
experimentation had occupied eighteenth century minds.
Also, the movement to improve agriculture, again, was not so
much a yeoman farmer enterprise, but an upper class longing.
Even still, Ross says that Turner earned a special place in
the history of the land-grant movement because of his
rhetorical display.
was, in part,

As Ross (1942) states, Turner's appeal

"due to its vigorous restatement of the

traditional national philosophy of popular opportunity and
its rhetorical onslaught on the aim and content of an
obsolescent classicism"

(p. 38).

Turner continued to speak

to agricultural conventions and urged others to make the
case for practical education.
Courses of instruction in technical practicality
increased throughout the 1850's and new state colleges with
agricultural leanings continued to emerge. The Farmer's High
School [now Penn State] opened in 1854.
Agricultural College started in 1857.

The Michigan
Progressive educators

laid the cornerstone for the People's College of New York in

14
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1858.

However, the People's College, like so many early

educational experiments, failed.
There were also several arguments for national
agricultural education.
lines.

They usually followed along common

They "combined appeals to precedent— land grants for

education, asylums, and public works, proposals for a board
of agriculture, and a national university--with the alleged
needs of the nation for industrial leadership" (Ross, 1942,
p. 39).

These assertions, however, always provoked strong

opposition.

Some argued that a national program for

agricultural and industrial education broke the limits of
the federal government's role.
was not expedient.

Others argued the process

At the 1857 convention for the United

States Agricultural Society, B. P. Moore "did not think any
gentleman acquainted with the practical workings of Congress
would believe for a moment that there was the slightest
chance of obtaining such an immense donation for such vague
purposes" (cited in Ross, p. 43-44).

By the end of the

1850's, the movement was at a point of uncertainty.
Many private and state funds provided technical,
practical education, but there was still a lack of standards
in subject matter, methods of teaching, and resources. Any
drive forward would have to come from a centralized, federal
level.

Ross (1942) explains that

Educational exigency had to wait upon political
expedience, but by the late fifties, in spite of all
past constitutional and social traditions and
prejudices and present sectional division involving
them, sufficient sentiment had been created to make

15
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federal aid to industrial education an 'available'
issue, provided it was strategically presented(p. 45).
Turner left the job to a New Englander, Justin Smith
Morrill.
Morrill, like Turner, did not care for the domination
of classical education.

From Vermont, Morrill was a self-

taught intellectual and retired businessman with close ties
to the working class.

He introduced a resolution on the

matter first in 1856, but it was tabled and lost.
introduced a bill in late 1857.

He

In the bill he coordinated

the leading technical pedagogical plans of the day.

In the

simplest terms, he desired to promote practical education in
service of industrial classes.
to do many things.

The bill, however, proposed

It charted out a popular way to dispose

of plentiful public lands. It promised soil rejuvenation.
It articulated a way to refine the "ordinary" people.

It

recognized the need to help states less blessed with fertile
land.

It illustrated that America could better compete with

the agriculturists of Europe.

Morrill, a Republican, also

hoped that the passing of the act would help along his
party's platform in the eye of the yeoman agrarian.
The arguments against the measure were boisterous. A
Virginia Representative howled that the measure was "an
unconstitutional robbing of the Treasury for the purpose of
bribing the States"

(cited in Rudolph, 1962, p. 250).

Others did not see the need for empowering the industrial
classes of the North or the white Southern farmer through
education; elitism was still in the air.

Moreover, there
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still existed hostility toward higher education.

As

mentioned, the bill, with some amendments, passed through
Congress, but President Buchanan vetoed
allies in Congress made specific

it. Morrill and his

changes for war-time

considerations and re-submitted the measure in the Senate.
It passed in 1862 and Lincoln signed it

into law.

The journals and newspapers of the time did not receive
the measure as major news.

Eventually, Northern states

generated varying forms of Land Grant colleges.
war, the Southern states were soon to follow.

After the
Pennsylvania,

Michigan, Maryland, and Iowa converted existing agricultural
institutions into land grant "A & M's."

Rhode Island,

Connecticut, Kentucky, Delaware, Indiana and New York gained
control of private institutions and made them the Land Grant
universities.

Minnesota, Georgia, Missouri, Wisconsin, and

North Carolina changed existing public colleges into state
Land Grants.

Places like Arkansas, Texas, and Kansas formed

brand new institutions.
Louisiana, too, embraced the national legislation.
Ross (1942) says that "in Louisiana, where educational
status had always been curiously confused and unsettled,
popular sentiment favored the union of the land grant
foundation with the old military seminary to provide a real
state university" (p. 82).
Subsequent land granting legislation increased federal
aid.

The second Morrill Act, in 1890, stipulated that

federal aid be used with an eye to racial equality.
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This

measure helped form several of the traditionally African
American institutions.
The Land Grant institutions did not have immediate
success.

Regardless, the institutions evolved and became

the mainstays of American higher education.
state has at least one Land Grant university.

Today every
The policy

remains one of the most profound legislative acts to affect
American higher education.
The above narrative is only partial because a detailed
examination of the history of practical or vocational
education is not the project of this dissertation.

Thus, we

can see practical, vocational, and scientific pedagogy
appearing here and there and scattered throughout early
American history.

What is essential to note, however, is,

again, that the call for practical education came from
voices of power, not true, uneducated, raw farmers.

The

great agrarian revolts did not occur until the late
nineteenth century.
Nineteenth Century Rhetoric
Interwoven within the above historical narrative is a
dynamic history of rhetorical theory and practice.

Thus, my

narrative account sets the stage for my analysis, but I must
also unveil the transformations of rhetorical theory and
discursive practice during the nineteenth century because my
texts for analysis encompass those changes.
Cmiel (1990) focuses on style and analyzes nineteenth
century voices rarely touched by scholarly lenses.
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Moreover, his project on style gives us a broad perspective
of the changing fabric of nineteenth century rhetorical
culture.

In his book about the struggle over popular speech

in nineteenth century America, Cmiel is particularly
interested in the tie between language and the self, social
authority, and an assumed audience.
According to Cmiel (1990), through a literary
education, early colleges indoctrinated young gentlemen into
a so-called refined style of speech and life.

Eloquent

language was a smaller part of an overarching "cultured"
sense of self.

The use of elaborated codes placed this high

culture style above vernaculars.

Yet, educated elites could

not always convey their messages to the masses. Thus,
according to Cmiel, as the nineteenth century was dawning, a
dilemma that expanded throughout the nineteenth century and
onward emerged:

America's elites wanted a refined,

educated, and civilized public, but also their own unique
political and communicative power.

They desired democratic

republicanism, but wanted to keep their perch.

What

emerged, Cmiel asserts, was a "middling" style, as Cmiel
calls it, that used both refined and vulgar speech.
Cmiel says that the middling style mixed the literaryeloquent with the uneducated raw, or the high culture with
low culture.

Often, to sway the public, literary educated

rhetoricians had to escape the chains of refined speech.
Henry Ward Beecher, for instance, used a middling style.
Daniel Webster and Lincoln used this hybrid style.
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The

distinctive features that characterized the middling style
included intrusive informality, calculated bluntness, jargon
and euphemism.

Cmiel (1990) states,

"The arrival of

middling styles led to a war over the soul of American life"
(p. 66).

The struggle over what type of language style to

use translated to a struggle over a sense of selfness and
citizenry.
We could also call Ralph Waldo Emerson's rhetoric an
example of what Cmiel calls middling rhetoric.

Antczak

(1985) considers Emerson a democratic educator.

However, to

educate the democratic masses, Emerson had to talk in a
plain tongue.

Emerson said that the

Masses are rude, lame, unmade, pernicious in their
demands, and need not to be flattered, but schooled.
I wish not to concede anything to them, but to tame,
drill, divide, and break them up and draw individuals
out of them (cited in Antczak, p. 92) .
His middling style invited the masses to identify with his
democratic, rhetorical persona.

Thus, Emerson also invited

his audiences to imitate sort of anti-institutional,
democratic character through his middling style.
Cmiel (1990) also states that "from the 1820s and 1830s
through the end of the century, there was continual sniping
between those favoring a more refined decorum and those
committed to the new idioms" (p. 66) .

Though the "war over

the soul of American life" persisted, the use of the
middling style was the norm in this era, and used in
journals and newspapers.

At the same time, asserts Cmiel,

mid-nineteenth century romanticism offered a Saxon
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eloquence, or a humble style.

Both the common touch and the

unadorned style were in vogue.

Nevertheless, in the years

after the Civil War, conservative, literary types desired to
revive the old, neo-classical style.

These conservatives

wanted to re-draw the lines between the few and the many.
As the century progressed, linguistic differences
between critics and scholars ignited furious feuds.

While

the critics wanted to return to the old style, the scholars
began focusing on grammar, expertise, and science.
Academically trained scholars wanted to assert themselves,
but through a scientific mode of thinking and talking, not a
literary one.

This struggle continued as rhetoricians and

philologists butted heads in the late nineteenth century.
The rhetoricians explained that one needed some flare for
effective rhetorical display, while the philologists thought
style was mere fashion.

The philologists wanted an

empirical understanding of the way language worked.
The tension between the high style and popular style
remained, but in the mean time, the academic, technical
expertise style invaded dictionaries and bibles.
was both jargon filled and informal.

Language

In the late nineteenth

century into the early twentieth, colloquial informality
became even more accepted while the language of the expert
flourished.

According to Cmiel (1990), as the century

closed the refined person was now an expert.

Technical talk

replaced aesthetics.
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In an effort to supply the "big picture, " Cmiel (1990)
argues that, first, cultures actively encourage one style
over another at given times.

Second, late twentieth century

public discourse has its roots in the effort to accommodate
a more educated, assertive populace, but at the same time
create authority for the educated. Third, after the rise of
mass democracy, the debates over the "raw" and "refined"
resulted in no wrong style, and by the turn of the twentieth
century, technical, plain, and colloquial styles were all
alternatives to traditional rhetorical theory and practice.
Fourth, middling rhetoric was and is polysemic.

Those best

able to capture populace expectation in their rhetorical
efforts often won political authority.

Thus, it should also

be noted that Cmiel's insight echoes Cicero and Quintilian.
The grand style, middle style, and plain style were still
resources for the nineteenth century rhetorician.
Cmiel's project is important to my work not only
because it offers a compelling description of the changes
occurring within the rhetorical culture of the nineteenth
century, but also because prudence is, in part, a mode of
style.

The type of style a rhetor uses often points to the

implicit idea of prudence the rhetor is advocating.

This

prudence, moreover, also entails a sense of selfness and of
audience expectation.
For instance, I will suggest that the Yale Report of
1828 is an example of a refined style.

While this style was

suitable for an academic audience in the early nineteenth
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century, it had little stylistic appeal for the mass
populace.

Wayland used more of a middling style that

allowed him to speak to the populace.

Turner used, for the

most part, a middling style and a humble style that aided
his efforts with his rural audience.

Morrill, too,

illustrated the use of a middling, but one fitted for his
Congressional situation.

In short, then, a prudential

outlook encompasses a certain style of discursive practice.
Clark and Halloran (1993) bolster Cmiel's view of how
rhetoric developed through the nineteenth century. In their
analysis of the oratorical culture in nineteenth century
America, they argue,
Both the theory of rhetoric taught in the schools and
the practice of public discourse sustained outside them
were transformed. .. from those of the neoclassical
oratorical culture into those of the professional
culture we see characterizing both colleges and
communities by its [19th Century] end (pp. 5-6).
During the first few decades of the nineteenth century,
the mainstay of the neo-classical rhetorical culture helped
create a communitarian ethos.

Echoing the perspectives of

Cicero and Quintillion, early nineteenth century classicists
called for public moral consensus through rhetoric.

John

Witherspoon's "complete orator was not motivated by the
ideal of striving for individual advancement that would
become central to middle-class culture in the nineteenth
century"

(p. 7) .

Thus, the first change of rhetorical

theory and practice during the nineteenth century was from
the orator having a central cultural role of expressing and
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building moral consensus to the orator building up his or
her own identity.
America's unique possession of land helped transfer
moral authority from the neo-classical "polis" to the
individual.

Individualism became concrete in the form of

private property which warranted individual claims of
natural rights and political independence.

This liberal

individualism invaded rhetorical theory and practice.

For

instance, the rhetoric of Ralph Waldo Emerson, again, moved
religion from communitarian institutionalism to private,
individual processes.

The public arena became a place to

promote one's own personality.

With Andrew Jackson's 1828

ascension to the presidency, the "common man" individual was
winning the day.

As Clark and Halloran (1993) put it,

More than any preceding president, Jackson was innocent
of a classical education, and his victory over the one
time Harvard chair-holder [John Quincy] Adams can be
taken as a figure of the declining importance of
oratorical public discourse and of the collectivist
assumptions about moral authority on which it was
based(p. 13).
When distinct academic disciplines and departments
emerged in the college setting, the expert became the valued
individual. The expert was the hero.
(1993) state,

Clark and Halloran

"Expertise, whether specifically scientific or

not, came to be understood in the new professional sense as
a privately held commodity and was for many in the new
[middle] class the means of advancement" (p. 20) . With the
expert professional came a neglect of classical rhetorical
invention and an investment in oneself as an economic
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commodity.

The professional ethos, argue Clark and

Halloran, called for a morally neutral discourse.

The

public forum was a place where persuasion became a "dubious
function of exciting the passions"

(p. 32) .

Moreover,

professional culture, assert Clark and Halloran, constrained
public debate.

It structured fragmented sub-publics.

at the close of the nineteenth century,

Thus,

"the dominant

aspects of American culture in general and the theory and
practice of its public discourse in particular had been
transformed by the emergence of the practical and seemingly
apolitical ideals of professionalism"

(p. 25).

While Clark and Halloran's work does not explicitly
discuss prudence, nor focus on educational discourse, it is
important to my study because norms of prudence emerge out
of a rhetorical culture.

I will illustrate, for instance,

that the authors of the Yale Report tied their idea of
prudence with a neo-classical, communitarianism, but
Wayland's prudence emerged out of individual longings.
Thus, my study of prudence helps illustrate the changing
tide of rhetorical culture in the nineteenth century from
the vantage point of educational policy discourse.
Clark and Halloran's edited work is also important to
my study because of one specific essay within it.

Clark

examines the oratorical poetic of Timothy Dwight,
Yale's president during the late eighteenth century.

Clark

(1993) suggests that Dwight used the language of poetic
sentiment, but his rhetoric was also "traditionally
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oratorical in its commitment to engage those it addresses in
the project of shaping and sustaining a common moral and
political culture"

(p. 58).

I will argue that the authors

of the Yale report extended Dwight's rhetorical mission.
Considering the rhetorical theory promoted in the
college and university classrooms of the nineteenth century,
Johnson (1991) suggests that the rhetorical educators
located rhetorical theory and pedagogy not only in the
classical conceptions of the art, but also eighteenthcentury discourse theory.

More specifically, three things

influenced nineteenth century rhetorical education:
classical foundations, like Aristotle and his canons,
belletristic interests in rhetorical beauty, and
epistemological approaches linking science with rhetorical
theory.

Thus, the most immediate characteristic of

nineteenth century rhetorical education was that it was
synthetic.
calls it.

This synthesis was a "New Rhetoric," as Johnson
Throughout the century, then, rhetorical

educators worked off this "New Rhetoric" and mixed
...a philosophical approach to rhetoric that examined
the nature and aims of rhetoric in terms of the
processes of the "mental faculties"; the view that the
study of rhetoric applies to all major forms of
communication, oral and written; and aesthetic/ethical
commitment to the critical study of rhetorical theory
and the development of taste; and a neoclassical
approach to rhetoric as the art of adapting discourse
to purpose, audience, and occasion (pp. 19-20).
While early nineteenth century rhetorical educators
most often focused on public speaking as the most crucial
practice of rhetoric, educators expanded the discipline to
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prose composition and critical analysis. The study and
practice of rhetoric also broadened toward the pedagogical
ideal of the eighteenth century belletristic tradition of
eloquence and nonverbal display.

Even though many have

argued that this move illustrated a decline in the status of
rhetoric, Johnson thinks that the liberal arts curriculum
during the century supported the pedagogical, philosophical,
and theoretical interests of rhetoric as a discipline.

Her

point is that rhetorical education served an important
cultural function.

Johnson states, "Rhetorical education

played a crucial role in bolstering the idealism of
nineteenth century liberal education, an enterprise that was
committed to the development of an intellectually
progressive and cultural enlightened society"

(p. 16) .

Johnson's work is important to mine because many of the
rhetors I examine were classically trained rhetors.

The

authors of the Yale Report, for instance, both took courses
in rhetoric from Timothy Dwight.
classics at Union College.

Wayland learned the

Turner went to school at Yale,

but wanted to shed himself of the classical persona to
promote practical curricular change.

Thus, it should also

be interesting to see how the academic appreciation for
rhetorical education worked out in a more functional
setting.
all.

Further, Morrill did not have higher education at

Thus, it will be informative to see how his rhetoric

matched up with the synthesized pedagogical processes
Johnson attests were part of the rhetorical fabric of
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nineteenth century culture.

In short, there is often a link

between prudence and the type of education one has had.
The above studies illustrate the struggles and
transformations that characterized the rhetorical culture of
the nineteenth century.

This rhetorical culture was an

offshoot of the oratorical tradition of instruction and
reflected public, political, and institutional needs.

In

short, we can see that in the nineteenth century the new
professional style and ethos eclipsed the Ciceronian.
(1990)

Cmiel

states, "The nineteenth-century debate over language

was a fight over what kind of personality was needed to
sustain a healthy democracy"

(p. 14) .

He goes on to say

that "the boisterous rhetoric of the nineteenth
century... reflected the increased assertiveness of the
popular audience" (p. 16) .
PREVIEW
As I mentioned, in my dissertation I will investigate
several texts that strongly influenced the educational scene
during the road to the Morrill Act.

The second chapter

contains a literature review that focuses on my theoretical
grounding, and I will also articulate my methodological
perspective.

In Chapter Three I will analyze the text that

best represents the rhetoric against practical education.
This text, the 1828 Yale Report, was a source of great pride
and power for the "classical" camp.

Crane (1963) states,

"...Yale faculty issued an uncompromising defense of the
prescribed curriculum and the residential college, which
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remained the chief reliance of educational conservatives
until after the Civil War"

(p. 83) .

In Chapter Four I will

analyze one of Francis Wayland's major rhetorical works, his
Report to the Corporation of Brown University (1850) .

In

Chapter Five I will investigate Jonathan Baldwin Turner's
Plan for an Industrial University, for the State of Illinois

(1851).

Writing of Turner's rhetoric, Crane (1963) says the

piece was "written in homespun style, an assault on the
learned professions... coupled with proposals for
institutional development that forecast the vocational
emphasis of many twentieth century universities"

(p. 172) .

I will center on Morrill's congressional speeches in Chapter
Six.

In the closing chapter I will discuss my results and

the implications of my study.
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CHAPTER
LITERATURE

REVIEW

TWO
AMD

METHOD

INTRODUCTION
Many present day scholars return to historical oratory
to better understand the nature of rhetoric and its impact
on historical change and institutional structures.

To

locate the link between prudence and historical discourse is
a current trend in contemporary humanist literature and aids
that project.

Prudence is an ancient concept.

and Cicero discussed it.

Aristotle

Many contemporary works on the

concept have taken a historical approach.

For instance,

Pocock (1975), Kahn (1985), and Garver (1987) each
historicize prudence in their own way.

Hariman (1991)

focuses on the link between prudence and performance to
insist that rhetors practice prudence in and through
rhetoric.

Many rhetorical critics locate the concept as a

take-off point for their analyses.

Most recently, Wilson

(1998) uses the idea of prudence to examine the
Congressional debate over civil rights in the late
nineteenth century Reconstruction period.

It is my hope to

continue the conversation about prudence and its
relationship to rhetorical discourse.
begin with my literature review.

In this chapter I

I touch on the theoretical

link between prudence and rhetoric, and on recent examples
of rhetorical criticism employing the concept of prudence.
After my literature review, I will offer an explanation of
my methodology.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Phronesis

If prudence has a theoretical heritage, it begins in
the classic notion of phronesis.

While some scholars, like

Ross (1980), translate "phronesis" as practical wisdom,
others, like Welldon (1987), translate it to prudence.
Hariman (1991) supports this translation, as do the other
scholars I depend on in my literature review.

Thus, I use

Welldon's translation for my review of Aristotle's
theoretical sense of prudence, though we should note that
prudence and practical wisdom are primarily, at least
theoretically, the same thing.
Aristotle spent a good portion of Book Six in his
Nicomachean Ethics pointing out his take on the theoretical

meaning of prudence.

For Aristotle, prudence was one of

many ways to arrive at truth.

The others were art, science,

wisdom, and intuitive reason.

In a moment of immense

clarity, Aristotle said that "We may ascertain the nature of
prudence by considering who are the people whom we call
prudent" (p. 191) .

To Aristotle, prudence was the ability

to deliberate effectively and expediently on one's own
behalf.

Another way of putting it is that if one

deliberated successfully in light of situational
constraints, then that person was automatically prudent.
To further account for the theoretical idea of
prudence, Aristotle compared it to other ideas from his

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

theoretical corpus.

Prudence was not an art, neither was it

a science:
— not a science, because the sphere of action is
variable and not an art, because all art is productive
and action is generally different from production.
It
remains therefore that prudence should be a true
rational and practical state of mind in the field of
human good and evil; for while the end of production is
different from the production itself, it is not so with
action, as right action is itself an end (Aristotle,
192, Welldon's emphasis).
What is most significant in the quote is that prudence was
an end in itself.
excellence.

Also, prudence was a type of virtue or

It was part of the rational soul; the part

dealing with the variable.

Thus, it was a practical virtue.

Additionally, prudence was like political wisdom, but
not exactly.

One could have political wisdom, but not

necessarily embody practical wisdom.

In Welldon's (1987)

translation, Aristotle said that "A person who understands
and studies his own interests is generally looked upon as
prudent, while politicians are looked upon as busybodies"
(p.198) .

Prudence was also different from intelligence

because intelligence made distinctions between things, while
prudence issued commands through effective deliberation.
General wisdom, too, was a bit different from prudence
because prudence regarded happiness.

Prudence was also

different from cleverness, but could not exist without it.
Aristotle thought that people often applied the term
prudence to the same people considered as having good
judgment, intelligence, intuitive reason, cleverness, and
all the other modes of coming to truth.

Thus, there was an
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assumption that prudence could encompass these other
notions, though it was still different.
Most importantly, prudence assumed a morality and a
wisdom.

Aristotle said that "It is clear from what has been

said that goodness in the proper sense is impossible without
prudence, and prudence without moral virtue"
Prudence gave birth to wisdom.

(p. 210) .

Aristotle revealed that

"prudence is not the mistress of wisdom or of the better
part of the soul.. .For prudence does not employ wisdom, but
aims at producing it; nor does it rule wisdom, but rules in
wisdom's interest"

(p. 211, Welldon's emphasis).

Even

still, Aristotle thought wisdom was superior to prudence.
Aristotle stated,

"It would seem paradoxical that prudence,

although inferior to wisdom should enjoy a higher authority"
(p. 206) . Its higher authority sprang from the fact that
humans lived in a contingent political world.
Aristotle's notion of prudence is important to my study
primarily because he suggested that prudence is practical,
occurs in deliberation, assumes moral virtue, wisdom, and
encompasses other concepts such as political virtue.

Kalin

(1985) thinks that Aristotle devised his dialectic syllogism
based on common opinion and consensus and that the
syllogism's authority sprang from a practical epistemology
guided by a sense of prudence.

This is to say that the

syllogism found authority in the decemment of a truth in a
contingent sphere in which "what all believe to be true is
actually true" (p. 32) .

Theoretically, then, even though
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prudence was practical and situational, it was also
communal.

It was a social construct.

Cicero also examined prudence.

The standard of

judgment that empowered Cicero's orator was goodness.
Moreover, one of Cicero's central rhetorical concepts was
decorum.

Generally, decorum, from a rhetorical perspective,

means adhering to discursive obligations.

Goodness, or

morality, and decorum could not conflict, according to
Cicero (Kahn, 1985). In the Orator, Cicero wrote that an
"orator must have an eye to propriety [decorum] , not only in
thought but in language...The universal rule, in oratory as
in life, is to consider propriety"

(cited in Kahn, p. 34).

Kahn argues that Cicero thought that political decorum and
prudence were one in the same.
Articulating Cicero's view, Kahn (1985) states,

"And

while he first opposes prudence to theoretical wisdom as
Aristotle does, he goes beyond Aristotle when he argues for
the superiority of prudence on the grounds that it is
concerned with action rather than contemplation"

(p. 35) .

From this perspective, prudence shaped moral or ethical
choice in the realm of the contingent.

In a human society,

prudence was more powerful than contemplation.

Cicero

stated in De officiis,
And then, the foremost cf all virtues is wisdom--what
the Greeks call sophia; for by prudence, which they
call phronesis , we understand something else, namely,
the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and
of things to be avoided. ..And service [a function of
prudence] is better than mere theoretical knowledge,
for the study and knowledge of the universe would
somehow be lame and defective, were no practical
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results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best
seen in the safeguarding of human interests.
It is
essential, then, to human society: and it should,
therefore, be ranked above theoretical knowledge (cited
in Kahn, p. 35).
Therefore, Cicero insisted that the prudent person and the
ideal, persuasive orator were synonymous.
Cicero's view of prudence is important to my study
because, even while Aristotle discussed it, Cicero made more
concrete the idea that prudence was the epitome of a good
person speaking persuasively in the realm of the contingent.
The prudent person performed well in life, but his or her
sense of decorum led to appropriate modes of persuasiveness
in rhetorical and political arenas.

The link between

political virtue and prudence is significant because
contemporary scholars appreciate the idea that prudence is
both a mode of discursive practice and political conduct.
This is a key point to remember.
Pocock (1975) studies what he thinks are enduring
traditions of prudential thought.

Pocock's work is

important to my study not only because he flushes out
prudential conventions, but also because Jasinski (1995)
uses Pocock's assertions to argue that in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an "immanent conceptual
struggle" existed between two norms of prudence, prudential
audacity and prudential accommodation.

To Pocock, the

Renaissance handed down these two norms of prudence.
Francesco Guicciardini, in his Dialogo del Reggimento di
Firenze, insisted that a governor be prudent; and to
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Guicciardini that meant waiting on an event and adapting to
it.

However, according to Pocock, Machiavelli thought that

the prince should be assertive.

Pocock suggests that this

pluralistic, yet stable view of prudence became a resource
for rhetorical invention during future controversies.
In her own study of the history of phronesis, or
prudence, Kahn (1985) links up rhetoric, prudence, and
skepticism in the Renaissance.

Throughout the work she

focuses on the rhetorical theories of Renaissance humanists,
Quatrrocento thinkers, Erasmus, Montaigne, and Hobbes, among
others.

Though I have depended greatly on her historical

review, a detailed description of her work and specific
arguments are not relevant to my study.

What is relevant is

that she illustrates how close textual study of historical
texts gives rise to divergent conceptualizations of
prudence.

She thinks that prudence is much like rhetoric in

that its ambivalent moral status is variable.
condemn rhetoric as immoral, like Plato.

One can

One can

subordinate rhetoric to moral judgment and thus justify
rhetoric as the moral use of rhetoric, like Cicero and
Quintilian.
constraints.
or evil.

One can also argue that rhetoric has no
Rhetors can use their persuasive art for good

Prudence is similar.

One can identify it with

theoretical wisdom if one believes absolute Platonic ideals
govern prudence.

One can identify it as an understanding of

good and evil— "what to seek and what to avoid"

(p. 42).

One can identify prudence with the faculty of practical
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reason governed in every case by decorum--"of the best means
to achieve the end at hand" (p. 42) .

Thus, her work

chronicles the variability of prudence throughout the
Renaissance.
Garver (1987) calls prudence a "perennial problem"
6) .

(p.

He thinks that the problem with prudence is "the

problem of practical reason" (p. 7).

More specifically,

Garver thinks that prudence "is the meaning of autonomy,
integrity, and character in a faculty whose primary strength
is responsiveness to circumstances..

(p. 7).

In the

simplest terms, Garvar posits a pivotal question for the
prudent rhetor:

"How can an orator base his [or her]

presentation on what his [or her] audience already believes,
yet persuade them to do what he [or she] wants, not what
they already want?"

(p. 7, his emphasis).

Thus, his

theoretical view of prudence is familiar to u s .
What is more important is that Garvar, like Kahn,
historizes prudence.
histories of prudence.
acts.

He says that there are different
Some can review pardigmatic prudent

Garver does not do this.

is a history of texts.

Instead, Garver's history

He explores the changing role of

ethics and politics when he compares and contrasts
Aristotle's work with Machiavelli's .

Garver (1987) insists

that "the sort of imitation required in the acquisition of
prudence, and the sort of uses of history available in the
practice of prudence, are fundamental dimensions in
prudence’s career..." (p. 164-165).

Prudence has an

37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

external history because its heroes change.

These external

and contingent factors, says Garver, gives rise to an
internal history of practical reasoning; the tactics and
resources also change.

Most significantly, Garver says that

The permanently defeasible and essentially contested
nature of any history of prudence, and the way that
history of prudence must be a history of the embodiment
of practical intelligence in specific roles and
characters, appear most critically in the way shifts in
practical autonomy are connected to the changing
relations between ethics and politics (p. 166) .
I suggest that the changing nature of prudence occurs not
just in a huge sweep of time, but is always contingent in
line with differing perspectives of ethics and politics.
Hariman (1991) offers the most compelling contemporary
theoretical explanation of prudence and its relationship to
rhetorical discourse.

He says that

Phronesis, or prudence, designates the capacity for
effective political response to contingent events. It
arises in deliberation, requires implicit understanding
of the possible, the probable, and the appropriate
within a specific community, and is not reducible to
categorical imperatives, deontologies, or universal
laws (p. 26).

Moreover, Hariman insists that "when we say that someone is
prudent, we often are accounting for how well he or she has
mastered the nuances of a particular art [rhetoric] in order
to perform a script capable of motivating advantageous
responses from an audience"

(p. 27) .

Hariman thinks that

prudence as a form of reasoning emphasizes the significance
of situation, social knowledge, and enthymemes.
We should particularly note that Hariman thinks that
prudence is performative.

Prudential thinking encompasses
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the nuances of a particular political culture, and a prudent
agent weighs strategic calculation with questions of
performative aesthetics or dramatic force.

Prudence is not

an explicit plan one can break off or separate from the
performance of rhetoric.

Prudence lives in and through

stylistic and argumentative performance of a persuasive
effort.

In essence, this is what Hariman means by the

performative nature of prudence.
Further, prudence holds the seeds for successful
rhetorical and political action.

Hariman (1991) says that

"...successful action must be more than the rules specifying
its reproduction, and this difference is fully articulated
only in performance"

(p. 28) . More specifically, Hariman

explains,
To claim that some decision is prudent requires that
one specify an action: it is prudent because it leads
to something desired actually happening, and the
account of why it is prudent has to include description
of each of the elements of action, including (in the
Aristotelian schema) the desire impelling thought, the
calculation of means and of ends, and the continuing
value of the state of character being realized (p. 28) .
The prudent rhetor often explicates the process of action he
or she advocates, but also imitates that action through
rhetorical performance.

Thus, not only must rhetorical

discourse, to be prudent, specify action, but also motivate
action by "activating awareness of and standards for the
aesthetic dimension of political conduct"

(p. 28) .

When a

rhetor enacts prudence through rhetorical performance, this
itself is an advocation of a particular political action.
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Hariman also acknowledges that prudence is rule
governed, but not from a strict rational perspective.
Different from mathematical algorithms or trial by error
heuristics, prudential rules for argument building,
aesthetic force, and action verge on the unruly.
(1991)

Hariman

puts it this way: " ... [P] rudential rules are rules

for designing, predicting, and evaluating an event whose
value will emerge during its successful enactment as a
performance"

(p. 30).

Prudent discourse emerges out of a

dynamic inventional process, but that brand of prudence
comes to life only within the performance of rhetorical
discourse.

During the performance of rhetorical discourse

one can become aware of the negotiation that involves coming
to terms with the available argumentative and aesthetic
dimensions and possibilities within a contingent,
performative culture.

The rhetorical construction of

prudence is itself an interpretation of the available means
of persuasion a performative culture allows.
There are several other important ideas that Hariman
highlights.

First, he illustrates the reciprocal

relationship between the concepts of prudence and decorum.
Again, where decorum accounts for situational obligation,
prudence accounts for the sense of how one comes to terms
with such obligations.

In viewing prudence as a

performative term, Hariman (1991) says one can take stock of
the "alternation between obligatory enactment and reflection
upon one's conventions of display"

(p. 33).

The view that
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prudence is a performative sensibility also stresses the
relationship between morality and gesture.

Symbolic gesture

itself, not motive or consequence, accounts for morality.
In short, a performative conception of prudence stresses
that political decision making is less a process of rational
calculation, but of "improvisation upon conventions of
display." (p. 35).
Hariman's conceptualization of prudence is, in part,
the basis for my understanding of it, and that is why his
brief essay is so important to m y work.

Again, to him, a

prudent rhetor must understand the possible, probable, and
appropriate within a specific rhetorical and political
community, and this sense of prudence comes to life through
rhetorical symbolism.

Prudence symbolically might also come

to life through specific policy action requests, through
illustrations of why such requests are taking place, through
a plan of how it will work, and through indicating the moral
value such an action will evoke.

Still, these policy

requests are not always cut and dry.

Recall that a

significant point I am trying to make is that rhetorical
gesture often develops political policy requests implicitly.
Hariman also thinks that prudence is rule governed, but
not necessarily rationally.

Prudential rules help a rhetor

design his or her rhetoric, predict what will happen with
it, and help an audience evaluate it, but the rules for
these processes will only show up in rhetorical discourse.
Rational generalizations do not ground the rules.
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In fact,

these rules are not rules at all, but rather unstable
cultural guidelines for appropriate rhetorical performance
one gleans from other acts of rhetoric.
We can see from the above discussion that prudence is a
very tricky and complex theoretical concept; this is
probably why only a hand-full of scholars have dared to
study it.

As we glance back through the review we can see

that prudence occurs in successful deliberation, but that it
is more of a virtue than anything else.

We cannot learn

prudence from a book; prudence is as prudence does.
Moreover, to Cicero, prudence encompassed ideas of wisdom
and eloquence in as much as it called for rhetorical
decorum.

However, we also learn that prudence can be

traditional and communal, though always variable.

It is

communal to the extent that it is learned through communal
participation and observation of prudent discourse and acts,
but also that prudence is a stylized repetition of
rhetorical strategies.

Hence, prudence is a discursive

practice and political action.
situational.

Prudence is traditional and

The interpretation of prudence is up for

grabs, but it is also an illustration of strategic
intention.

And when I say, "Up for grabs,

that prudence is totally polysemic.

" I do not mean

A particular act of

rhetorical discourse still limits the ways we can read that
act.
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Prudence and Rhetorical Criticism
As mentioned, Jasinski (1995) used the idea of prudence
to understand and critique Henry Clay's oratory.

Jasinski

argues that the Congressional struggle over slavery in the
mid-nineteenth century was actually a battle between two
different perspectives on what was prudent, given the
complex situation.
mentioned,
audacity."

The views of prudence at odds were, as

"prudential accommodation" and "prudential
Prudential accommodation impelled Clay and other

Congressmen to reason that compromise was the most prudent
way to act.

Clay performed this prudence through his

techniques and strategies.

For instance, Clay valorized the

ontological status of accommodation, created an association
between the Union and constitutional compromise, and
deferred the slavery issue through metonymic logic that
substituted the problem of disunion for slavery.
Importantly, Jasinski, like Hariman, argues that prudence is
a product of rhetorical performance, but that producing a
certain view of prudence (accommodation in this instance)
can limit the possibilities of effectively negotiating a
crisis.

In this dispute over slavery, Jasinski argues that

the situation called for prudential audacity and that Clay's
misreading of the constitutional framers' prudence
contributed to his promotion of accommodation.

As Jasinski

puts it, "It may also be the case that history is open and
contingent.

If that is the case, then a tradition of

prudential accommodation based on deferral, restraint, and
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blind imitation probably contributed to the [the Civil War] "
(p. 473).
Jasinski's research is important to my dissertation in
two ways.

First, Jasinski says that acute controversies

illicit standard norms of prudence.

"A political culture's

dominant form (or forms) of prudence will most likely be
enacted or performed in an effort to resolve a particularly
acute controversy"

(1995, p. 456).

I suggest that the

educational debates during the nineteenth century
accentuated an acute controversy.

As industrialization and

commercialism became dominant modes of cultural discourse,
as regions conflicted and war eventually waged, and as
literary canons controlled the educational scene, something
or someone had to render American higher education relevant.
Second, Jasinski's work displays important characteristics
of nineteenth century political rhetoric.

In the process of

promoting any sort of federal action, he says that a
nineteenth century rhetor "was obliged to engage in
constitutional hermeneutics:

they needed to subvert rival

constructions of the Constitution and federal power...while
affirming that the government possessed the power to do what
was proposed"

(p. 462).

The Morrill Act is an example of

this interplay.
However, though Jasinski's rhetorical critique offers
valuable insight for the student of rhetoric and prudence, I
think he misses something.

Echoing Wilson's (1998)

sentiment, Jasinski treats prudence as too stable.
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In other

words, he takes the performative traditions for granted.
Jasinski implies that all prudential outlooks are either
accommodating or audacious.

But rhetoric is an innovative

art and rhetoricians are egocentric.
call his or her rhetoric imprudent.

A rhetor would not
There is a multiplicity

of prudential resources even as there are prudential norms.
Another recent rhetorical critique using prudence is
Levasseur's re-examination of Edmund Burke's rhetorical art.
Critiquing Burke's private correspondence, Levasseur depicts
the struggle between prudential and heroic functions of
rhetoric in attempt to account for Burke1s ironic place in
the history of rhetorical discourse; scholars view him as a
rhetorical genius, yet many of his persuasive efforts were
not successful.

To Levasseur (1997), Edmund Burke's

rhetorical discourse "is an apt illustration of the frequent
tension that exists between rhetoric's prudential and
existential functions...[and how] the collision of these two
functions can generate discourse which is at war with
itself"

(p. 334) .

and practical.

Levasseur equates prudence with the good

Heroic rhetoric corresponds to an

existential function.

Through rhetorical discourse rhetors

constitute their "very beings"

(p. 336).

Levasseur argues

that while Burke's rhetoric was both prudential and heroic,
the heroic function usually won out:

"Burke was rather

successful at elevating his personal standing with discourse
which failed to meet its explicit persuasive goal"
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(p. 345).

Thus, Burke is a mainstay rhetorical hero, yet he often did
not move his immediate audiences.
Levasseur's project is important to my research in one
important way.

Levasseur emphasizes the important and

complex role of prudence in the process of rhetorical
invention.

To him, prudence is both good and practical, and

in "rhetorical practice, this tradeoff between principles
and pragmatism translates into a dialectical tension between
adaptation and constancy"

(1997, p. 335).

How can a rhetor

use the expected norms, yet innovate for the sake of unique
immediate concerns?

The rhetor's view of what is prudent

helps flush out this inventional process.
However, even as Levasseur points out the complex
nature of prudence, I still think that he makes it out to be
too simple.

I agree with Wilson (1998) when he states,

"I

do not dispute Levasseur's reading per se, but I do question
his dichotomy that implies a settled and widely accepted
notion of what is prudent"

(p. 133).

Levasseur does not

express an appreciation for the dynamic and multiplistic,
yet normative nature of prudence as a performative tradition
of political expression.

It might have been prudent to be

heroic.
Browne (1997) thinks that Daniel Webster's fictional
speech within a speech during his eulogy to Thomas Jefferson
and John Adams was a sign of Webster's prudence.

During the

speech, Webster offered a sort of "sub-speech" he attributed
to Adams, but which Webster composed.

Browne says that
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Webster wanted to transmit cultural knowledge through
prudential display.
Browne uses Lyotard's understanding of how narrative
tradition helps generate cultural knowledge.

Lyotard offers

pragmatic rules that help generate a social bond through
cultural narrative.

These rules include "know-how,"

"knowing how to speak," and "knowing how to listen" (p. 41).
Know-how is a symbolic standard of action and a celebration
of quick, practical wisdom in a specific community.
Browne,

To

"Know-how is thus displayed as a quality of

character as much as of mind, and it is evident in the
actor's successful negotiation between principle and
expedience.

It is a sign of prudence"

(p. 41).

Browne

thinks that Webster illustrated "knowing how to speak"
through celebrating the orator-as-hero and attributing
rhetorical eloquence to character and oratorical authority.
Eloquence and authority merge when eloquence "gives to great
action its fitting expression" (p. 41).

Considering the

last criterion, Browne thinks that Webster suggested that
listening properly meant to study and learn from the past:
"As Webster commemorates Adams he in effect celebrates
himself, at least as an exemplar of republic competence, and
teaches others that in listening well the good citizen
learns to remember"

(p. 42).

I do not specifically use Lyotard's scheme in my
dissertation.

Nevertheless, Browne's essay is essential to

mine because it appreciates the communal nature of prudence.
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The essay also suggests that prudence emerges out of
rhetorical action.
Leff (1997) also employs the idea of prudence when he
suggests that Jane Addams appropriated Lincoln as a
prudential hero in order to help diffuse the Pullman strike
of 1894.

Leff's project is to locate uses of Lincoln as an

important symbol of national identity in rhetoric after his
assassination.

Leff argues that the symbolic Lincoln became

a resource for rhetorical invention,

"but a pliable resource

that could be constructed and adapted to fit a variety of
political purposes and ideological agendas"

(p. 135) .

Pullman thought Lincoln's own explicit values were a fixed
code.

However, Addams altered Lincoln's values for the

moment at hand.

She did not reproduce Lincoln, but imitated

his authority in new forms.

Though Leff does not explicitly

make the point, to be prudential means appropriating or
imitating past rhetorical gestures in new forms for present
circumstances.

That is why his work is important to mine.

Wilson (1998) argues that prudence is not a stable,
unchanging concept or practice, but a contested space:
Not only does it demand a balance between the ideal
good and the practically possible, political rhetoric
remakes prudence so that it coincides with the
speaker's position... Prudence, then, is a coveted space
of legitimacy that [political rhetors] attempt to
occupy by discursively controlling its meaning" (p.
133) .
Focusing on the civil rights debate between 1874-1875,
Wilson argues that the battle over civil rights during
Reconstruction was a competition between different meanings
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of prudence.

By performing different images of the past and

present within their texts, the rhetors implied different
forms of prudence.

These different perspectives, Wilson

charges, contributed to different views about desegregation.
Wilson explains that the differing textual contexts "implied
divergent norms for political judgment and discursive
practice...Each side articulated a different vision of the
then and the now, and these expressions led to opposing
ideas about the wisdom of desegregation"

(p. 137).

In

short, the Southern Democrats saw racism as a personal error
that individual maturation could remedy.

On the other hand,

the Republicans saw it as a systemic cultural problem.
Thus, these contrasting visions of prudential action led to
the separate but equal doctrine, the doctrine that
established "equal" public accommodations for African
Americans, but maintained segregation.
Wilson's essay is important to my dissertation not only
because he emphasizes prudence as implicit and dynamic, but
also because he links prudence with social change.

Wilson

(1998) concludes that
Social change...has links to the variability of
prudence. Because rhetoric refashions prudence in
every moment of practice, a progressive articulation
may rework the norms that inform the practice. From
this perspective, political judgment theory becomes a
useful perspective to illumine the evolution of a
rhetorical culture and community" (p. 132).
Though Scott and Smith (1969) imply that principles such as
prudence can impede confrontation and change, Wilson says
that, "In every communicative act, prudence may be a
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conservative or progressive influence on the norms that
guide its articulation"

(p. 145).

Moreover, I think Wilson is pretty much on the mark
when he says that "sharp boundaries between prudent and
imprudent rhetoric...underrate the dynamic elements that
make the concept an important window into rhetorical theory
and practice"

(1998, p. 133).

I agree that critics must

interpret the dynamic workings of rhetorical discourse and
that prudence is indeed re-fashioned through rhetorical
practice.

Because prudence is at the heart of rhetorical

invention, the prudential process a rhetor advocates is the
window into understanding the artistic process of invention.
What Wilson misses, however, is the idea that prudential
conventions are often communal.
his research.

This,

I think, is a flaw in

Again, we need to appreciate prudence as

communal and thus as a rhetorical resource, but prudence is
also up for grabs from an interpretive perspective.
METHOD
I will use a textual methodology to uncover the
implicit views of prudence alive in the rhetoric I will
investigate.

While I agree with the foundational premises

of textual criticism, my research is more in line with
Jasinski's (1997) stand on the interpretive practice.

In

the effort of making the method clear, let us take a look at
this brand of rhetorical analysis from a historical
perspective.
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Textual Criticism
Textual criticism received a great deal of interest in
the late 1980's and early 1990's and continues to offer the
critic a valuable tool for getting inside rhetorical
discourse.

Leff (1986), in his encomium to G. P. Mohrmann,

illustrates the basic nature of textual criticism.

As he

puts it, textual criticism is generally
The close reading and rereading of the text, the
analysis of the historical and biographical
circumstances that generate and frame its composition,
the recognition of basic conceptions that establish the
co-ordinates of the text, and an appreciation of the
way these conceptions interact within the text and help
determine its temporal movement (p. 380) .
The methodological process seeks to flush out the
relationship between the textual, internal rendition of the
external situation and the historical circumstances.

To

Leff, "The central task of textual criticism is to
understand how rhetorical action affect[s] this negotiation,
how the construction of a symbolic event invites a
reconstruction of the events to which it refers"

(p. 385,

his emphasis).
In many cases this method was, and still is,
problematically stabilized into a search for the text's
context.

Concerning this notion of "textual context," Lucas

(1988) states that, "Based on the understanding that
rhetorical discourses are temporal phenomena, it holds that
a text creates its own internal context as it unfolds in
time and is processed by a listener or reader" (p. 249).
text creates the context.

It creates and contains various
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A

circumstances, temporality, characters, and norms of action.
The method, then, seeks to better understand the temporal
flow of rhetorical characteristics within the text and how
this progressive flow interacts with the audience to suggest
a way of seeing.

Lucas goes on to say that

The benefit of close textual analysis is that it
allows the critic, in essence, to "slow down" the
action within the text so as to keep its evolving
internal context in sharp focus and to allow more
precise explication of its rhetorical artistry" (p.
249) .
The methodological vantage point described above holds
an important assumption: rhetorical oratory is time-bound.
In a sense, immediate concerns and audiences imprison
rhetoric.

Yet, though a rhetorical text must adhere to the

history outside the text, it also holds an internal history.
Rhetoric develops in time through discursive progression.
Leff (1986) contends that
Every rhetorical text is a particular construction that
unfolds in time as it is written or spoken and as it is
processed by a listener or reader. The rhetorical
text, then, is a historical development occurring
within a broader context of historical developments.
However circumscribed by extrinsic events, the text
retains an internal history of its own (pp. 384-385) .
As mentioned, in his monograph on the contested space
of prudence, Wilson (1998) uses Lucas' and Leff's notion of
"textual context" to interpret prudence.

Taking this view

of textual criticism and the idea of "textual context,"
Wilson reconstructs the way the texts of the civil rights
debate during Reconstruction advanced a specific past,
present, and future.

As his rational for this method,

Wilson (1998) argues,

"Prudence requires an apprehension of
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circumstances and an anticipation of potential futures"

(p.

134) . Wilson continues, “To appreciate the prudence
articulated by the Democrats and conservative Republicans
who opposed desegregation, it is necessary to recover the
reality that their discourse created— that is, their
rhetoric's textual context" (p. 134).
However, Jasinski (1997) thinks that "rethinking the
relationship between context and text may help stimulate
thicker interpretive practice" (p. 205).

Jasinski's problem

with the textual context process is the assumption of a
stable context.

Jasinski criticizes Lucas when he contends

that Lucas's "version of particularism contributes to a
[sic] set of interlocked assumptions that constitute the
instrumental tradition"

(p. 210) . As Jasinski has it, this

instrumental condition includes:
A mode of contextualization that assumes situational
stability, a sense of agency that assumes that
intentions are unambiguous, fully present, and capable
of directing textual production, and a sense of the
text that assumes its coherence and its ability to
represent authorial intention fully and without
significant distortion (p. 210) .
The goal, then, should not be to stabilize the particular,
but illustrate the multiplicity in the particular.
The way he seems to do this methodologically is to
uncover performative traditions embedded in rhetorical
discourse. This process is not only a good way to answer my
first question, but I also think it is an addition to our
theoretical understanding of prudence.

We theoretically

understand prudence better, or at least differently, when we
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accept it as a type of performative tradition.
(1997) says,

Jasinski

“Performative traditions are a promising

context in that they constitute the conditions of discursive
possibility or, in the neo-Aristotelian idiom, the available
means of persuasion" (p. 212).
To Jasinski, there are four things that help define and
label a performative tradition.

First, "a performative

tradition is embodied in a linguistic idiom or language" (p.
213).

Certain types of terms and specific words ground

certain traditions.

Rhetors use these terms and words to

give meaning to or describe the tradition.

For instance,

Jasinski says that civic republicanism is embodied in terms
of value, like virtue, and opprobrium, like corruption.
Second,

"a performative tradition is enacted through

particular speaking voices"

(p. 213).

It would be difficult

for a wealthy suburbanite to enact the performative norms of
inner city poverty.

Third,

"a performative tradition is

marked by various figurative and argumentative patterns and
structure"

(p. 213).

Jasinski says that the locus of the

existent marks the performative tradition of
accommodationist prudence.

Last,

"a performative tradition

is perpetuated by a range of textual practices and organized
into generic forms that are structured through generic
conventions"

(p. 214).

As Bercovitch (1978) observed,

Puritanism uses the jeremiad.

In other words, certain

traditions rely on certain genres of speech.
according to Jasinski (1997),

Hence,

we can say that prudence is a
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resource for rhetorical invention because it is a
performative tradition that occurs within a language
context.

And a "language context is most appropriately

understood as an ongoing process of creating and diffusing
multiple idioms or modes of speaking"

(p. 210).

Prudence is

itself a layered mode of speaking.
More specifically, prudence is a performative tradition
because certain words and phrases— idioms--essentially
embody certain modes of prudence.

Also, specific voices

enact certain traditions of prudence.

Certain traditions of

prudence rely on marked figurative and argumentative
structure.

Prudence, because it concerns the process of

appropriate political judgment, is most usually dependent on
epideictic genres, though most genres are never pure.
However, I do not see prudence as just one of many
performative traditions.

Because of the nature of prudence,

I argue that prudence is a master performative tradition.
Even while there are different modes of prudence— like
accomodationist prudence or audacious prudence— in whatever
shape or form prudence takes it orchestrates the process of
rhetorical invention.

Prudence, as such a performative

tradition, is the process of interplay between a rhetor's
textual interpretation of the available means of persuasion
and the contextual limitations on those available means of
persuasion.
Therefore, while I agree with Wilson's (1998) stance
that prudence is not an "a priori reflection of cultural
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expectations"

(p. 133) , his sense of the stability of an

internal textual context which then implies a perspective of
prudence troubles me.

Wilson argues that it is the text's

rendition of a past, present, and future, what he calls a
"vision," that implies divergent norms of political judgment
and discursive practice.

This procedure seems not to

appreciate the fluid nature of the text, its inside context,
and its outside context.
needs help.

Wilson's method is good, but it

Wilson's method allows me to answer my second

question, but not my first.

The cultural norms of political

judgment and discursive practice embedded in performative
tradition help craft the way rhetors see certain situations.
In the inventional process, the multiplicity of resources is
not unending.
tradition.

Innovation cannot stray too far from

In short, prudence as an orchestrating

performative tradition is implicit within the rhetorical
elements in a text that, then, help construct an internal
temporality.
Hence, my method is a sort of play between a neo
classical, intentionalist approach, and one, as Jasinski
(1997) recommends, that de-centers the rhetorical agent to
focus on the text/context relationship apart from
intentionality.

And this seems to be a useful way to go.

Hariman (1997) thinks that a combination of neo-classical
thought, and post-structural analysis invigorates the study
of public oratory.
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Neo-classical approaches to oratory focus on an
individual speech and a specific situation, and how this
speech supplies an argument for a tangible political policy
or defines some aspect of civic culture.
Poststructuralists, on the other hand, get away from all
this and desire to analyze the social structure and a
broader process of discursive creation and reception.
Generally, poststructuralists emphasize the fragmentation of
discursive practice, the limited role of individual rhetors,
and the dispensability of particular texts.
Hariman (1997) thinks a middle of the road approach
might look to the relationship between prudence and decorum;
decorum, again, being situational obligations.

However,

single versions of prudence or decorum are short-lived.
Cultural pluralism disallows it.

Thus, Hariman thinks that

to study oratory one must give an "eye to its imitation"

(p.

173) .
The middle ground is focusing on the imitation of
persuasive artistry for specific, situational expectations.
More specifically, Hariman (1997) says that "Instead of
attention to the striking turn of phrase, the critical
interest should be in the strategic value of particular
persuasive designs that become widely available for use in a
myriad of situations" (p. 175).

And how particular

persuasive designs are themselves imitations of past
rhetorical art.

I want to understand how certain senses of

prudence, implicit within the texts I analyze, are

57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

themselves imitations of communal norms of prudential
thinking.
Another way of saying all this is that the middle
ground method is really an attempt to capture both grounds.
Thus my study of prudence looks something like Watson’s
(1997) recent study.

In her study of the Sentiments of the

1833 American Anti-Slavery Society, Watson finds a middle
ground between viewing a text as a symbolic whole and as an
intertextual phenomenon.

She argues that the Declaration of

Independence was a textual influence on later American

Declarations.

She also argues that "historically rhetors

have been the interpreters of texts to their own strategic
ends"

(p. 92).

Even iconic texts are in the process of

intertextual play.

However, I also think that my study

looks something like Henry's (1997) investigation of William
Lloyd Garrison's 1833 Declaration of Sentiments through
close textual analysis.

He concludes that the Declaration

is an outgrowth of Garrison's personal history and immediate
anti-slavery persuasive goals.
words, instrumental rhetoric.

The Declaration is, in other
It is purposeful discourse,

shaped with intent by the rhetor, to persuade a specific
audience, in response to immediate situational concerns.
I view rhetorical texts as wholes.

I think we ought to

focus on specific texts that rhetors intended as responses
to specific situations.

However, those texts are also

intertextual to the extent that, in line with Leff (1997),
they appropriate past prudential voices in certain ways.
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spgcigj-c Application
I organize each chapter, and each analysis, using a set
methodological process in attempts to understand the
prudence implicit in each discourse and how that prudence
impacts persuasive art.

In each of the following chapters I

will offer, first, a general introduction that attempts to
capture the key exigencies the rhetors faced.

Next, I will

supply a general textual description; a summary.

This is

important because it will illustrate the basic pedagogical
policy each rhetor advocated.

We must assume that each

rhetor thought that his policy was prudent.
After that, I will take Jasinski's (1997) advice and
try to recover a representation of prudence as a
performative tradition.
first question.

Again, this will help me answer my

I will focus in on the important figurative

and argumentative aspects of a text; these figurative images
and argumentative patterns that gave life to prudential
traditions and possible innovations.

This process will be a

sort of back and forth interplay between the artistic
elements of the text and the aesthetic traditions of
discourse available to the rhetor.

In other words, in light

of Jasinski’s description of performative traditions, I will
attempt to illustrate the tradition or innovation within the
text.

During this effort I will often use words like

"actualize" or "enact" because a notion of prudence is alive
within discursive symbolism.

During this effort I will also
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use various "sub-methods" to help me account for persuasive
art.

I will describe those methods when I get to them.
Next, I will show how the text's artistry and the view

of prudence it offers generated a vision of the past,
present, and future within the text; its textual context.

I

will illustrate how the performative tradition(s) of
prudence worked within the text and orchestrates the
multiplistic nature of rhetorical invention within a
temporal framework; the framework of the rhetoric and the
reality it created for immediate rhetorical purposes.
Simply put, this method will illustrate how the marker's of
the text's prudence played out within a temporal framework
and helped (re)negotiate the historical context; it helps me
answer my second question.
Finally, I will underscore the implicit prudence within
each text, but evaluate the limitation or aid its prudential
outlook afforded given the texts' historical, cultural
context.

This will be an attempt to fold the text back into

its historical grounding, both discursively and politically,
to figure out its rhetorical consequence.

While I will, to

some extent, discuss the rhetoric's successfulness or
unsuccessfulness, I certainly understand that such labels
are difficult to make.
Further, in this final section I will also attempt to
grapple with Hall's (1980) idea of encoding and decoding and
the different types of "readings" an audience or specific
receivers might develop.

From my understanding, all Hall
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means by encoding is the meaning an author embeds in a
message, and decoding is what an audience gets out of that
message.

However, an author might intend one thing, but an

audience member decodes it another way all together.
Moreover, the term "reading" is complex because it connotes
a sophisticated process of not just decoding, but organizing
meaning from a message to fit one's individualized scheme of
reality.

In my dissertation I will not attempt to offer a

"cultural study."

I do not necessarily consider myself a

structuralist, or poststructuralist, or ethnographer, or
semiotician.

And I am obviously not studying media culture.

Yet, Hall's project is useful to anyone studying
communication.
His project is useful mainly because of his ideas of
dominant or preferred, negotiated, and oppositional
readings.

By a dominant or preferred meaning, Hall (1980)

means communication that is perfectly transmitted,

"or as

close as we are likely to come..." (p. 136)— a rhetor
intends a certain message, and the "reader" gets that same
message.

A negotiated meaning is a mixture of adaptive and

oppositional elements.

Finally, an oppositional reading is

one that decodes "the message in a globally contrary way"
(p. 138, his emphasis).
are negotiated.

I should note that most readings

Very rarely do we completely accommodate to

the speaker's message and very rarely do we receive a
completely different intention.

In sum, these ideas will

help me consider the impact of the rhetor's prudence and
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persuasive art.

I will not use his ideas as a method, but

as a simple guide to direct my thinking about possible
interpretations of prudence in rhetorical action.
I think through all of these methodological layers of
analysis I can best see how struggles over prudential
discursive practice impacts historical political and
pedagogical action.

Again, the first critical exercise

attempts to capture prudence as a performative tradition.
It illustrates how the text's symbolic gestures were
imitative and/or innovative.
instrumental.

The textual context is more

It more closely looks at how the norm of

prudence in the text helps constructed an internal reality,
but also how that norm of prudence impacted political
consideration.

The last step goes back to figure out the

historical impact of that sense of prudence implicit in the
text performatively and temporally.
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CHAPTER
THE

THREE

"YALE REPORT"

OF

1828

INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores a pivotal report authored by
Yale's president, Jeremiah Day, and ancient language
professor, James L. Kingsley, and the report's impact on the
academic battle waged during the early nineteenth century.
Again, this battle concerned the unsteady function of
American higher education in an increasingly industrialized,
commercial society.

On one side stood the reformers or

progressives, who wanted an American system of higher
education fitted for the perceived practical realities of an
industrialized era:

choice in the curriculum and practical

education for the masses.

On the other side, classicist

conservatives wished to preserve the literary tradition.

As

I mentioned, the conservatives seemed to be winning the
debate in the early nineteenth century.

The conservatives

thought that a classical education was the ideal form of
pedagogy no matter what societal changes were occurring
outside the college (Butts, 1939, p. 116).
I mentioned in Chapter One that Harvard, early on,
experimented with progressive pedagogy.

George Tickner,

Harvard's president during the early nineteenth century,
supplied a voice of reform.

The changes he desired included

opening up Harvard to students not seeking degrees,
developing departmental systems, and allowing some choice of
curriculum for students. He helped bring an elective
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principle to Harvard.

Though Harvard's progressivism

declined under future conservative college presidents,
Tickner's ideas provoked Yale's faculty and administrators
to ponder such progressive changes at their institution.
Thus, in light of Harvard's move to make ancient
languages and the classics elective, some at Yale proposed a
similar change.

The trustees of Yale asked Day and Kingsley

to comment.

X suggest that they had to meet a couple of key

exigencies.

Obviously, they had to quiet the shouting down

of classical education as impractical.

They had to

illustrate that the ancient languages mattered.

Also, Yale

was the stronghold of orthodox Congregationalism and was a
model for many denominational colleges springing up in the
West.

Thus, they had to tie together orthodox religious

ideals with a classical education.

Originally published for

the public in 1829 in the American Journal of Science and
the Arts , what Day and Kingsley came up with is today

considered one of the most powerful defenses of classic,
literary education: "Yale explicitly and forcefully
formulated, in opposition to Harvard's position, the
doctrine that a liberal education can be attained only by
following a strictly prescribed college curriculum based
upon considerations of mental discipline"

(Butts, 1939, p.

119) .
In the first section of this chapter, I will give a
brief summary of the report.

Second, I will analyze the

emergence of prudence in the text.

Third, I will analyze
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the text's textual context.

Finally, I will evaluate the

report and the sense of prudence implicit within it.

I will

suggest that Day and Kingsley's conception of prudence both
hindered and helped their rhetorical effort.
SUMMARY
The authors arranged the report in two major
sections.
second.

Day authored the first section and Kingsley the
The over-riding policy action they advocated, in

both sections, was continuing the tradition of literary
education at Yale.
modern languages.

They desired to beat back the tide of
In the report, Day dealt mostly with what

he called the "object" of collegiate education, while
Kingsley focused on the particular struggle between ancient
and modern languages.
Day (1829) understood a college's mission as laying a
foundation for future studies, not to finish a student's
education.

Day grounded this foundation in vigor, balance,

authority, and, by necessity, suitable buildings.

Moreover,

part of that foundation was a balanced approach to
instruction.

Day wanted study in science balanced out by

study in literature.

A balanced mechanism for instruction

gave symmetry to the foundation Day was building.

However,

though Day desired educational balance, students in his
scheme marched the same steps.

This devotion to a thorough

education differentiated the literary education from the
professional.

To Day, one attained practical information

with little mental effort.

A student acquired a literary
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education, on the other hand, only from seemingly endless
mental drudgery.
superficial.

To Day, any other type of education was

Further, those schools in the United States

desiring to copy practical European institutions without
caution ran the risk of diminishing the thoroughness of a
literary education.

Finally, Day linked a thorough,

classical education with an elevated character.

The

practical arts, like farming, should begin not in practical
measures, but in foundational classics to help build an
elevated character.

If American institutions were to ignore

the classical foundation, they would be disavowing the
country's destiny of greatness in all spheres of public
culture, and the nation would crumble.
Kingsley (1829) supported Day's ideas by comparing a
liberal education to the foundational elements of
mathematics in under standing the workings of the physical
world and the ancient perfection of Greek architecture.

He

wrote that a person educated in the literary classics could
assert themselves over the artisans.

Furthermore, Kingsley

claimed that ancient languages were more practical than
m o d e m ones because the world was partly literary and those
who desired to participate in it needed to realize the value
of ancient literature.

Also, ancient languages were simply

the foundation of many professional studies.

To substitute

m o d e m languages for ancient languages resulted in a
superficial education.

Additionally, Kingsley argued that

the public did not really demand m o d e m languages. Those who
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desired it sought out every new fad.

Finally, to Kingsley,

a literary education led to public notoriety.
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT
The policy Day and Kingsley advocated was to perpetuate
the pedagogical status quo at Yale.

They apparently thought

this was prudent pedagogical action.

Day and Kingsley

enacted this idea, or invented it symbolically, through,
first, specific metaphorical concepts.

The authors offered

structural, light and dark, and nature metaphors and so
encouraged a certain way of seeing classical and practical
education.

Second, Day and Kingsley also constructed a

sense of prudence by making classical education a vehicle
for moral development both for the individual and,
consequently, society.

Rhetorically, they did this

specifically by employing the sacred/secular metaphors of
"taste" and "genius," metaphors used by Yale's former
president Timothy Dwight.

Thus, while the Yale Report is a

secular, educational epideictic, I also contend that the
authors engaged a performative homiletic tradition framed by
the ideas of Dwight.
Metaphor
Ivie (1989) says that "In the most important uses of
metaphor, as a source of rhetorical invention, a term (or
'vehicle') from one domain of meaning acts upon a subject
(or 'tenor') from another domain" (p. 199) .

As the vehicle

and tenor interact, the number of ways one can see or read a
rhetorical text becomes limited.

The interaction of vehicle
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and tenor directs one’s attention to a certain place.
(1968) calls this idea "terministic incentive"

Burke

(p. 45).

For

Burke, metaphors incite a reader to see the text from a
certain perspective.
As I mentioned, there were three clusters of vehicles
Day and Kingsley used to create a particular vision of
classical and practical education.

The first was a

STRUCTURE cluster consisting of such terms as "foundation,"
"solid," "balance," "finish," "superstructure," "furniture,"
"pillar," and "superficial."

Though one might consider

"solid" a dark-light metaphor, the authors used it as a
positive metaphoric descriptor of a structure; no one wants
a building that is not "solid."

Likewise, no one wants a

building that is "superficially" constructed.

Moreover, the

term "balance" metaphorically reinforced the idea of a
"solid” structure, something that will not "fall."
Additionally, the term "finish" supported Day's assertions
because Day did not think Yale ought to be in the business
of "finishing" any sort of structure.

These images, or

vehicles, helped Day and Kingsley describe classical
education, the tenor, and its premises.

Consequently, they

also gave practical education a pretty bad rap.
There are several examples of the "foundation" metaphor
in association with the "balance" metaphor.

For instance,

Day (1829) asserted that the object of a literary college
like Yale was "to LAY THE FOUNDATION of a SUPERIOR
EDUCATION..."

(p. 300, his emphasis).

Classical education
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maintained this "object" through strict toil of all mental
faculties.

Day stated, "A costly edifice ought not to be

left to rest upon a single pillar" (p. 301). Thus, Day also
thought that "in the course of instruction in this college,
it has been an object to maintain such a proportion between
the different branches of literature and science, as to form
in the student a proper balance of character"

(p. 301, his

emphasis).
The "foundation" metaphor ruled the pages of the
report.

The other STRUCTURE metaphors seemed also to

congregate around the term "foundation."

Using constant

repetition, Day declared that a literary education "is far
from embracing everything which the student will ever have
occasion to learn.

The object is not to finish his

education; but to lay the foundation, and to advance as far
in rearing the superstructure..." (p. 308, his emphasis).
And again, "Our object is not to teach that which is
peculiar to any one of the professions; but to lay the
foundation which is common to them all"
of students, Day asserted,

(p. 308) .

Speaking

"They should not be sent, as we

think, with an expectation of finishing their education at
the college; but with a view of laying a thorough foundation
in the principles of science, preparatory to the study of
the practical arts" (p. 310, his emphasis).
Further, Yale offered "...solid attainments"
Kingsley, 1829, p. 321).

(Day and

The country needed classical

education, because "there is perhaps no nation whose
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interests would be more deeply affected, by a substitution
of superficial for solid learning"

(p. 322).

A general DARK-LIGHT cluster supported the STRUCTURE
cluster and revealed further how Day and Kingsley enacted
their prudence textually.

The DARK-LIGHT cluster included

such images as "elevated," "high," "thorough," "down,"
"low," "partial" and "blind."

Day and Kingsley almost

always associated the term "solid" with an "elevated" or
"enlightened" way of seeing.

Moreover, I consider

"thorough" this type of vehicle because it indicated a
clarity in seeing.

Throughout the report, Day and Kingsley

associated practical education with the dark and classical
education with the light.
We see this when Day explained that people of "mere
practical detail are wanted, in considerable numbers... but
the higher stations require enlightened and comprehensive
views"

(1829, p. 311).

Recall that Day and Kingsley wanted

all literary students to follow the same steps.

Why?

"To

this we answer, that our prescribed course contains those
subjects only which ought to be understood, as we think, by
every one who aims at a thorough education."

(p. 312, my

emphasis).
Day (1829) argued against progressives who desired to
copy the expanded German form of education in the United
States through metaphor.

Day claimed that American

universities might learn a few things from European
institutions, but "not by blindly adopting all their
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measures without discrimination"

(p. 316).

Thus, Tickner

and Harvard could not see.
Moreover, Day thought that the sentiment that Latin and
Greek ought to be optional would reverse intellectual
progress.

Day asked,

When in almost all our schools, and academies, and
professional seminaries, the standard of education has
been enlarged and elevated, is this a time for the
college to lower its standard? Shall we fall back, and
abandon the ground which, for thirty years past, we
have been striving so hard to gain? (1829, p. 318, his
emphasis).
Though Harvard had made ancient languages elective, "it is
to be hoped that, at no very distant period, they will be
able to come up to this elevated ground, and leave the
business of second-rate education to the inferior
seminaries"

(p. 321).

Day (1829) offered his conclusive remarks by explicitly
declaring that a literary institution holds an "elevated
character"

(p. 320) .

Those educated in the literary,

classical tradition "must take their position on a summit
which towers above the height of surrounding ranges of
hills" (p. 322).
Kingsley (1829) thought that when one knew Greek and
Roman writers, in the Greek and Roman tongues, one could
take "relish of what is elevated..."

(p. 329).

It worked

the mental faculties and brought the intellect to its
"highest maturity"

(p. 330).

To stay its liberal course,

Yale had much to expect, "but by deserting the high-road
which it has so long traveled, and wandering in the lanes
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and bye-paths, it should trifle with its prosperity, and put
at hazard the very means of its support and existence” (p.
337) .
A final cluster, a NATURE cluster, referred to
naturally occurring objects and bound the positive structure
images and the light images with the beauty of nature.
These images helped Day and Kingsley construct a tie between
classical education and the perceived splendor of a poetic
nature.

The authors associated the "highest" of natural

beauty with classical education.

While a practical

education was like a poplar, "slender, frail, and blighted,“
a classical education was "more of the stately elm; striking
deep its roots, lifting its head slowly to the skies,
spreading wide its grateful shade, and growing more and more
venerable with the years"

(1829, p. 322).

Day asked, "When

even our mountains, and rivers, and lakes, are upon a scale
which seems to denote, that we are destined to be a great
and mighty nation, shall our literature be feeble, and
scanty, and superficial?" (p. 324).

He thought that

classical education ranked up there with mountains, rivers,
and lakes.
While these metaphorical images do not necessarily
force a reader to accept the necessity of certain
pedagogical perspectives, they do limit one's ability to see
classical and practical education any which way.

Again, the

basic pedagogical policy the rhetors advocated was in
keeping with the educational status quo at Yale.
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Thus, to

enact this prudential policy, Day and Kingsley helped the
report's readers see classical education as a good, "solid,"
and lasting structure, more "elevated" than other types of
education, and very near the beauty of nature.

The authors

bound classical education with "solid" structures, but did
not "finish" the details.

Classical education did not deal

in "ornaments, " as Day put it, but in building the
foundation for future studies.

However, that foundation was

much more "elevated" than the "low-ness" of "mere" practical
education, or professional education minus the foundational
elements of a specific practice.

To study the ancients was

to study the "beautifully displayed, " the "warmth,
animation, and intellectual illumination of the living,
active and intelligent being..."
346).

(Day & Kingsley, 1829, p.

The various subjects of classical education were the

best possible examples of solid and lasting human work.
This use of metaphor, then, was the prudential argumentative
and figurative enactment of the policy Day and Kingsley
desired upheld.
"Taste" and "Genius"
By themselves, the metaphors Day and Kingsley employed
give us a good demonstration of how they went about
constructing a sense of prudence rhetorically.

Another way

prudence took shape was through the terms of "taste" and
"genius."

When we accept "taste" and "genius" as

metaphorical appeals or perspectives as well, we can
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interpret the Yale Report as an extension of a tradition of
prudence passed down from Timothy Dwight.
Timothy Dwight, president of Yale during the first two
decades of the nineteenth century, thought that "public
happiness results from individual citizenship that enacts a
regenerate sort of virtue that must come of God's grace"
(Clark, 1993, p. 57).

According to Dwight, Yale was "the

fountain from which flow the laws of the state [Connecticut]
and its whole jurisprudence, the rules which form its happy
society, and the doctrines and precepts which are inculcated
in its churches"

(cited in Clark, p. 58).

Clark suggests

that Dwight expressed his idea of prudence through the
metaphors of "taste" and "genius."

To understand how Day

and Kingsley's representation of prudence worked out
textually, we must investigate Dwight's notion of prudence.
In Clark's view, Dwight meant the metaphor "taste" to
refer to the process of correct judgment, and intended the
metaphor of "genius" to refer to the action of this socalled correct judgment (Clark, 1987, p. 156).

More

specifically, by taste, Dwight signified both an aesthetic,
secular taste that, once acquired, led to moral virtue; but
also a sacred taste that was a "refined sensibility enabled
by spiritual regeneration"

(Clark, 1993, p. 65).

In 1812

Dwight offered angels as the model for what he saw as
prudent.

As cited in Clark, Dwight explained that angels

...admit nothing but truth [because they
are]possessed. .. of the most noble and refined taste.
Their relish is as regularly conformed to truth as
their intellect . Nothing little can engross their
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attention: nothing debased can give them pleasure
(cited in Clark, p. 67, Clark's emphasis).
By genius, Dwight indicated a genius consisting of two
functions:

a logical function sifting through truth and

error and a rhetorical function in eloquence making
impressions upon others.

Teaching both theology and

rhetoric at Yale, Dwight professed a public discourse theory
that was both secular and sacred.

This discourse theory

assumed the "motivating force of the language of
sentiment..." and it was "traditionally oratorical in its
commitment to engage those it addresses in the project of
shaping and sustaining a common moral and political culture"
(p. 58).
Dwight blurred rhetoric and poetic and in so doing "did
the homiletic work of appealing to sentiments that would
nurture the regenerative virtue that he believed functions
as a powerful public bond"

(p. 59).

Both theology and

rhetoric inculcated taste and genius in Dwight's type of
society.

Dwight had a religious and political vision of a

"godly government"

(Clark, 1987, p. 149).

prudential endpoint.

This was Dwight's

It is apparent that Day and Kingsley

take these metaphorical terms— taste and genius— and
Dwight's perspective of what they meant, as models for
prudential action and discursive practice.
Considering the term "taste," the authors often used it
either in promoting so-called correct taste in relation to a
classical education, or poor taste in a desire not to study
the classics.

For instance, Kingsley (1829) illustrated
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that "Familiarity with the Greek and Roman writers is
especially adapted to form the taste, and to discipline the
mind, both in thought and diction, to the relish of what is
elevated, chaste, and simple" (p. 329).

Kingsley argued

that through the study of ancient literature a student
gleaned proper, superior taste.

This was "proved by the

only proper evidence, the voice of men of letters in every
country where the classics have been studied, and where a
correct taste has prevailed"

(p. 330).

To Kingsley, Yale

laid "the foundation of a correct taste..." (p. 330).

When

engaged in classical study, "every faculty of the mind is
employed; not only the memory, judgment, and reasoning
power, but the taste and fancy are occupied and improved"
(p. 330). Day and Kingsley illustrated that through the
study of language, at its classical root, the student could
"hardly fail to improve his taste and to enlarge his
capacity to think, and to communicate thought" (p. 347) .
Again, the term "taste," understood metaphorically,
submitted both a sacred and secular appeal while it also
framed the Yale Report1s construction and imitation of
prudential tradition.

While I suggest that Day and Kingsley

perpetuated Dwight’s notions of "taste" and "genius," it is
also important to understand that Dwight depended upon
conventions of prudential thought as well.

Hence, Day and

Kingsley not only imitate Dwight, but Dwight's models too.
For his secular understanding of taste, Dwight depended
on the understanding of the term drawn from the moral
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philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment.

From this

secular stance, taste was the refined moral sentiment and a
pre-requisite to public virtue.

Dwight connected the

aesthetic poetic and the moral by asserting moral virtue to
be the endpoint of their merger.

Day and Kingsley, too,

seem to have meant secular virtue as the endpoint of
classical education.

To them, classical education did not

merely offer the means for future employment, but it
generated the proper character to enact morality and thus
public virtue.

For Day and Kingsley, I argue, their

rhetoric inescapably tied their sense of secular morality to
their conceptualization of prudence.
The secular notion of taste leading to moral virtue
blurred into the sacred notion as depicted by Jonathan
Edwards, Dwight's maternal grandfather.

Both Dwight and

Edwards embraced regeneration by grace in sentiment before
reason.

"And both use the refinement of sensory taste, n

Clark (1993) argues,

"as a metaphor to describe the felt

effect of grace, relying on the term relish to describe the
heightened ability to perceive the good that was, for both,
a primary consequence of regeneration" (p. 65, his
emphasis).

Perception of God's grace and beauty led to

affection for that grace, or sacred taste, which, then, led
to godly, virtuous actions.

Therefore, for Dwight, part of

prudence began in the ability to perceive and relish in
moral and spiritual beauty.

I contend that this was the so-

called regenerative virtue and the meaning for sacred taste
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to which the language in Day and Kingsley's report aspired
as well.

One could best enact and explore both morality and

the grace of God through classical education.
As I mentioned,
"genius."

"taste" is performed through a kind of

To Day (1829), part of Yale's purpose was

"rousing and guiding the powers of genius"
Moreover,

(p. 301) .

"The sublime [sic] efforts of genius consist in

the creations of the imagination, the discoveries of the
intellect, the conquests by which the dominions of science
are extended"

(p. 302) .

Kingsley thought genius resided,

partly, in the works of ancient Greeks.
that,

Kingsley wrote

"...the original works of Grecian genius are the

models by which artists, even at the present time, direct
their labors; the standards by which in great measure, their
merits are determined..."
asked:

(p. 329).

Furthermore, Kingsley

"...[I]n order to understand the true spirit and

genius of English literature,--which is of the greatest
practical use, the literature of France, or the literature
of Greece and Rome?"
Greece and Rome.

(p. 332).

Kingsley thought it was

In the closing arguments. Day and Kingsley

suggested that
.. .we [Americans] are the people, the genius of whose
government and institutions more especially and
imperiously than any other, demands that the field of
classical learning be industriously and thoroughly
explored and cultivated, and its riches productions
gathered (p. 345).
In an essay written in 1787, under the title of An
Essay on American Genius, Dwight proposed, with Hugh Blair,

that genius, nationalistic poetry for instance, would pave
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the way for a refined, tasteful American citizenry.

Clark

(1987) suggests that "Dwight presented his notion of
American genius as the core of his politicized doctrine of
taste"

(p. 158).

tradition.

Clearly, Day and Kingsley continued this

Clark also explains that Dwight's Yale lectures

somewhat re-defined genius into a general faculty of effort.
As Clark notes, "This redefinition transports Blair's
esthetic notion of genius as the native ability to create
beauty directly into Dwight's political realm of moral
action and public discourse"

(p. 160).

Dwight’s project

filtered truth and error and generated the idea of a "city
upon a hill" inhabited by regenerative souls (p. 161) .

For

Day and Kingsley, it took classical education to foster
taste, but also to enact it by storing past works of genius
within the mind, building upon and imitating them, and
performing eloquence in the community.

Classical education

fostered this sense of prudence.
In Siam, Dwight's secular and sacred sense of taste and
genius was the foundation of Dwight's prudential outlook.
It, too, had a heritage and took shape in his teaching style
at Yale, but also emerged in the discourse of his students,
Day and Kingsley.

The students, like Dwight, linked taste

with grace and the language of animated feeling or
sentiment.

They showed genius as a mode of distributing the

impression of taste to the community.

Clark (1993) thinks

that
This act of impression was central to his [Dwight's]
instruction at Yale... instruction in public discourse
79
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[both in theology and rhetoric] that addressed first
the taste, in both the sacred and the secular senses of
that term, from which he believed would spring the sort
of citizenship upon which his vision of community
depended (p. 75) .
Dwight hand-picked Day to take his place as Yale ’s
president.

It is evident that Day, a mathematician, and

Kingsley, a professor of ancient languages, inherited
Dwight's notion of prudential action and discursive
practice.
Hence, from Jasinski's (1997) point of view, we might
say that Day and Kinsley represented a specific prudential
outlook that was also a performative tradition anchoring and
organizing the process of rhetorical invention.

It existed

in and through the language of feeling and sentiment and
used specifically the terms "taste" and "genius".

It was

best spoken through classicists radiating Dwight's sacred
and secular notions of taste and genius.

It depended on

metaphorical thinking as its figurative and argumentative
framework.

Intellectual, conservative homiletic tradition

perpetuated this thinking.

Another way of putting it is

that Day and Kingsley's rhetoric was an imitation of
previous rhetoric, but their prudence also lived on through
future rhetoric.

For instance, while Austin Phelps,

schooled at Yale's theological seminary, preached a much
more rational stance compared to Dwight, a conventional view
of prudence remained, not necessarily pure, but alive.
Speaking of Austin Phelps, Professor of Sacred Oratory in
Andover Theological Seminary from 1848-1879, Hirst (1993)
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explains that Phelps thought that "from the fountain of
regenerated individual character would spring the right,
unforced, and lasting response to every kind of social ill"
(p. 78-79).
THE REPORT'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT
The authors' weaved their idea of prudence with
metaphors.

The metaphors revealed a standard way of viewing

classical and practical education, and the regenerative
vision of Dwight extrapolated from the metaphors of "taste"
and "genius".

Furthermore, Day and Kingsley's depiction of

temporal reality is telling not only because the report's
rhetoric created it, but it highlighted their prudential
outlook by illustrating what they saw to be appropriate
action, rhetorical response, and judgment in temporal
action.
Undoubtedly, the symbolic prudence, as analyzed above,
was a layered configuration of both sacred and secular
arguments.

The report advocated both the intellectual path

to individual and societal moral attainment, but also a
feeling-centered, more sacred notion of the same process.
In attempts to prudentially create a symbolic reality--a
rhetorical vision of the past, present, and future--the
classical became sacred and evangelical.
Day and Kingsley supply a fairly specific view of how
they saw the wide sweep of past, present, and future.

To

them, the past, antiquity, was an era of beauty and
perfection. The present was a struggle between the beauty of
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past treasures and the "business" or "practical" character
of their contemporary America.

The future, if students

studied the past, would be bright.

If Yale ignored the

past, or made ancient languages optional, the future would
be dismal.
To Day (1829), the past held "sublime discoveries"
311) .

(p.

Kingsley thought along the same lines, but made a

more profound statement.

He said that a classical, literary

education "is obviously distinct from a professional,
education...The former is antecedent in time; the later
rests upon the former as its most appropriate foundation"
(p. 324) .

The works of the ancients, of "genius, " are

"models" for artists.

Ancient art supplied the "best

guides, the surest interpreters of nature itself" (p. 328).
To Kingsley,

"Time, which brings to light so many defects,

and suggests so many improvements in most of the discoveries
of men, has added its sanction to the perfection. .." (p.
330) .

Speaking directly to the question of the practicality

of ancient languages, Kingsley announced that "to begin with
the m o d e m languages in a course of education, is to reverse
the order of nature"

(p. 333) . Moreover,

"to suppose the

m o d e m languages more practical than the ancient... is an
obvious fallacy"

(p. 333) . To study ancient languages was

foundationally important and had always been so because "the
learned world long ago settled this matter, and subsequent
events and experience have confirmed their decision"
344) .
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(p.

Not only did the study of ancient languages help
illustrate perfection in art and linguistic practice, but
also in character.

Day and Kingsley (1829) illustrated that

...to appreciate justly the character of the ancients,
the thorough study and accurate knowledge of their
classics, in the language of the originals, are
indispensable; as the simplicity, energy, and striking
peculiarities of these pristine exemplars of freedom
which are forcibly and beautifully displayed. ..(p.
345) .
When a student read the ancient literature in the ancient
language then
...such study carries the young pupil back to the
earliest era in the history of mental efforts, and lays
open to him the most simply and original operations of
the mind and acquaints him with its brilliant and
unrivaled productions (p. 346).
Even further, a classical education revealed "splendid
results of mental labors" and "seized [sic] the refined
treasures of antiquity"

(p. 347).

To study Greek was to

study "perfection" of "almost mathematical precision" (p.
347) .
What is most important to the authors was that ancient
insight revealed truth:
The ancient languages having been made the organ of
communicating revealed religion to man....In a matter
of such deep concern, what teacher will be disposed to
forego any available means of ascertaining the truth?
As by biblical criticism, controversies involving
eternal interests are often determined, faithfulness to
the souls of men imposes an imperative obligation to
read and know the Scriptures in their original
simplicity and purity (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 348349) .
Thus, for the student desiring to study the "Divine, "

the

bible, in its antique linguistic form, offered the "oracles
of truth"

(P. 349) .

For Day and Kingsley, the Christian God
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"communicated to man in the ancient languages"

(p. 349) .

Not only did the authors perfect the past, but made it
sacred, and so too its languages.
To Day and Kingsley, the present was a struggle between
the beauty of antiquity and a call for practical education
within a "business" culture. Day (1829) thought that the
public were "undoubtedly right, in demanding that there
should be appropriate courses of education, accessible to
all classes of youth, "
Yale's job (p. 318).

but Day argued that this was not

In light of the "business" character

of Day's era, as he depicted it, the argument that colleges
should adopt "to the spirit and wants of the age" was wrong.
Day thought that the argument that Yale and other classical
colleges will "soon be deserted, unless they are better
suited [sic] to the business character of the nation" was
ill-conceived (p. 300) .

He asked, "Do the public insist,

that every college shall become a high-school, gymnasia,
lycea, agricultural seminaries, &c" (p. 318)?

Day did not

think so because this would, in part, de-value college
education:

"What will induce parents in various and distant

parts of the country" Day inquired, "to send us their sons,
when they have academies enough in their own neighborhood?"
(p. 320) .

The only way to maintain Yale's place in the

"business character" of the nation was to offer an "elevated
rank" of education.
Moreover, in this "business character" the "field of
enterprise is so wide" that even a person of "a very limited
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stock of knowledge" could "push himself forward into notice
and employment" or even to "office and popular applause"
(Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 321-322) .

In this type of

atmosphere, America needed a college like Yale in order to
supply "high literary excellence, and professional
distinction"

(p. 322).

Classical education gave a student

sacredness, and the ability to influence others toward
godliness.
Further, Yale was indeed changing.

While critics

charged that Yale started up in the days of "monkish
ignorance, " Day (1829) responded that "nothing is more
common, than to hear those who revisit the college, after a
few years absence, express their surprise at the changes
which have been made. .." (p. 299) .
asserted,

"We believe, ” Day

"that changes may, from time to time be made with

advantage, to meet the varying demands of the community"
299) .

(p.

Yale inevitably changed with time, but it was hasty

to change everything.

To Day, any institution ought to

"still firmly adhere to some of its original features, it is
from a higher principle,
salutary reform"

[rather] than a blind opposition to

(p. 299) .

Again using a key metaphor, Day

believed in a cautious and gradual change.
In the Yale Report, the future had two possibilities.
As mentioned above, Yale could adhere to antiquity and
prosper, or "blindly" change and "fall" into "blight."

To

Day (1829) , if Yale adopted a practical or vocational
European approach then parents would not send their children
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to college.

In Germany, for instance, there was no

"parental" philosophy that helped guide and discipline the
student.

Day asked, "Would parents in this country consent

to send their sons, at the age of sixteen, to an institution
in which there should not be even an attempt at discipline,
farther than to preserve order in the lecture room?" (p.
316).

Raising the standards of admission was a good idea,

but to allow students complete freedom of curriculum "shall
only expose" Yale to "inevitable failure and ridicule"

(p.

317) .
Moreover, Day and Kingsley illustrated that some French
schools neglected the ancient languages and "that example,
neither by its literary or moral results, can demand our
imitation"

(p. 345).

If Yale made the study of ancient

languages and option, then not only would its education sink
in value, but also lead to a further perpetuation of
commercialism.

Day and Kingsley did not want to surrender

to the business climate of the day: "The standard of
scholarship would not only be lowered here, but we should
become directly accessory to the depression of the present
literary character of our country" (p. 345) .
Also, and as I mentioned, if Yale acquiesced to the
call for mass practical education without foundational
classical education, then the public would lose confidence
in the institution.

Certainly, a new class of student might

walk the halls of Yale college, but "if we should not
immediately suffer in point of number, yet we shall exchange
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the best portion of our students, for others of inferior
aims and attainments"

(Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 320, Day

and Kingsley's emphasis).

If all educational institutions

in America offered the same "object, " then the "rivalry
becomes a mere scramble for numbers, a dexterous arrangement
of measures in beating up for recruits, the stand attainment
will sink lower and lower, till the colleges are brought to
a level with common academies"

(p. 321).

However, even while Day called for a "high intellectual
culture" he understood that the business class would earn
most of the financial prosperity in the country:
Is it not desirable that they should be men of superior
education, of large and liberal views, of those solid
and elegant attainments, which will raise them to a
higher distinction, than the mere possession of
property; which will not allow them to hoard their
treasures, or waste them in senseless extravagance;
which will enable them to adorn society by their
learning, to move in the more intelligent circles with
dignity, and to make such an application of their
wealth, as will be most honorable to themselves, and
most beneficial to their country? (p. 323-324)
Hence, clearly Day and Kingsley thought that Yale and its
graduates out to regenerate the commercial go-getters in the
business climate or culture pervading Day and Kingsley's
era.

Yale needed to spiritually re-awaken the commercial

culture.
The distinct textual context articulates a certain
vision of the past, present, and future, and this expression
leads to an over-arching idea about the practical wisdom of
classical education.

The temporal vision of the Yale Report

is thus telling in three ways.

First, it located the wisdom
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of classical education in the perfected language of God.
Only through perpetuating the perfection of the past could
one glean godly revelation.

Second, because "business"

tainted the present, it was only through a thorough,
classical education that secular/sacred moral taste and
genius emerged.

One could not generate a language of

sentiment without deep knowledge of the classics and
Dwight's society needed this type of language in order to
exist.

Therefore, third, this textual context illustrated

the prudence of Dwight's political vision and the metaphoric
resources Day and Kingsley used to spur it along.
Clark (1987) illustrates that Dwight used the metaphor
of "family" as a model for a happy political community.
Those who lead, Dwight thought,

"should nurture the citizens

as a virtuous parent nurtures his children"

(p. 152).

Moreover, societal leaders lead "on the basis of the same
divine sanction and divine guidance that authorizes people
to govern their own children"

(p. 152).

As quoted in Clark,

Dwight, in 1791, said that these "virtuous rulers" were
"...elevated to the first earthly distinction, entrusted
with the first means of usefulness, and separated from the
rest of men by peculiar insights of deity..."

(p. 152) .

These insights took the form of both revelation from God,
but also knowledge of God's language.

Dwight thought that

"the voice of god...entitled [leaders] to an unrivaled
homage, and secured from opposition, disgrace [sic], and
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unrivaled irreverence as common parent to the great family
of the state"

(p. 152).

Day and Kingsley surely thought the same way.

To Day,

"When removed from under the roof of their parents, and
exposed to the untried scenes of temptation, it is necessary
that some faithful and affectionate guardian take them by
the hand, and guide their "steps" (1829, p. 303) .

The

"parents" in the college were not only responsible for
disciplining the students, but also for illustrating the
vision of the type of leadership that would enact Dwight's
plan.

Day stated.
This consideration determines the kind of government
which ought to be maintained in our colleges. As it is
a substitute for the regulations of a family, it should
approach as near to the character of parental control
as the circumstances of the case will admit (p. 303).

Undoubtedly, Day and Kingsley meant this type of government
to also be the model for their country.

Classically trained

people would lead this country by acclaiming the past as
perfect, and transforming the present "business" society
back to a literary one.

Yale would produce students who

could spiritually re-awaken the culture because those
students would become the secular/sacred parents of a godly
society.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
In light of Harvard's move to make classical studies
and ancient languages elective. Day and Kingsley revealed
that prudent pedagogical policy was maintaining the
pedagogical status quo; ancient languages stayed where they
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were.

To do this. Day and Kingsley defended classical

education and asserted its importance over practical
education through metaphor.

They recovered the language of

sentiment and feeling, and also borrowed the prudential
conventions of Timothy Dwight by using the key terms of
"taste" and "genius."

This recovery fused a sacred/secular

meaning for classical education itself.

Also, the author's

rhetorical re-enactment of an oratorical poetic within a
perceived business culture illustrated the primary wisdom of
maintaining the status quo.

It would further develop

Dwight's vision of a godly government.
Placed within the context of nineteenth century
rhetorical culture. Day and Kingsley's sense of prudence had
both successful consequences, and not so successful ones.

I

evaluate it as successful because it perpetuated the role of
the classically trained rhetor in an oratorical society.
Again, during the first part of the nineteenth century, the
stronghold of the neoclassical tradition helped create a
communitarian ethos helped along by classical, literary
pedagogy.

The Yale Report and the view of prudence it

advanced gave solace and fuel to the classically educated.
These types thought that the educated orator had a central
cultural role of expressing and building moral consensus.
The notion of prudence that the Yale Report adhered to
certainly helped Day and Kingsley advance their sense to
many denominational schools in the West.

For the most part,

the report staved off any major pedagogical change in
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conservative, literary colleges for many years.

The report

and its model of prudence helped to prolong "neoclassical
elitism"

(Clark, 1993).

To Clark (1993), Dwight's doctrine was "developed in
the eighteenth century, influential in the nineteenth, and
perhaps still with us residually...worked explicitly against
a democratic transformation of public discourse..."

(p. 76).

The model of prudence Day and Kingsley supplied helped the
conservative, classical cause in the eyes of those already
perpetuating classical elitism.

However, it only alienated

the industrial and agricultural yeoman.
education illegitimate.

It made practical

It did not bring the working

classes into the fold, nor could it.

Those who disagreed

with Day and Kingsley's standard of prudence, both
politically and discursively, were, in fact, imprudent.
Granted, during this early period farmers and industrialist
thought classical education was nonsense and that science
was too "magical" to learn.

Regardless, the Yale Report

certainly did not make classical education attractive to the
yeoman agrarian and industrialist.

If anything, it created

a larger chasm between those desiring practical education
and those clinging to the conservative way.
From Hall's (1980) perspective we might note that those
academic, classical audiences read the report in a preferred
manner.

To them, communitarianism fit in with how they saw

the culture.
news.

It made sense to them.

It sounded like good

For even those desiring practical education, we might
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say that Day and Kingsley offered some solace.

A negotiated

reading might have been one that scoffed at Day and
Kingsley's arrogant argument that classical education was
superior to other forms, yet applauded the idea that
practical, vocational education had a place.

Even the

Morrill Act, once passed, gave legitimacy to classical
pedagogy even as it advanced vocational education.

However,

we might also say that some readers might have received the
report as one not having the entire national interest in
mind, but a class interest instead.
for grabs.

Prudence, thus, is up

To some, perhaps, the policy Day and Kingsley

advocated, and the report itself, were prudent.

To others,

they certainly were not.
Again, according to Cmiel (1990), while a classical,
literary education indoctrinated young gentleman into a
refined style of speech and lifestyle, the classically
educated elites had trouble conveying their message to the
common people.

Therefore, while I suggest that the

tradition of prudence Day and Kingsley prolonged helped them
in the eyes of other conservative classicists, their primary
audience, it may have hindered them when it came to
persuading anyone else outside that class.

The Yale Report

slowed down pedagogical progressivism in certain spheres.
However, those spheres were populated, for the most part, by
easily swayed, already cheering, classically trained
audiences salivating at the ringing sounds of Latin and
Greek.

But practicality would soon have its day.
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It got a

good shot in the arm when Francis Wayland reported the
status of American higher education to Brown's overseeing
corporation in 1850.

93

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER

POUR

FRANCIS WAYLAND AND HIS 1850
"REPORT TO THE CORPORATION OF BROWN"
INTRODUCTION
Francis Wayland was born March 11, 1796, in New York
City and died in 1865.
immigrants.
childhood.

His parents were both English

Strong religious teaching occupied his early
On Sundays, before dinner, Wayland's parents

taught him a new hymn; before tea, his parents taught him
portions of the Catechism; after tea, his father read
scriptures and explained their meaning; after that the
family sang hymns and prayed.
His strong Christian, Baptist upbringing seemed to
prepare him for his years at the Dutchess County Academy,
and then at Union College.

He graduated from Union on July

28, 1813 at the age of seventeen.

He then studied medicine,

but decided to return to his Christian roots.

He began

study at the Theological Seminary at Andover in the autumn
of 1816.

In 1817 he became a tutor at Union College

teaching the classical courses.

In 1821 he entered his

pastorate at Boston's First Baptist Church.

He was ordained

pastor on August, 21, and stayed in that post for five
years.
He decided to leave Boston and return to Union College
to teach in 1826.

Although he was popular in Boston,

Wayland himself condemned his sermons because he thought
they were lacking in the "simple and homely address
essential to true popular effect, and [they were]
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constructed too much on lines of an ambitious, intellectual
display"

(Murry, 1891, pp. 55-56) .

Wayland hardly got his

feet wet back at Union when Brown declared a vacancy.
Wayland was president of Brown University from 1827 to
1855.

Although educational scholars dub Wayland a

progressive, early in his career he embraced a
conservative educational philosophy (Butts, 1939).

Between

1827 and 1840, Wayland did not challenge the status quo.
His radical call for reform did not come until after a trip
to Great Britain.

It was not that he wanted America's

colleges to mirror English ones.

Wayland did not think too

highly of Oxford and Cambridge because these were places of
"fruitless discussions" (p. 143).

However, Wayland

perceived a cultural chasm between England and America.

To

Wayland, the English college was near perfection for
monastic and literary- needs, but America needed a newly
styled system of higher education.
His voice of educational reform took flight in several
speeches, articles and pamphlets.

His most important works

include his Thoughts on the Present Collegiate System in the
United States, published in 1842, and his 1850 report to the

corporation of Brown.

He was conservative in his stance in

1842, desiring to increase requirements for the bachelor's
degree, and he did not advocate the elective system.

What

was clearly radical in his earlier work was that he thought
Brown should supply an education for people desiring
knowledge and skill in the practical arenas such as
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mercantilism and agriculture.

Butts (1939) contends that

Wayland's 1842 pamphlet unveiled a "complete" statement of
the problems Wayland saw with early nineteenth century
American college education.

Wayland's 1842 effort

proclaimed that America's students needed a narrower focus.
Though he did not explicitly support an elective
system, Wayland thought colleges assisted only ignorance by
promoting the ideal that students should learn all subjects:
Wayland pointed out, as others had done, that the
amount of knowledge and number of courses had doubled
or trebled since the colleges were first established
and yet that the amount of time allowed for finishing
the course had remained exactly the same; thus it had
become impossible for young men to acquire all of this
knowledge in such a manner as to insure proper mental
discipline (Butts, 1939, p. 145).
Wayland's other ideas for reform included raising
requirements for admission in order to instill in students
an appreciation for thorough knowledge, but also to engender
a "university" system through advancing all the important
branches of knowledge.

The classical course would lead to

the B .A. and the practical would lead to the B.S. or B.
Litt.

Wayland wanted to retain the classically prescribed

college curriculum, but also wanted to expand the system and
open Brown's gates to everyone.

Wayland thought that

offering scientific knowledge and modes of scientific
application to the arts, like farming, would increase the
wealth of the country by way of the individual and, at the
same time, enlighten the masses.
"His theories were the most advanced in terms of
democracy since the days of Jefferson"

(Butts, 1939, p.
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146) , but his recommendations did not take hold.

He could

not make the changes he wanted at Brown because of so many
dissenting voices in the faculty.

At the same time,

enrollment had decreased almost twenty-five percent from
1835 to 1849, and the college's income was plunging.

In

1849 Wayland tried to resign, but the Brown corporation
would not let him.
for reform.

Instead, Wayland designed a new proposal

In light of the situation, Wayland had to

contend with several general contingencies, as implied
above.

First, he had to negotiate his radical ideas with

the conservative scene of mid-nineteenth century American
higher education; especially at Brown.

He also had to re

make Brown into an enticing place to earn an education.
Finally, he had to deal with the glum state of Brown's
income.

What Wayland came up with was pretty much in line

with his 1842 treatise, but much more radical.
In the first section of this chapter I will describe
and summarize the report.

Second, I will interpret the view

of prudence Wayland advocated discursively.

In the third

section I will examine the report's textual context and how
Wayland further developed his prudential outlook temporally.
Finally, I will evaluate the historical consequence of
Wayland's view of prudence, suggesting that it hindered his
efforts at Brown, but helped his public rhetorical effort.
SUMMARY
Wayland's report is a broad treatise of seventy-six
pages, organized categorically, and within each category,
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organized chronologically.

Wayland discussed education in

Great Britain, the progress of education in the United
States, the condition of Brown University, how to make it
more useful, and finally the value of collegiate degrees.
Wayland claimed in the first two sections that the
nation's educational founders misunderstood the nation's
unique educational needs; copying English traditions stifled
American higher education.

Thus, classical education

created elitism, but practical education uplifted the
practical longings of practical people.

Wayland (1850) did

not want a student "profoundly versed in mathematics or
classics, and ignorant of all earthly things else..."

(p.

37) .
Within his third section, his history of Brown, Wayland
declared that he would alter Brown’s system in several ways.
For instance, Wayland suggested abandoning the four-year
fixed term of a college education.

Wayland also proposed to

determine time allotted for particular courses of
instruction by the nature of the courses themselves.
Additionally, he wanted to allow every student to choose a
particular course of study and never interrupt it until
finished.

Wayland also suggested that Brown should

continually revise the curriculum according to communal
desire.

He urged Brown to allow students to attend any

particular course they wished to attend, allow for non
degree seeking students, and award non-degree seekers with
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certification for every course pursued.

To Wayland, these

changes would help Brown fend for itself financially.
Wayland also wrote about the relationship between the
corporation and the instructors.

He argued that the

corporation should furnish the instructor only with the
necessary apparatus, lecture room, and library.

Payment

depended largely on individual academic and pedagogical
talent in Wayland's scheme.
Moreover, talent and intellect were the true signature
of an academic degree.

Wayland (1850) believed that the

degree in arts had become a social "knighthood" signifying
no real "attainment" of knowledge.
academic value.

The degree had lost

It was merely a social distinction.

Wayland wanted to change this, not only to bring more
students from the working classes of society to college, but
also to usurp the aristocratic label of the college degree.
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT
Wayland's claim was that Brown ought to democratize its
education in order to uplift the practical classes of
society.

Consequently, this was what Wayland suggested was

prudent pedagogical policy.

The rhetorical sentiments of

individuality, self-reliance, and commercial autonomy
enacted Wayland's sense of prudence.

A mode of rhetorical

identification also helped bring his notion of prudence to
life.

Both Wayland's political ideals and his discursive

practice were popular and conventional.

Wayland used and
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perpetuated a representation of prudence consonant with the
perceived egalitarianism in the age of Andrew Jackson.
Individualism
As the nineteenth century marched on, "the rhetoric
that emerged both within and outside the academy in America
expressed...increasing individualism"
1993, p. 13).

(Clark and Halloran,

Antczak (1985) explains that the watershed

moment of Andrew Jackson's election marked the era and
called for a "rhetoric of identification."

Echoing

Antczak’s perspective, Clark and Halloran (1993) explain
that "Jackson defeated Adams by presenting himself to the
voters as a representative personality, using rhetoric that
addressed its audience not as citizens who must judge but as
spectators observing a version of themselves" (p. 14) .
Wayland exemplified this discursive practice and it brought
to life his sense of prudence.

In short, sentiments of

individualism were more persuasive then classical
argumentation.
The desire for practical training was, in Wayland's
(1850) view,
(p. 13) .

"Individualized in the bosom of every citizen"

Wayland's prose constructed a lush view of

individuality in which "every man is desirous for himself
and especially for his children, of that knowledge which is
most essential to success in the field which is placed
before him" (p. 13).

Moreover, Wayland thought that "it is

one thing to aid the struggles of genius oppressed by
adversity," but it is "another to provide such inducements
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to education, that young men shall be enticed into the
learned professions, who would be more useful and successful
in other departments of life" (p. 35) .
his or her own unique calling.

Every individual had

Wayland went on to say that

any funds or scholarships given to entice students to enter
Brown should "not paralyze the sentiment of honest, manly
independence, without which genius itself is contemptible"
(p. 35) . A college or university ought not make a preacher
out of a farmer, or vice versa.
Along the same lines, Wayland (1850) proposed that
Brown must supply "courses of instruction, not for the
benefit of one class, but for the benefit of all
classes...Is there not reason to believe that, if such an
education were furnished, they would cheerfully avail
themselves of it?" (pp. 50-51).

It was obvious to Wayland

that individuals would snatch up opportunities for self
progress.

Also, Wayland justified his idea of prudence

through that argument that "every man. ..has an equal right
to the benefits of education, every man has a special right
to that kind of education which will be of greatest value to
him in the prosecution of useful industry" (pp. 56-57).
Therefore, imparting only classical studies was,
consequently, unjustified and imprudent.
Wayland (1850) also suggested that the corporation
should support professors, but that Brown's corporation
members could not "pretend any longer to hold themselves
responsible for the support of every professor;
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nor. . .pretend to oversee him in the discharge of his duty"
(p. 62) .

Wayland thought that the professors should look to

independent student fees for what the corporation could not
give.

In this way, "like every other man, the instructor

will be brought directly in contact with the public, and his
remuneration will be made to depend distinctly upon his
industry and skill in his profession"

(p. 62) . This

discursive strategy recognized the ideal of self-reliance.
I suggest this rhetorical gesture was a key symbolic
enactment of Wayland's prudential outlook.
Continuing his sentiments of individuality and selfreliance, Wayland (1850) argued that the college degrees
were "mere privileges by courtesy" (p. 66).

Wayland

insisted that the A . B . should signify the possession of a
specific amount of knowledge, and the A.M. a bit more.
Wayland believed that if Brown reduced the number of studies
an individual student took up, it would increase the value
of the degree program.

The student would have options and

could take electives that substituted for other courses.

Of

significance, Wayland admitted that this kind of policy
might greatly effect the classics, but "if by placing Latin
and Greek upon their own merits, they are unable to retain
their present place in the education of civilized and
Christianized man, then let them give place to something
better"

(p. 74).

We can see that Wayland's treatment of academic degrees
was a representative anecdote of his discursive treatment of
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individualism and self-reliance, and thus his sense of
prudence.

When the college degree was an individual program

of study, aiding the student in an individual, practical
quest, the degree obtained its merit.

His talk about

degrees and his policy solution to the problem indicated his
idea of prudent policy and how he enacted it rhetorically
through the gesture of curricular natural selection.
In short, Wayland supposed several stances on
individualism and self-reliance.

My point is that these

stances were themselves discursive sentiments that
articulated his implicit view of prudence.

At the heart of

it, he thought that every person longed for personal
attainment, but he also thought that each individual was
unique and had a special, individual calling.

Not every

person attained, or should attain, high intellectualism.

As

long as each individual was self-reliant and there was equal
opportunity to seek out autonomy, Wayland was content.

That

would be prudent policy.
Additionally, this prudential perspective, and the
inventional framework that constructed it, was consistent
with Wayland's (183 5) thoughts in his Elements of Moral
Science .

In that work, Wayland argued that "every human

being, is a distinct and separately accountable individual"
(p. 202) . While each person was unique, equality reigned:
" [A] 11 men are placed under circumstances of perfect
equality.

Each separate individual, is created with

precisely the same right to use the advantages with which
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God has endowed him, as every other individual"
emphasis).

(p. 202, his

In this moral philosophy we also see the seeds

of Wayland's primary ideal of prudence.

This ideal, as

manifested in his report and his text on moral philosophy,
emerged out of the democratization of his era.
Wayland's report is a Jacksonian appeal.

Antczak

(1985) says that during the early period of the nineteenth
century, with the aid of Jackson's election, a democratic
audience emerged.

A characteristic of this democratic

audience was, in part, "outsideness;" a willingness to buttheads.

As Antczak puts it, "Americans saw themselves as

potential 'heroes against the odds';increasingly confident
in their can-do attitudes, they were willing and even eager
to 'enter the scramble' and get ahead" (p. 49).

This

perception developed, Antczak contends, through the
personality and exaggerated triumphs of Jackson.

What is

more, an aversion to authority existed and also an antiintellectualism.

Antczak, speaking of Jackson, says that he

"was the key representative figure of American politics in
the nineteenth century because with him, identification with
a democratic character became the most effective mode of
persuasion of the popular audience..."

(p. 49).

Hence, I argue that Wayland developed these attitudes
as dimensions of prudential conduct and discursive practice.
I also suggest that Wayland might have seen himself as a
sort of Jacksonian educator.

Though a Baptist Whig, he

apparently considered himself the outsider in an arena
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dominated by conservative, classical thought.

He was trying

to beat the odds in consideration for the mass populace.
Crane (1962) says that Wayland's earlier critiques of
classical education "struck a popular and potentially
destructive note in the age of Jackson" (p. 107).

The

destructive note was that he still wanted to retain and
improve the traditional classical course.

However, in 1850,

he thought the traditional courses should stand on their own
merits.

His democratic appeal illustrated that he seemingly

longed to be the public's educational hero, and the
classicist's villain.
Commercial Autonomy
A consistent economic voice further established
Wayland's gestures of individualism and self-reliance.
Through his mode of rhetorical identification, he
established a sort of commercial personality for the
democratic, autonomous agent.

Again, Antczak (1985) reveals

that in the age of Jackson the "rhetoric of personal
identification" beat out the "rhetoric of issues"
To Antczak,

(p. 43).

"[T]he practice of Jacksonian politics, a

rhetoric of personality led to reshaping the substance of
politics..."

(p. 43).

The substance centered around

"strictly personal considerations"

(p. 43).

While Wayland

was not on the same political playing field as Jackson, I
contend that he, too, engaged in a type of rhetoric of
personality.

Though it does not recant any triumphant

measures, Wayland's report granted only a specific
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characterization for the moral individual: He or She was
economically viable.

At the get-go, Wayland argued that

"Every man among us is the architect of his own fortune"

(p.

13) .
Two of Wayland's key ideas were that education was an
article, and that universities ought to be economically
independent.

Discussing the history of American colleges,

Wayland (1850) said that "the demand for the article
produced in the colleges was falling off, not from the want
of wealth, or intelligence, or enterprise in the community;
but really because a smaller number of the community desired
it" (p. 22).

Wayland thought that to fix things meant

offering newly styled and practical course work.

This would

allow colleges/universities to stray away from communal
financial support.

Wayland's point was that asking a

community for money was not economically self-reliant.
Harvard tried this system of communal charity, but Wayland
did not think it worked out.

Wayland offered extended

statistics to argue that Harvard found it difficult to fund
itself even as the community helped it along.

Therefore,

there was a profound problem with the system.

Primarily,

the problem rested in college and university administrators
not being prudent enough to re-work pedagogy to become
economically autonomous as institutions.
Wayland (1850) continued this thought when he discussed
some proposals for agricultural and industrial schools.
argued that if traditional colleges did not provide for
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He

practical training, the populace would attend the new,
practical institutions:

"If the prestige of colleges should

be thus destroyed, and it be found that as good an education
as they furnish, can be obtained in any of those other
schools, the number of their students will be seriously
diminished"

(p. 60, his emphasis) .

Brown had to change or

it would become obsolete in the educational market-place.
If Brown would make the changes Wayland thought prudent,
only then could it "reap all the benefit arising from the
diffusion and progress of knowledge"

(p. 61). Brown, like

the individual, should be self-reliant— especially, like
Jackson in New Orleans, in the face of adversity.
Furthermore, Wayland1s (1850) "history of the
institution"

(p. 41) was an economic narrative.

He

discussed the number of students, the salaries of teachers
and administrators, he even supplied a table.

He considered

the income of the institution, the aid given to students,
the money donated to the institution, the property assets of
the institution, and the financial strategies the
corporation followed to insure the college's success.
Wayland also recounted administrative deeds, but with an
economic slant.

He reported at length on how donors offered

specific amounts for such things as the library and means
for scientific progress.

These were all commercial appeals

that helped shape his prudential point of view.
Wayland concluded his treatise with several economic
observations, also appeals shaping his conception of
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prudence.

First, Brown could not exist much longer without

increased funding.

Second, given the impractical mode of

education, even funding additions would not increase the
number of students unless a major provision created
"gratuitous" tuition. Third, "gratuitous" tuition would only
steal students from other colleges; it would not increase
the number of educated citizens in society or bring
education to the working classes.

Fourth, the same amount

of money needed to sustain the college would, if they would
fix things the way Wayland wanted, add to the number of
students and "confer inestimable advantages on every class
of society" (1850, p. 75).

While one might argue that

Wayland was simply reporting the obvious economic state of
things, I suggest his economic observations highlighted his
form of practical reasoning.

His economic way of seeing and

talking bolstered what he considered prudential pedagogical
policy.

He was declaring his thesis that

...our colleges are not filled because we do not
furnish the education desired by the people...Our
customers, therefore, come from the smallest class of
society. ..We have produced an article for which the
demand is diminishing... Is it not time to inquire
whether we cannot furnish an article for which the
demand will be, at least, somewhat more remunerative?"
(p. 34) .
Thus, Wayland regarded students as customers seeking an
article.

His supply and demand way of thinking borrowed

from a tradition of prudence founded in the commercialism of
the mid-nineteenth century.

He enacted a notion of prudence

through the language of commercialism that revealed the
importance of economic self-reliance.

Wayland thought that
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Brown had to adapt or become impoverished.

The school had

to re-invigorate the value of its education so customers
could consume a product of value and, through the process of
consumption, become more independent.
Crane (1962) says that "his [Wayland1s] policies were
based on principles of educational finance..."

(p. 68).

Crane also reveals that Wayland's "individualistic moral
code, qualified faith in democracy and progress, and
laissez-faire economics, which he associated with the laws

of the universe, provided the basis for his educational
policies"

(p. 69).

I have suggested that the discursive

practice of talking in an economic tone helped establish
Wayland's sense of prudence.

It illustrated the type of

democratic personality he advocated.

Put simply, the ideal

democratic personality, the prudent democrat, was
economically viable.

Additionally, the economically viable

person was also moral:
Wayland's investigations in political economy
strengthened his convention that a benevolent
providence governed human affairs and that social
institutions must meet the test of utility...Thus the
laws of political economy paralleled and reinforced
those of moral philosophy" (Crane, p. 74) .
As Wayland himself put it.
Reasoning from unquestionable facts in the history of
man, they [wealthy people] have incontrovertibly proved
that the precepts of Jesus Christ, in all their
simplicity, point out the only rules of conduct, in
obedience to which, either nations or individuals can
become either rich or happy (cited in Crane, p. 74).
Thus, Christian rules apparently supported Wayland's
prudential framework.

These rules took formal structure in
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both his moral philosophy and political economy texts.

In

1837, Wayland announced that "the principles of political
economy are so closely analogous to those of Moral
Philosophy, that almost every question in one, may be argued
on grounds belonging to the other" (p. vi) .
To summarize, Wayland’s idea of prudential pedagogical
policy was to democratize higher education.

In light of

Jasinski's (1997) ideas, we might say that Wayland enacted
this sense of prudence through appeals to Jacksonian
individualism and the language of commercialism.

The

conventions of mid-nineteenth century democratic
individualism, Wayland's personal understanding of moral
philosophy and political economy founded in Baptist,
Christian belief all produced Wayland's conceptualization of
prudence.

Because he thought that the rules of moral

philosophy and political economy were manifestations of the
laws of God, he used this conventional mid-nineteenth
century conviction in order to invent his rhetoric.

Through

his prudential way of thinking Wayland sought to fashion a
specific kind of democratic identification.

He offered his

own commercial/Christian, political/moral personality to the
public as a rhetorical illustration of the ideal democratic
citizen.

Furthermore, Brown was a symbolic representation

of the democratic individual.

To make Brown profitable was

to make it an example of prudent democratic and moral
action.
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THE REPORT'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT
I have suggested that Wayland emphasized what he saw as
the ideal democratic citizen.
rhetorical popularizer.

In this, Wayland was a

I also suggest that Wayland

unveiled an ideal of democratic citizenry for the audience
to model.

Like other rhetorical popularizers, his

"invitation was not to some specific and shareable
commitment but to the acceptance of individual moral
responsibility generally"

(Clark and Halloran, 1993, p. 14).

Rhetors often conveyed this "responsibility" through story.
While Wayland offered specific educational proposals to
advance his prudential stance, he also conveyed an ideal
democratic character in narrative action.
Crane (1962) thinks that Wayland believed that "simple
piety...was more effective than learning"

(p. 71).

Moreover, Wayland "paid little attention to the historical
development of human institutions.

If educators obeyed

moral laws, their schools would probably prosper; in any
case, their consciences would be clear"

(p. 69) .

While I am

not as cynical as Crane, I do think that Wayland perhaps
meant his historical narratives to frame the role of
American college education and the specific role of the
practical classes within the unfolding of American history.
Therefore, his narrative history further dramatized the
plight of the practical classes, illustrated the specific
character of college as sin economic article to be consumed
on the road of individual progress, but, most importantly,

111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

promoted what he thought was the ideal, prudent person in
action.

His textual context was a fiction that helped him

develop his prudential view in temporal flow.

The

rhetorical appeals that established his prudential outlook
also generated his textual context.
When Hart (1997) discusses the rhetorical narrative, he
urges critics to look for specific things.

For one, the

critic ought to decide if a narrative springs from a master
story.

Second, one should decide what proposition a

narrative is revealing.

Third, one should decide what

propositions the narrative masks.

Simply put, Wayland's

fiction was the story of mythical frontierism, pragmatism
and the self-made American.

It submitted the proposition

that a college/university education ought to be a utility
for the individual on the way to economic well-being.
However, the story hid the proposition that a
college/university ought to function more classically,
producing a sense of communitarianism.

More specifically,

it hid the competing view of prudence articulated in the
Yale Report.

Through his individualistic and commercial

appeals, Wayland generated a seemingly historic narrative
that implicitly refuted the Yale Report by masking the
perceived importance of classical education with the face of
individual, commercial merit.
Wayland painted the past as a time of warranted mis
understanding and error; early American educators simply did
not understand the progressive nature of the American
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experiment.

Wayland illustrated the present in his repeated

comments about the "progress” of the nation, and in his
rendering of Brown as an educational embarrassment.

His

vision of the future took form in his arguments about what
might happen if the corporation would not, or would, heed
his proposals.

For instance, if the corporation conceded to

Wayland's policy requests it would result in financial
compensation to Brown.
Wayland spent most of his rhetorical effort recounting
the past.

For instance, in the first major section of the

report, he weaved a narrative about the traditional style of
education in Great Britain.

To Wayland (1850) , it was

"natural" for early American educators to desire to copy
English literary colleges.

However, Wayland argued that

because the United States was unlike Great Britain in many
regards, the fit between literary education and American
democratic idealism and pragmatism was unnatural.
first place,
institutions"

In the

"they were ecclesiastical and monastic
(p. 6) .

Further, Wayland argued that British

universities were not universities at all, but rather "a
collection of colleges"

(p. 7).

The single college, the

prototype for the colonial colleges, was a "distinct
society" (p. 9) .

The object was to educate youthful, future

ministers in a family environment: "master, fellows, tutors,
and students, all sitting at the same table"

(p. 9).

Wayland made the traditional English college out to be an
educational utopia for future clergy.

Moreover,
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"if a

system of this kind were to be adopted, we do not perceive
in what manner the present organization of a college in an
English university could be improved"

(p. 9) .

However, Wayland suggested that historic American
colleges unwittingly fouled things up.

Mistakes took shape

in, first, an adoption of "the unchangeable period of four
years, and confined the course of education almost
exclusively to Greek, Latin and Mathematics..."
9).

(1850, p.

Also, early American colleges assumed the role of

superintendence over the student, but did not arrange their
buildings appropriately or require all officers to live on
campus.

Third,

"We [American educators] gave to the college

the power of conferring all degrees in the several
faculties..."

(p. 10).

Wayland insisted,

"Hence, in this

country, a college and a university mean the same thing; in
England their meaning is very dissimilar.

The result of our

departures from the original idea has been in every respect
unfortunate"

(p. 10) .

Finally, Wayland maintained that the

American experimentation was in some ways successful.

"We

certainly have then no reason to be ashamed of the colleges
founded in our early history"

(p. 11).

Yet, Wayland emphasized throughout the first section
that the nation's educational founders misunderstood the
nation's educational needs; copying English traditions
stifled American higher education.

The early colleges

wanted to use the clergy model for every student.

Early

educators did not quite see the unique democratic sense of
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Americanism.

America had a unique democratic

characteristic, much different from that of England, and
Wayland thought this should force educators to re-model
American higher education.
Within the second section of the report, Wayland (1850)
became even more of an embellishing historian, still focused
on the past, but closer to home.

With the "dawn" of the

nineteenth century new sciences held the "progress of
civilization"

(p. 12).

Literacy increased, the Revolution

quickened intellectualism, and the "spirit of self-reliance
had gained strength by the result of that [the Revolution]
contest"

(p. 12).

To Wayland, the nation's wealth and its

ability to produce was unending, but the country needed
scientific application.
Wayland argued,

Given this historical rendition,

"That such a people could be satisfied with

the teaching of Greek, Latin, and the element of
Mathematics, was plainly impossible"
needs awaited.

(p. 12).

Practical

"What could Virgil and Horace and Homer and

Demosthenes, with a little mathematics and natural
philosophy, do towards developing the untold resources of
this continent?"

(p. 12-13).

With frontier leanings,

Wayland became an opponent to classical education; he became
the "outsider."
Wayland (1850) suggested that instead of changing the
curriculum, turn of the century educators held to
unwarranted assumptions that "our colleges were designed
exclusively for professional [clergy, law, medicine] men;
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that they must teach all that professional men might wish to
know; and that all this must be taught in four years..."
14).

(p.

Wayland narrated all the various branches of learning

offered in New England at the turn of the century and, using
his statistical mode of support, he added all the weeks of
four years, divided it by twenty courses of study, and
concluded that "in this manner all continuity of thought is
interrupted, and literary enthusiasm rendered almost
impossible"
educators,

(p. 15).

However, to the turn of the century

"The greater the number of studies prescribed in

the curriculum, the more generous is believed to be the
education imparted"

(p. 15).

Wayland thought this was

absurd.
Still focusing on the past, but alluding to the
present, Wayland (1850) contended that the result of turn of
the century educational system was not all that impressive.
Again using his statistical examples, he made it obvious
that given a fixed amount of time, an increase of subjects
resulted in a decrease in learning: "the student never
carrying forward his knowledge to its results, but being
ever fagging at elements, looses all enthusiasm in the
pursuit of science"

(p. 17).

Colleges during the early part

of the nineteenth century simply taught too much.
did this impact the student, but also the teacher.

Not only
The

teacher could "not mark out such a course as he would wish
to teach, but must teach as much as he can, in the fragment
of time allotted to him" (p. 19) .
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In his historical narrative, Wayland discussed the
early history of American higher education from an even more
economic way of seeing.

Through several paragraphs, Wayland

argued that the option of teaching more in the same fixed
time was partly a function of the institution's economic
framework.

In the early history of American education the

institutions supported themselves.

Most usually, at least

before communal support, institutions depended on fees, but
fees were failing because of the movement of civilization.
The early system was correct, thought Wayland, but did not
move quick enough.

Offering a glimpse of his view of

American progress, Wayland (1850) insisted,

"It is manifest

to the most casual observer, that the movement of
civilization is precisely in the line of the useful arts"
(p. 21) . Given this seemingly natural movement, colleges,
especially in New England, had difficulty supporting
themselves: "The fact is, they were originally schools for
merely the learned professions, and the proportion of those
whole desired a professional education was growing less" (p.
22).

Thus, what resulted was a system of charity in order to
create a "gratuitous" tuition.

However, to Wayland (1850)

there was "danger, under such a system, that colleges may be
tempted to render education cheap instead of striving to
render it valuable"

(p. 31).

This system of looking for

financial support in the community in order to supply very
cheap education failed, according to Wayland.

It did not
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work because the practice did not idealize the American
democratic experiment of individuality and commercial selfreliance that saturated the culture outside of academe.
When Wayland elaborated on his present-day Brown he
praised the university, but, in light of its charity system
and lack of innovative courses, also said that in many ways
it was not the type of institution it ought to be.

"The

number of students, for several years, has not increased,
but has diminished.

Hence the condition of the institution

has become embarrassed"

(1850, p. 47).

Wayland continued

the point by reporting that not only might Brown exhaust its
funds if the failing system persisted, but also that the
institution would lose prestige if it did not alter its
educational philosophy.

Given these problems, Wayland

suggested that two options of "relief" were open to the
college.

The first was to continue what it was doing and

adjust the branches of learning available, but stay the
literary framework and fixed time.

However, this would "do

nothing, or very little either to reduce the cost of tuition
or render it gratuitous.
the number of students"

It would not, therefore, increase
(p. 49) .

The second option would be

to meet the needs of the public.
As he continued developing his historical narrative,
Wayland (1850) illustrated that one of the reasons for
making education more practical and democratic was its
expedience (p. 57) .

I suggest this expediency supported and

developed Wayland's sense of prudence in temporal movement.
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Again, to Wayland, American civilization was naturally
advancing toward the useful arts. Past minds did not
appreciate the practical arts, but the birth of practical
industry called for practical knowledge.

He revealed, "The

time then would seem to have arrived, when our institutions
of learning are called upon to place themselves in harmony
with the advanced and rapidly advancing condition of
society"

(p. 59) .

Brown had to make the change or it would

"suffer injury from one of the most hopeful indications of
the progress of civilization" (p. 61) . Again, Brown could
not be economically self-reliant without the change.
I already mentioned the changes Wayland wanted to make
at Brown and the general policy he advocated and thus
apparently thought prudent.

As he proposed his changes, he

revealed one a glimpse of how he saw the possible future.
He said,

"The object of the change would be to adapt the

institution to the wants, not of a class, but of the whole
community"

(1850, p. 53).

This would relieve Brown's

embarrassment by allowing the college to fend for itself:
[N] o other way can this result be arrived at, than by
extending its advantages to every class of the
community, and thus increasing the number of its
pupils. The more it can do for itself, the less
need...[for] friends...(p. 54).
Wayland, therefore, saw past educational systems as
blunders to be re-worked.

Wayland flooded the present with

progressivism outside the academy, but stagnation within.
The future, if the committee accepted Wayland's proposals,
would help perpetuate Wayland's notion of prudence and thus
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help sustain commercial individualism.

Through a narrative

voice, he weaved a tale aligned to the popular American
mythos of the time.

Antczak (1985) says that democratic

urges often got help from frontier notions.

He explains

that "people of the time found the notion of the possibility
for advancement increasingly credible, so much so that their
belief eventually generalized to the characteristically
American 'myth of the self-made man' and 'the doctrine of
self-improvement'" (p. 26).

Materialism amounted to an

idealism; and, the "moral habits of self-determination"
helped average citizens think in political terms.

Wayland's

narrative emphasized a prudential stance marked by moral,
commercial individualism and a democratic mythos.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
In sum, Wayland's view of prudent policy was that Brown
ought to extend the curriculum and allow the working classes
to attend the institution.

I suggest that the languages of

individuality, self-reliance, and economic materialism were
the linguistic idioms that actualized Wayland's sense of
prudence.

These idioms were traditions Wayland adhered to

for dramatic effect.

He used these idioms for the purpose

of uplifting the practical classes of society— or individual
citizens within those classes— in accordance with what he
identified as universal laws.
Further, Wayland also made himself out to be the
Jacksonian outsider through his often anti-classical
sentiments and the recanting of his own moral causes. Not
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unlike his political contemporaries, Wayland's was a
rhetoric of identification.
structure.

This was his argumentative

"The speaker had to be a sort of representative

figure," says Antczak (1985), "— representative in the sense
of being one with, one of the democratic audience, of
course; but representative too of the discipline he wanted
to popularize"

(p. 9, his emphasis) .

In this case, WayLand

wanted to popularize not rhetoric, but college education,
and a mode of prudential conduct and discursive practice.
Though the work he crafted was a formalized report to
Brown's corporation, it was, as Crane contends, an appeal to
the public.

To be sure, future pragmatist perpetuated his

prudential outlook of democratic, commercial individualism,
and his inventional framework.

Noting the democratic

idealism within the 1850 report, Crane (1962) states,

"It

was used by critics of the classics and became a weapon for
politicians demanding radical changes in existing
institutions that they might serve the 'practical' needs of
laborers and farmers" (p. 67) .
Considering the textual context, we can see that
Wayland constructed a narrative in order to tap into popular
mythos.

To Antczak, the average citizen longed for

education in order to live up to the ideal of materialism
and self-determination.
as a utility to this end.

Wayland re-worked higher education
This was his proposition.

No

longer was a college education about the sanctity of
classical thought.

Wayland's prudential outlook was that
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Brown must democratize higher education in light of the
story he narrated.

Wayland's was the age of commercial

individualism, and he gave terms of action to his audience
through his rhetorical narrative.
Wayland seemed to have acquired much of the financial
support he needed to inaugurate his new system before he
published the report.

Though the New England Baptists did

not give funding, after Brown published the report the
public rallied to Wayland's economic needs, and the
corporation conceded.

The Fall semester of 1850 saw

Wayland's new scheme in action.

There was a wide choice of

courses, though the traditional classics remained.

Brown

promised a master's degree to students desiring to learn and
complete their studies in the classics.

The Bachelor of

Arts offered elective options and only required one ancient
language.

The only course required of all students was

Wayland's own in moral philosophy.

According to Crane

(1962), it was the only course required "since it treated of
God's laws for human conduct, it was more important than
purely intellectual studies" (p. 117).

Wayland appointed

two new professors in "practical" education.
non-degree seekers, especially their payments.

Brown welcomed
What is of

most importance, however, is that
Wayland's reforms involved not simply the
introduction of elective studies, but, more
significantly, the provision of a pattern of
alternative degrees and educational opportunities for
students who were not seeking any degree at all. Here,
in a repudiation of the traditional curriculum which
appears almost chaotic, was the ultimate expression of
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the president's utilitarianism and educational
democracy (Crane, p.118).
Typical of an administrator, Wayland was happy to see
Brown's classrooms very full.
dramatic.

The increase in number was

However, the major increase was in the demand for

a classical education and the new master's degree.

While

Wayland thought it was his educational proposals that were
ringing in the profits, Crane asserts that it was a new tide
in American prosperity.
Even still, Brown was a successful institution for a
while, but such controversies as dormitory supervision
forced Wayland to oust professors and replace them with
trusted alumni.

Faculty morale grew low, especially in

regards to Wayland's fee system of compensation.
resigned in 1855.

Wayland

Brown elected Wayland a Fellow of the

University, but he broke all ties with Brown in 1857 because
the new president, Barnes Sears, for all intents and
purposes dismantled Wayland's radical system.

He did so,

says Crane (1962), in order to gain respect with his
colleagues around the country "who had viewed Brown's 'new
system' primarily as an attack on the ancient languages" (p.
120) .

Historically, Wayland and his 1850 report have many
fans.

For instance, Crane (1962) reveals that the

democratic leanings and emphasis on a practical curriculum
forecasted two of the major features of American colleges
after the Civil War.

William Green Roelker (1943) acclaimed
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Wayland as the pioneer of the elective system.

Butts (1939)

ranks Wayland with Jefferson.
However, many educators responded to Wayland's rhetoric
and his prudential way of thinking with harshness.

Crane

(1962), though giving Wayland some credit, explains that
Wayland's progressive ideas "rudely interrupted the natural
development of Brown University, though they were
accompanied by a major addition to its funds"

(p. 66) .

Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison (1936) thought that
Wayland's philosophy did more "mischief" than any other
reform notion in the history of American education.

Bronson

(1914) says that Wayland struggled between the objective of
mass education and the objective of a sound Brown treasury.
Wriston (1945) thinks that Wayland's report was "vitiated by
a fatal confusion"

(p. 30).

More specifically.

It was framed with a view not only to educational
reform but also to financial support. No program can
have promotion as one of its essential elements and be
educationally successful. It is not possible to make
money by emphasis on 'high intellectual culture,'
practical philosophy, or Christian ethics (cited in
Crane, 1962, p. 68) .
Wayland's contemporaries at Brown, like Sears, shared many
of the above critical sentiments.

Wayland's critics

commented on the danger of placing the principles of supply
and demand upon pedagogical culture.
Nevertheless, I contend that Wayland's prudential
outlook and the way he enacted it through his rhetoric
helped his persuasive effort.

Wayland's prudential thought

promoted the commercially viable, self-reliant individual as
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the epitome of ideal Christian morality and as a model of
the ideal democratic personality.

X suggest that this aided

his quest to democratize higher education in America not
only because it helped perpetuate his own moral and economic
codes, but also an American mythos he obviously embraced.
It helped because he borrowed his prudence from an immensely
popular public sentiment.

While for the most part the

faculty of Brown were ashamed by the report, as were others
in the higher education scene, the general public,
especially those in Rhode Island, seem to have rallied to
Wayland's side (Crane, 1962).
Hence, we can say from Hall's (1980) perspective that
perhaps the general public, or those advocating democratic
notions, read the meaning that Wayland actually intended;
this idea that democratic individualism was synonymous with
commercial self-reliance and morality.

However, we can say,

too, that perhaps a negotiated reading led some in the
culture to think in terms of democratic pedagogy, but also
retort the supply and demand way of thinking.

However,

others might have read it not as a slogan for and from the
democratic masses, but rather an attack on ancient
languages.
intended.

And I do not think that is really what Wayland
He was saying that classical courses, courses he

had taught at Union College, simply needed to compete with
more vocational studies.

He wanted all the types of courses

under the same roof to give students choice.
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In short, I suggest that his prudential way of thinking
hindered his efforts within the educational scene.

His

changes at Brown were short-lived, and scholars savoring the
sacredness of classical education have consistently berated
his appeals.

Maybe Wayland wanted to antagonize

conservative educators.

If so, this clash gives credence to

the successfulness of his effort for the future.

While he

made little lasting headway in his immediate arena, he
became a martyr for his cause.

Progressive voices still

herald him as an educational savior and imitate his sense of
prudence.

Even J.B. Turner, though he did not discuss

Wayland's proposal, certainly enlisted similar notions of
American democratic individualism in his speech to a rural
crowed in Illinois.
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CHAPTER

FIVE

JONATHAN BALDWIN TURNER AND HIS 1851
"PLAN FOR AN INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY"
INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Baldwin Turner was b o m on a farm in
Massachusetts, December 7, 1805, and died on January 10,
1899.

His father was an Army captain, and his grandfather a

lieutenant.
origin.
type.

Turner was of English, French, and Norman

Turner was a strong, vigorous youth— a farm boy
But he was smart as well.

The practical knowledge he

picked up here and there he taught to others.

He also

worked for neighbors when he was not needed at home.
Turner's family wanted him to stay home and not venture
off to school like his older brother.

When Turner was

twenty-one his father gave him a deed to all the Turner
property.

However, Turner's brother, Asa, persuaded his

father to allow Jonathan to enter Yale, as Asa himself had
done.

At Yale, Turner was appointed as an instructor of a

gymnasium school connected with Yale, but Turner also took
preparatory courses in order to enter Yale.

When he

finished his preparatory work, Turner entered the Classical
Department at Yale.
and Greek.

He took prizes in English composition

After the summer vacation of 1832, Turner

returned to Yale, but things would soon change his
educational process.
In 1833 Jeremiah Day personally suggested to Jonathan
Turner that he journey to Illinois to teach at Illinois
College in Jacksonville.

Although Turner had not yet
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graduated from Yale, Day promised to award him the degree if
he went west before his graduation.

Henry (1961) explains

that "Turner's enlistment in Illinois education and the
reasons for it had the quality of a volunteer for missionary
duty"

(p. vii) .

Turner was not the first Yale student or

graduate to venture that way.

The Presbyterians helped

establish Illinois College and wanted Yale graduates to help
develop the religious frontier through education.. The number
of Yale graduates in Illinois led to the formation of the
"Yale Band," a group of seven.
Turner’s older brother, Asa.

Included in the seven was
These seven had organized, in

1829, "The Illinois Association" to promote learning and
religion in the rural area through preaching and
establishing a seminary of learning.
Turner, however, was unorthodox and did not strictly
adhere to conservative doctrines.

Turner dabbled in

religion, politics, and education and was sort of a roaming
"evangelist of ideas" (Henry, 1961, p. viii), but his
unconventional stances brought him criticism.

For instance,

conservatives rebuked him when he attacked the views of his
Presbyterian roots.

Early on, he spoke against slavery

before it was popular to do so.

In the educational arena,

he voiced the need for practical education for the working
classes and the impracticality of a classical education for
the yeoman agrarian and industrialist.

He was so boisterous

that he became the "center of public turmoil" in Illinois
(p. viii) .

According to Henry,

"Like Horace Mann, he used
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every occasion he could find--teachers' meetings, sermons,
county fairs— to awaken the people to a greater interest in
their schools and in how to advance their welfare"

(p. ix) .

Edmund James, president of Illinois College, called him "A
prophet of democracy in the western country"
Henry, p. ix) .

(cited in

Even so, in 1848, the Presbyterians forced

Turner to abandon his post at Illinois College.

Turner,

then, returned to the love of his youth, agriculture.
Instead of going back to his Massachusetts homestead,
however, he remained in Illinois.
While he was advancing agricultural products like the
Osage Orange, which made it possible to fence the prairie,
Turner also lectured both in and out of Illinois on

the

social and practical advancement of the "working class."

He

became associated with the movement for the creation of an
industrial university in Illinois, and through the 1850's
was the principal lobbyist for the Illinois Industrial
League.

He gave several speeches very similar in nature.

One speech Turner delivered to a convention in Granville,
November 18, 1851, best captured his prudential outlook, his
view of reality, and what he saw as the plight of the
laboring classes.
When he taught, Turner was a teacher in the humanities,
specializing in rhetoric, Latin, and Greek.

According to

Henry (1961), Turner most usually offered "purple passages"
and a "grand manner" of speaking characteristic of early
nineteenth century oratory (p. xi) .

This is true, but
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perhaps he needed to maneuver around his classical training
for this speech.
exigencies.

I suggest that Turner faced two general

First, he had to promote a pedagogical plan

that brought the rural crowd into the fold; he had to
convince them that it was prudent for a farmer to have a
college or university education.

Second, in light of his

classical training, he had to identify with his rural
audience.
In the first section of this chapter, I will describe
Turner's speech.

Second, I will interpret the notion of

prudence he developed rhetorically.

In the third section I

will examine the speech's textual context in order to more
fully understand the sense of prudence Turner advanced
through textual time.

Finally, I will explain how Turner's

prudential outlook aided his persuasive effort.
SUMMARY
Turner's speech was about the proposition to devise an
Industrial University in the state of Illinois.

Turner's

arguments for a new university took shape through several
different sections.

He first discussed what he interpreted

as the "want" of the industrial classes and how they could
themselves supply it.

Then he moved to offer his arguments

for practical education by contrasting practical education
with a classical education.

Finally, he spoke of funding

and administering the would-be industrial college.
As Turner began his speech, he established what he saw
as a natural relationship between the professional class and
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the industrial class. This class division was necessary,
but the industrial class had, heretofore, received the short
end of the stick in regard to education.

The professional

classes had their specific schools, curriculums, textbooks,
teachers, but civilized society had not yet afforded the
working classes with a unique and appropriate educational
system.

Turner believed the working classes desired their

own educational niche.
To Turner, existing institutions could not offer such
an education.

There needed to be parallel educational

schemes that correlated to the opposite destinies of the two
classes.

Through a new education system, Turner wanted to

supply the working classes with a different, practical
pedagogical process that might bring them higher social
standing.
As Turner continued his speech, he insisted that
progressive efforts should not focus on primary education.
Education, like water, flowed downhill.

Moreover, he argued

that a National Institute of Science should exist to help
coordinate industrial universities in each class with other
schools like lyceums and high schools.

Turner wanted a

federal eye on the ball.
Turner's plan also focused on specific, practical
principles.

For instance, he urged that any industrial

university must have several appropriate buildings.

He also

thought that instruction should cover the "anatomy and
physiology, the nature" (1851, p. 73) of almost every living
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animal, bird, insect and plant under the sun.

Turner

suggested that the university should instruct students on
the nature of soils, on the nature of manufacturing, on the
"political, financial, domestic, and manual economy...to all
industrial processes..."

(p. 73).

Even further, the model

industrial university would to teach law, the theory and art
of government, the laws of vicinage, health, trade,
commerce, ethics, and accounting.

In short, Turner desired

the institution to teach
...all those studies and sciences, of whatever sort,
which tend to throw light upon any art or employment
which any student may desire to master, or upon any
duty he may be called to perform, or which may tend to
secure his moral, civil, social, and industrial
perfections as a man (p. 73)
Apparently, Turner wanted nothing left out.
He suggested, too, that professors ought to hold annual
experiments.

In order to accomplish these experiments, the

institution required plentiful resources like appropriate
grounds and collections of vegetation.

Turner insisted that

there should also be a number of buildings to secure a
successful experimentation process and a shed to keep tools
in.

When the experiments started producing results the

state would create a patent office to register inventions.
Additionally, any industrial education would have an
industrial library with practical literature.

Students

would come from any class and stay at the institution for
any length of time they were willing to pay for, either in
money or necessary work on the grounds.

Even more, Turner
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envisioned an annual fair during which students showcased
their efforts and professors lectured.
Turner then moved to ideas about how to handle the
administration and funding of his hypothetical, practical
institution. He thought a fund already existing for the
purpose of creating a college would do the trick. Illinois
designed the fund to give a college to the "people."

And

the administration of such a college would be in the hands
of the "people."

He wanted the Governor to nominate a board

of five to look after the funds.
the nominations.

The Senate would confirm

If any members of the board were

"sinister" the people could impeach them.
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT
I suggest that Turner's prudential sense of appropriate
pedagogical policy was that the yeoman agrarians ought to
have their own educational scheme.

We can recall that

Jasinski (1997) thinks a performative tradition exists in
and through certain linguistic idioms, particular speaking
voices, figurative and argumentative patterns, and future
generic conventions.

The idea of prudence that emerged in

Turner's discourse primarily existed in and through the
language of myth.

Turner became a representative hero of

that myth not only because he bought into the mythic cause,
but because he shed his classical identity.

The myth took

shape in the metonymic structure of his argument and the
anti-intellectualism Turner professed.

This tradition, more

or less, was perpetuated by other rhetors, especially in the
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late nineteenth century during the agrarian revolts, to
enliven agrarian ideals through the story.
Metonvnrv
The essence of metonymy is that it reduces substantive
reality to a word or phrase.

Hart (1997) says that metonymy

refers to "using the name of one thing as the name for
something else to which it has a logical relationship"
151).

(p.

This stylistic device functions to generate a new

association among ideas.

Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson

(1980) say that metonymy provides a spotlight on the
intellectual focus of a rhetorical effort.
attention to a single feature.
is the phrase,

It calls

The example Hart (1997) uses

"Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait"

(p.

151) , which reduces the Iraqi military to a single villain.
This reduction, however, can be dangerous.

Burke (1950)

thinks that a metonymic reduction does not capture the
essence or substance of reality.

Leff (1989) thinks that

this stylistic device does not consider "the motives and
interests that inform the substance of human behavior..."
(p. 120).

To Leff, this type of logic reduces "all human

action to naturalistic correlations, to mere processes..."
(p. 120).

Echoing Burke and Leff, Madsen (1993) states, "A

mytonymic construction of an event would be a
misrepresentation or deflection of the essence of the event"
(p. 210).
Turner's speech reduced social reality to what he
called a non-antagonistical relationship between the so-
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called professional class and the working class.

While this

mytonymic structure of social reality maybe mis-represented
the existing substance of Turner's external reality, this
social organization gave potentiality to the prudential
action he advocated.

We can see the logic advancing

throughout his speech as he compared and contrasted the
destinies of the two classes of people.
In the introduction of his "plan, " Turner (1851)
proposed his metonymic view of reality:
All civilized society is, necessarily, divided into two
distinct cooperative, not antagonistic, classes; a
small class, whose proper business it is to teach the
true principle of religion, law, medicine, science,
art, and literature; and a much larger class, who are
engaged in some form of labor in agriculture, commerce,
and the arts (p. 69) .
He called one class the "professional" class and the other
the "industrial" class.

Society needed very few people in

the professional class, but Turner implied that a seducing
professional siren often snatched up individuals not suited
for that class.

While Turner concluded that the

professionals were unique, he also seemed heartened by the
number and preponderance of workers.
To Turner, it was problematic for a "worker" to become
a "professional."
to the other.

The life of each class was the antithesis

From Turner's perspective, if fate had one

picked for farming, it would be ridiculous to combat that
destiny.

A "farmer at birth" had to embrace the practical

life and long for a practical education, not a classical
one.

"How absurd would it seem,"

Turner (1851) mused,
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"to

set a clergyman to plowing and. studying the depredations of
blights, insects, the growing of crops, etc., in order to
give him habits of thought and mental discipline for the
pulpit.. ." (p. 81). A person destined for a practical art
would learn "all that God has made, and all that human art
has done"

(p. 81) .

Like Wayland, Turner believed that the existing
pedagogical system needed to radically change, but Turner
was much more revolutionary than Wayland.
classes had their liberal education.

The professional

They had enough

literature to "well-nigh sink a whole navy of ships"
p. 70) .

(1851,

The industrial class, however, had no schools,

university, professors, or apparatus.

As Turner revealed,

"In other words, society has become, long since, wise enough
to know that its teachers need to be educated; but it has
not yet become wise enough to know that its workers need
education just as much" (p. 70, his emphasis).
True, teachers offered rudiments of a practical
education in the early schooling years, but that education
was not nearly enough for Turner.

While the classicists,

like Wayland, had invited the industrialists to higher
education. Turner thought that the process "set by some of
our older professional institutions [was to] keep the rising
and blazing thought of the industrial masses from burning
too furiously"

(1851, p. 70) .

Turner insisted,

"They

[professionalists] have hauled a canoe alongside of their
huge professional steamships and invited all the farmers and
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mechanics of the State to jump on board and sail with
them..." (p. 70).

Turner admitted that the professionalists

might have had their hearts in the right place, but they did
not know how to "save," as Turner put it, the workers.

The

workers needed to "save" themselves.
Therefore, Turner (1851) wanted to generate a totally
new scheme of industrial education.

His idea was that no

existing institution could supply effective practical
pedagogy.

Those colleges could not escape their

professional, literary design.

"Their whole spirit or aim

is literary and intellectual— not practical and industrial;
to make men of books and ready speech— not men of work, and
industrial, silent thought"

(p. 71).

Again, one should not

attempt to tempt fate:
But the very best classical scholars are often the very
worst practical reasoners; and that they should be made
workers is contrary to the nature of things, the fixed
laws of God. The whole interest, business, and destiny
for life of the two classes run in opposite lines; and
that the same course of study should be equally well
adapted to both is as utterly impossible as that the
same pursuits and habits should equally concern and
benefit both classes (pp. 71-72).
Thus, the working class needed its own "system of liberal
education ... adapted to their own pursuits; to create for

them an industrial literature, adapted to their professional
institutes"

(p. 72, his emphasis).

Why?

Turner thought

this should "elevate them, their pursuits, and their
posterity to that relative position in human society for
which God designed them" (p. 72).
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The metonymic logic that marks Turner's prudential
outlook was similar to the prudential thinking of John C.
Calhoun.

This suggests that this basic prudential

perspective already existed discursively in the rhetorical
and political culture of the day.

Calhoun also argued that

civilized society must, necessarily, divide itself between a
working and professional class.

To Hofstadter (1970),

Calhoun wanted division of labor adapted to the needs of the
particular geographical sections of the United States.
Calhoun thought the North had wage labor, the West the
farmer, and the South, slavery.
correct divisions.
farmer and mechanic.

To Calhoun, all were

Turner was talking only of the western
My point is that Turner used a marker

of societal organization perhaps most popularly promoted by
Calhoun.

Calhoun, and other rhetors, established it in the

oratorical culture of the day.

Unlike Calhoun, however,

Turner wanted to upset the roles.
Hence, Turner's idea of prudence depended on this
metonymic way of structuring society, but from a particular
slant. Turner seemingly believed in a natural aristocracy
much like Thomas Jefferson did.

Marmor (1988) insists that

Jefferson thought an American aristocracy would spring from
"more distant and humble counties of the nation"

(p. 6) .

They would not be aristocratic in birth, but in humble hardwork and self-reliance.

Jefferson thought that the best

suited to lead were the simple people.

Jefferson expected

that the members of this natural aristocracy would "emerge
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from the farm houses of yeoman America, not the Federalist
drawing rooms of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and
Charleston" (Marmor, p. 15) . Calhoun was born into this
idea and perpetuated it, but, as Hofstader (1970) observes,
he too rigidly perceived the dichotomy-

Calhoun's

contemporary. Turner, did not.
Thus, not only did Turner's logic generate a natural
dichotomy in line with the tradition popularized by Calhoun,
but hearkened back to the Jeffersonian ideal of a new,
natural aristocracy tempered by simplicity and agrarian
values.

According to Turner (1851), the workers would rise

up and form their own aristocracy.

Americans had to produce

a nobility with the leisure and means for agricultural
experimentation.

For Turner, this nobility would come "from

our own ranks, to aid and serve, not to domineer over and
control us" (p. 77) .

There was no rise to such a level

without the hierarchy Turner built through his metonymic
logic.

There was no natural aristocracy without a non

aristocracy.

Turner's notion of prudence depended on this

metonymic structure.
In short, Turner established a way of thinking and
acting prudently using a metonmyic logic that reduced
reality to a struggle between two natural classes of people.
In this, Turner resonated the popular sentiments of Calhoun,
one of the most prolific rhetoricians of Turner's era.

I

contend that Turner used that tradition, but stepped back to
adhere to the Jeffersonian ideal of a natural aristocracy.
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This yeoman aristocracy was also dependent upon the
metonymic logic on which Turner relied.
Anti-Intellectualism
Hart (1997) says that rhetoric often reduces evil to a
scapegoat, "a person, group, or idea treated as the
incarnation of evil"
something else.

(p. 270).

A rhetor can scapegoat

Burke calls this victimage.

scapegoat him or herself.

A rhetor might

Burke calls this mortification.

"In either case," Hart asserts, "rhetoric cleanses the soul
of sin and provides new 'attitudes’ for use in daily
decision-making"

(p. 271).

When looking for processes of

scapegoating, Hart suggests one ought to consider how strong
or overt the scapegoating is, where the scapegoat resides,
if the scapegoat resides in another person or group, and why
that person or group is being victimized.

As mentioned, I

suggest that the language of anti-intellectualism was
another aspect of Turner's prudential representation.

He

used anti-intellectual sentiments to overtly scapegoat the
professional class and classical education, and his own
background.
Turner revealed, in part, his anti-intellectual
sentiment when he asserted that classical education did not
necessarily have all there was to say about mental and moral
discipline. With a sarcastic tone, Turner (1851) admitted
that he trembled "at the thought of being arraigned before
the tribunal of all the monks and ecclesiastics of the Old
World, and no small number of their progeny in the New" (p.
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79) for advancing practical education.

Sure, classicists

should become fine writers and talkers and, therefore, learn
the dead and living languages, but "it has become quite
doubtful whether, even in their case, such a course is most
beneficial..." (p. 79).

While mental discipline did arrive

for these literary types through daily course of study, it
only hindered their teaching effort.

Turner thought that a

"classical teacher who has no original, spontaneous power of
thought, and knows nothing but Latin and Greek, however
perfectly, is enough to stultify a whole generation of boys
and make them all pedantic fools like himself"

(p. 80).

Turner (1851) also believed that there was just too
much talk and too many "purple passages."

"This chronic

diarrhoea of exhortation, while the social atmosphere of the
age tends to engender, tends far less to public health than
many suppose" (p. 80).

Turner promoted an idea of mental

and moral discipline--a conceptualization of prudence--that
came from daily practice of simple farming.

To Turner, "The

history of the Quakers shows that more sound sense, a purer
morality, and more elevated practical piety can exist, and
does exist, entirely without it [classical education], than
is commonly found with it" (p. 80) .

Thus, the practice of

"sophistical cant" and "verbose declamation" had too much
power over "obvious facts"

(p. 81).

There was no way for a classicist to teach a person
suited for a life in agriculture:
It may do for the man of books to plunge at once amid
the catacombs of buried nations and languages, to soar
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away to Greece and Rome, or Nova Zembla, Kamchatka, and
the fixed stars, before he knows how to plant his own
beans, or harness his own horse, or can tell whether
the functions of his own body are performed by a heart,
stomach, and lungs, or with a gizzard or gills (Turner,
1851, p. 80).
Common people had to rise and generate a new pedagogical
process, "unless, indeed, the pedantic professional trifles
of one man in a thousand are of more consequence than the
daily vital interests of all the rest of mankind"

(p. 82).

According to Burke, hierarchy helps generate obedience
and communication, but one cannot obey everything since
humans are imperfect.

Thus, this imperfection feeds guilt,

or pollution, into human language systems.

When individuals

recognize guilt, both victimage and mortification occur.
The catharsis or purification comes through victimage and/or
mortification, and leads to a state of stasis, or
redemption.

The rhetor is a new self.

Thus, on one level,

by evoking sentiments of anti-intellectualism Turner was
renewing himself by wringing himself away from his own
educational background that he perceived as out of date.

He

was building, through his rhetoric, an agrarian character
for himself and this discursive gesture encompassed his
notion of prudence.

Also, still working within his

metonymic logic. Turner used his own elite style to make fun
of it and treated classical studies, and the class that
promoted it, as the incarnation of societal evil.

This also

helped develop the sense of prudential action he advocated.
Additionally, Turner's anti-intellectualism associated
him with the same feeling popular in the oratorical culture
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of his day.

I classify his anti-intellectual sentiment as a

characteristic of what Cmiel (1990) calls a middling style
of rhetorical discourse.

We can recall that this middling

style mixed the literary eloquent with the uneducated raw.
Because literary education was so powerful in the early part
of the nineteenth century, rhetoricians,

to sway the common

populace, had to escape the chains of refined speech, as I
mentioned.

Again, Cmiel identifies several basic

characteristics of this effort, including intrusive
informality, calculated bluntness, jargon and euphemism.
Cmiel thinks that the invention of this middling style
provoked a "war over the soul of American life"

(p.

66) .

There existed a battle between the refined style and the
raw.

Turner's speech was a microcosm of this war.

Along

with his refined speech spawning from his classical
training, he used calculated bluntness and euphemism, and at
points great informality, to, again, scapegoat his own
educational background, literary studies, and the class that
employed it.
During the same period, mid-nineteenth century
romanticism helped offer a Saxon eloquence, or a humble
style of speech.
his plan.

In several cases, Turner (1851) disclaimed

For instance, when presenting his points he said,

" [A] nd let them pass for whatever the true friends of the
cause may think them worth"

(p. 71) . When he described his

plan of administration, he revealed, in his humble style,
that if someone had a better idea then he would "cheerfully
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accord with it" (p. 84) .

Turner used an often adorned style

to promote an unadorned, simple attitude and new, simple,
unadorned hierarchy.

This was a representation of

appropriate political action and discursive practice.
Mvth
Myths are "the substance of culture" (Hart, 1997, p.
242) . A culture’s dominant myths hold "...a society's
collectivity of persistent values, handed down from
generation to generation, that help to make the world
understandable, support the social order, and educate the
society’s young"
(1980) says,

(Rushing & Frentz, 1978, p. 67).

"Myths are self-justifying.

Robertson

Because they often

carry social ideals, the people who use them and participate
in them assume that the ideals justify the past out of which
these ideals came" (p. 19).
making.

A myth can rationalize decision

A myth can hold the seeds of prudence, but Burke

(1947) sees a difference between political ideology and
myth.

Myth drifts to the side of image, but ideology drifts

to the side of ideas, though image and ideology obviously
bleed into one another.

Burke sees myth as a non-political

first principle of the political; it is pre-political. As
Braden (1983) puts it, "[M]yth provides an effective means
of establishing identification or consubstantiality.

When

the speaker activates the myth, listeners develop feelings
of kinship or oneness with him"

(p. 74) . When a speaker

activates a myth through speech, that invigorates the pre
political narrative, the society that embraces it, and the
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individuals that participate in that society and story.

One

of the most important markers of Turner's conception of
prudence was his activation, dependence and perpetuation of
mythic agrarianism.

With it, he helped energize a specific

audience identity.
This agrarian myth was a story of the yeoman farmer and
his sacred tie to land.
the myth:

Hofstadter (1955) describes part of

"Because he [the yeoman farmer] lived in close

communion with beneficent nature, his life was believed to
have a wholesomeness and integrity impossible for the
depraved populations of cities"

(p.24-25).

Burkholder

(1989) describes several themes of the myth often used in
nineteenth century populist rhetoric.
are important for my purposes here.
were archetypal citizens.

Four of the themes

First, small landowners

As Burkholder puts it, "Self-

sufficient and economically independent, yeomen farmers were
the foundation of democratic society"

(p. 294).

Second,

agriculture was uniquely important to society and called for
governmental protection.

Third, America was the "garden of

the world" and "[f]orces outside the garden, in other
countries and in the American east, were suspect and
probably evil" (p. 294).

Finally, nature was beneficent and

honest labor reaped its bounty.
There were several instances that indicate that the
yeoman agrarian was the ideal citizen to Turner, but this
was perhaps best illustrated when he discussed what kind of
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student ought to attend, and who should control his
propositional university.

Turner (1851) said that

A man of real skill is amazed at the slovenly ignorance
and waste he everywhere discovers on all parts of their
premises, and still more to hear them boast of their
ignorance of all 'book farming, ' and maintain that
'their children can do as well as they have done'; and
it certainly would be a great pity if they could not
(p. 78).
Turner wanted to tap into the mythical possibilities of the
situation, but also wanted to refute the often unfriendly
response some farmers gave to scientific agricultural
education.

Turner wanted students amazed at the ignorance

and waste .and wanting to change that tide.

"The man whose

highest conception of earthly bliss is a log hut in an
uninclosed yard, " Turner announced,

"where pigs of two

species are allowed equal rights, unless the four-legged
tribe chance to get the upper hand, will be found no patron
of industrial universities" (p. 78) .

Turner would cast a

certain type of yeoman in his mythic drama.
He also thought that another class of untaught farmers
was not right for his school.

These were the farmers

schooled in management of capital and labor, not in the
actual labor.

As Turner (1851) put it, "[DJeprive them of

these [their management skills] , and confine them to the
varied culture of a small farm, and they would starve in
five years, where a true farmer would amass a small fortune"
(p. 78) .

It was the self-reliant, independent farmer Turner

praised.

146
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Turner (1851) also suggested that these true farmers
were democratic exemplars, as he desired to place control of
the university in their hands.

When he pondered the

question of administration of the would-be institution he
said that
...without hesitation and without fear, that this whole
interest should, from the first, be placed directly in
the hands of the people, and the whole people, without
any mediators or advisers, legislative or
ecclesiastical, save only their own appointed agents,
and their own jurors and courts of justice, to which,
of course, all alike must submit (p. 82).
Turner meant the agrarian yeoman when he used the term
"people."

If a board member did to take into constant

consideration the "interest of properly and worthily
educating all the sons of her [the state's] soil," then the
people would "set on such a man, if the miscreant wretch
lives, for all future time, a mark as much blacker than the
mark set on Cain as midnight is darker than noonday"

(p.

83) .
Another mythic theme Turner articulated was that, in
light of the above illustrations, government would have a
direct hand in the protection and progression of the
agrarian ideal:
The fund given to this State by the general government,
expressly for this purpose, is amply sufficient,
without a dollar from any other source; and it is a
mean if not an illegal perversion of this fund to use
it for any other purpose.
It was given to the people,
the whole people, of this State— not for a class, a
party, or sect, or conglomeration of sects...(Turner,
1851, p. 82).
This idea of using educational funding for the "people," or
for yeoman farmers and industrialists, was very important to
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Turner because governmental funding and endless promotion of
professional and classical education was the "inevitable
result of trying to crowd all liberal practical education
into one narrow sphere of life" (p. 79) .

If government

would fund an agricultural and industrial university these
yeoman heroes would not be as they were "starving
scavengers," but "honored members" of the mythic yeoman
class.
Turner also said that Illinois lost financial resources
because of farming ignorance; thus he again tied agriculture
to government.

Using an economic argument woven within his

mythic proclamation, Turner suggested that "in a few years
the entire cost of the whole institution would be annually
saved to the State in the above interests alone, aside from
all its other benefits..."

(p. 75).

Turner also illustrated the theme of the garden and the
theme of honest labor.

He weaved a lush tale of his school

as an agrarian utopia managed through diligent labor.

Smith

(1950) says that the "image of this vast and constantly
growing agricultural society in the interior of the
continent became one of the dominant symbols of the
nineteenth-century"
symbolism.

(p. 123).

Turner tapped into this

It is my conjecture that while part of his plan

included necessary "garden speak," he embellished the
symbol, especially the associated "labor" symbol, for
rhetorical purposes.

Even if he did not mean to, the

symbolism still existed.

"The master symbol of the garden, "
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Smith explains, "embraced a cluster of metaphors expressing
fecundity, growth, increase, and blissful labor in the
earth, all centering about the heroic figure of the
idealized frontier farmer armed with that supreme agrarian
weapon, the sacred plow" (p. 123) .
Turner went back and forth between his recanting of
labor and the fruits it brought.

For instance, early in his

plan he illustrated the importance of annual experiments.
Turner (1851) revealed specific examples for each
department, but his point was that every professor labor not
only to expand existing practical knowledge, but also
because the "most natural and effectual mental discipline
possible for any man arises from setting him to earnest and
constant thought about things he daily does, sees, and
handles. . .to make them thinking laborers. .. (p. 80, his
emphasis).
As for those needing "at this late hour" to write the
textbooks, professors would "...be men of the most eminent,
practical ability in their several departments... or all the
peculiar benefits of the system would be lost"

(Turner,

1850,p. 76). Professors would not only preach, but practice
what they did.

In Turner's program, the professors would

give lectures in the colder months of the year so that they,
and their students, could labor during the warmer months.
The students would come from any class and stay at the
institution for any length of time they were willing to pay
for, either in money or labor.

Moreover,

"[a]mong those who

149
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

labor, medals and testimonials of merit should be given to
those who perform their tasks with the most promptitude,
energy, care, and skill" (Turner, 1851, p. 76). In the
process of reward. Turner would "let the law of nature,
instead of the law of rakes and dandies, be regarded, and
the true impression ever made on the mind of all around,
that work alone is honorable, and indolence certain
disgrace, if not ruin" (p. 76, his emphasis).
Turner used lush symbolism when he revealed the garden
resources required for the labor of the university. There
was, for instance, a direct cluster between labor and the
garden.

On his institution. Turner (1851) would have "a

botanical and common garden...orchards and fruityards... lawns and promenades, in which the beautiful art of
landscape-gardening could be appropriately applied and
illustrated..."

(p. 75).

Furthermore, Turner desired to

maintain "...all varieties of pasture, meadow, and tillage
needful for the successful prosecution of the needful annual
experiments"

(p. 75).

On these symbolic grounds, Turner

wanted samples of "every variety of domestic animal, and of
every tree, plant, and vegetable that can minister to the
health, wealth, or taste and comfort of the people..."

(p.

75) .
The myth of the garden and the farmer as its
archetypal hero was a mainstay as a performative tradition.
Walt Whitman called the West and its farmers "the real
genuine America"

(cited in Smith, 1950, p. 124) . Ben
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Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and many other popular
writers of that day, helped this notion along.

Franklin

theorized a society based in the agrarian mythos.

In the

late 1780's Franklin declared agriculture as the business of
America (Smith, p. 125).

Likewise, Jefferson contended,

"Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God,
if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made
His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue"
(cited in Edwards, 1976, p. 23) .
Jefferson,

Smith (1950) says of

"He saw the cultivator of the earth, the

husbandman who tilled his own acres, as the rock upon which
the American republic must stand"

(p. 128) .

Jefferson used

his agrarian ideal for political endeavors like the
Northwest Ordinance that opened the trans-Allegheny and
eventually admitted new Western states, he arranged a plan
for the country to give out public lands to individual
owners, and he achieved the Louisiana Purchase, not to
mention his educational experiment at the University of
Virginia.
The discursive assertions and political actions of
Jefferson were also simply part of a rich fabric of ideas
and attitudes living within the rhetorical culture of his
era.

Eisinger (1947) finds several themes of agrarianism in

the late eighteenth century by pursuing the writings of the
time:
[A] griculture is the only source of real wealth; that
every man has a natural right to land; that labor
expended in cultivating the earth confers a valid title
to it; that the ownership of land, by making the farmer
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independent, gives him social status and dignity, while
constant contact with nature in the course of his
labors makes him virtuous and happy; that America
offers a unique example of society embodying these
traits; and, as a general inference from all the
propositions, that government should be dedicated to
the interests of the freehold farmer (cited in Smith,
1950, p. 126).
Thus, early on in American history the farmer was a
republican symbol.

This symbolism continued throughout the

early part of the nineteenth century along with westward
settlement.
However, by 183 0, Smith (1950) contends, there were two
conflicting views of agrarianism.

Smith says that "each of

these new agrarianisms found expression in imaginative and
symbolic terms:

that of the South in a pastoral literature

of the plantation, that of the Northwest in the myth of the
garden of the world with the idealized Western yeoman as its
focal point"
Jefferson.

(p. 133).

Turner continued the tradition of

Calhoun took the Southern perspective.

While

for Calhoun the laboring class were the slaves, for Turner
they were the heroic yeoman farmers.

During the middle part

of the century, as Smith puts it, the mythic agrarian yeoman
was the "darling of poets and social theorists.... [the
yeoman symbol] is one of the most tangible things we mean
when we speak of the development of democratic ideas in the
United States"
speech.

(p. 135).

Turner assimilated the myth in his

It became a resource for his prudential point of

view both as a mode of political action and discursive
possibility.
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TURNER'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT
As mentioned above, myth is a story, a narrative, and
therefore a type of narrative strategy.

Not only does the

myth, once activated by a rhetor, provide identification and
a heightened sense of community (Hart, 1997), but the form
of the myth gives direction to human action.

Many "identity

myths" plot out the narrative course of the myth's hero.
According to Rushing(1989a), "In a truly transcendent myth,
although the hero may be from a particular culture and thus
appear in a time and space-bound guise, his or her message
will be universal"

(p. 35).

Specifically, the hero usually

has an extraordinary, but modest birth, proves early
superhuman strength, rises to distinction and authority, and
gains great victories over forces of evil.

In essence,

Turner asked his audience members to rise up and become
heroic; and he did it through the mythic context he weaved.
Like the textual context of Wayland's report. Turner also
fictionalized a figurative sentiment popular in the culture
of his day in order to further develop the educational
policy he thought was prudent.

The use of metonymy, anti-

intellectualism, and myth helped generate the narrative he
weaved.
Turner recounted a past controlled by "pedantic fools."
"Ancient worthies," generated only confusion by focusing not
on the simple facts in front of them, but on abstract
theories.

As Turner (1851) put it,

I think the exclusive and extravagant claims set up for
ancient lore, as a means of disciplining the reasoning
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powers, simply ridiculous when examined in the light of
those ancient worthies who produced that
literature...If it produces infallible practical
reasoners, we have a great many thousand infallible
antagonistic truths, and ten thousand conflicting paths
of right, interest, duty, and salvation (p. 80).
He continued to scapegoat the classicists by aligning them
with these so-called "ancient worthies."

He called

classical education an "evasive discipline" which had given
power to "sophistical cant" and "stereotyped nonsense,"
instead of the "obvious facts" (p. 80).

To Turner "verbose

declamation" would hold sway over the educational schemes of
the country until "any man will just be at the trouble to
open his eyes and his ears" to sense the garden of the
world.

Even so, this ancient invention and diffusion of

confusion continued as the classically trained mind
perpetuated the ideals of the ancients.
Thus, Turner saw the present as dominated by a caste
system controlled by the professional classicists, and he
saw his time as ripe for a heroic class rebellion.

If the

industrial classes would rise up, then an implicit American
caste system would fall.

This was a foundational goal of

his scapegoating strategy and why he put the agrarian
audience in narrative action.

Still relying on his

metonymic logic, Turner (1851) argued that America's elite
educationalists, though not aristocratic in the European
sense, had nevertheless helped develop a "caste education,
legislation, and literature"

(p. 78).

The caste

participants would only desire to perfect the hierarchy
unless a competing discourse upset the perfection:
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

If any one class provide for their own liberal
education in the State, as they should do, while
another class neglect his, it is as inevitable as the
law of gravitation that they should form a ruling caste
or class by themselves, and wield their power more or
less for their own exclusive interests, and the
interests of their friends (p. 78).
The country's leaders had neglected industrial and
agricultural education. This left the working classes in the
dark "while the professions have been studied till trifles
and fooleries have been magnified into matters of immense
importance, and tornadoes of windy words and barrels of
innocent ink shed over them in vain"

(p. 79) .

Most of Turner's speech was about the future.
plan of what could be.

It was a

It was a deliberating proposal in

the language of a ceremonial celebration of the mythic
agrarians and their future utopia close in the distance.
The idea for the future Turner created was that his plan, or
one like it, would come to fruition.

As such, Turner was a

prophetic voice singing a truism for the future.

For

instance, Turner closed his remarks by illustrating the crux
of the historical moment and the eventuality of the
proposition:
Others may feel a little alarm when, for the first time
in the history of the world, they see the millions
throwing themselves aloof from all political and
ecclesiastical control, and attempting to devise a
system of liberal education for themselves; but, on
mature reflection, we trust they will approve the plan-or, if they are too old to change, their children will
(1851, p. 85).
This plan, like a farmer's life, was fated.

It was the

fixed law of God that the people would design this
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university.

To not adhere to the plan, or the general jest

of it, would be to kill the drama he has depicted.
Rushing (1986) sees myth as an unfolding drama.

If

that is so, than Burke's dramatistic pentad is useful in
understanding the motivation of the myth.
insists,

Burke (1969)

"...any complete statement about motives will offer

some kind of answer to these five questions:

what was done

(act) , when or where it was done (scene) , who did it
(agent) , how he [or she] did it (agency) , and why (purpose) "
(p. xv) .

Thus, this perspective affords us a crisp way of

looking at Turner's vision of the future.

From this

perspective. Turner's story was that the agrarian farmer and
industrialist (agent), living within a caste-system
controlled by classically learned professionals (scene)
would re-do the American caste-system (act) , with the aid of
practical education (agency), in order to promote an
educational order aloof from political and ecclesiastical
control (purpose).
The ratios are interesting too.

Foss (1989) suggests,

"A ratio is a pairing of two of the elements in a pentad in
order to discover the relationship between them and the
effect that each has on the other" (p. 339) .

Some terms, if

emphasized, will shadow others. The agent dominated Turner's
symbolic story.

The agent, when in conjunction with the

other elements of Burke’s scheme, and in light of Turner's
metonymic logic, scapegoating, and mythic sentiments, became
the central figure of his effort.

Turner centered on the

156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

character of the yeoman agrarian and industrialist.
Further, the disposition of the yeoman, laden with symbolism
of purity, simplicity, honorable labor, and fate, made the
pedagogical plan he advanced pure, simple, honorable, and
fated— both the yeoman agrarian and his pedagogical
institution would illustrate an ideal conceptualization of
prudence.

The character of the yeoman would rise despite

the scene.
Smith (1950) asserts,

"The Western yeoman had become a

symbol which could be made to bear an almost unlimited
charge of meaning,
patriotism..."

[and] it had strong overtones of

(p. 135).

While Turner perpetuated the

traditional ideals of the agrarian cause, he also continued
a notion of beating the odds.

He rendered the yeoman

agrarian as a type of Jacksonian individualist.

Again, this

type of individualism flowed within the linguistic wave of
mid-nineteenth century oratorical culture.

Turner's

prudential framework helped him generate the mythic context
that potentially incited the audience to act it out.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
In sum, I have argued that Turner's prudential claim
about action was that the yeoman agrarians should invent
their own educational scheme.

Turner discursively defined

and refined this claim through aesthetics of metonymy, antiintellectualism, and, of course, the agrarian myth and the
symbolic reservoir of the yeoman agrarian.

The metonymic

logic afforded him the opportunity to perpetuate a perceived
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political chasm between the working class and the
professional class. This lent credence to the agrarian myth
and the narrative he told.

I suggest that Turner used anti

intellectual sentiments to make himself out to be a
representative hero of the agrarian myth.

He enacted his

own verbal mortification and he poked fun at his own
training in order to become a voice for the agrarian.

The

language and themes of the agrarian myth grew out of a long
symbolic lineage, and the democratic republicanism and
Jacksonian individualism of Turner's era.
In the process of generating a symbolic reality, I have
suggested that Turner was asking his audience to live out
the agrarian myth he told, and take it to its telos.

He

wanted his audience to live out a popular and sacred fable
that, at that time, represented the process of democracy.
And though the myth was mainly a fable for the voices of
power, the mass populace, too, seemed to have enjoyed the
story.
Turner's notion of prudence was itself an imitation of
past conceptualization of prudence, but this mythic
tradition, though worse for wear, still exists today.
However, especially in the mid-nineteenth century, this type
of prudential thinking found declamation in the continued
move for federal support for agricultural and mechanical
education.
There has been much deliberation as to Turner's role in
the congressional bill passed in 1862.

For the most part,
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historians have given Morrill credit as the sole author of
Land Grant Act.

Many Land Grant universities have even

heroically memorialized Morrill by having campus buildings
named after him.

The real question is what role did the

sense of prudence and the rhetoric of Turner play in
Morrill's inventional processes. Did he imitate them at all?
While Morrill offered his own slant on the myth, he also
perpetuated Turner's idea of prudence.

Turner's prudential

thought and his speech were important stepping-stones toward
the ultimate goal of federal support for agricultural and
industrial colleges.

Thus, I suggest that Turner’s sense of

prudence certainly added his persuasive art.

Even though he

inhibited a fusion of vocational, practical education with
classical education, his audacity brought success in so much
that Morrill, and others, apparently interpreted his policy
and rhetoric as prudent.
Morrill submitted an initial resolution on the topic of
agricultural colleges during the first session of the
thirty-fourth Congress, February 28, 1856, but Mr. Keitt of
South Carolina rejected it.

Even so, and all the while.

Turner had been trying to enact his plan.

The United States

Agricultural Society met in Washington in 1856 and again in
1857 to address Turner’s ideas.
delegate to both meetings.

Morrill was the Vermont

Though the records indicate that

Morrill did not make any statements, True (1929) argues that
...it seems probable that Mr. Morrill knew about
Turner ’s proposition even if he took no part in
discussing it. Something must have happened which led
Mr. Morrill to bring forward a bill differing
159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

materially in its purpose from that indicated in his
resolution..." (p. 98) .
After Keitt rejected his first resolution, Morrill went
back to the drawing board.

What he came up with closely

resembled what Turner desired.
of Turner's basic plan.

Morrill's bill emanated out

Granted, Morrill's proposal was not

an exact duplicate of Turner’s plan.

Nevertheless, the

wording of the speeches which Morrill delivered to promote
his proposals had a rhetorical and prudential lineage
illustrated through Turner's message.
True admits,

"Morrill's measure,"

"was in fact the culmination of the long

movement for agricultural and technical schools... and it is
altogether likely that Morrill derived the ideas
incorporated in the bill from various sources connected with
that movement"

(p. 99).

Again, it would appear that Turner's prudential
framework aided his rhetorical effort.

He reduced reality

to a canonical mythic struggle between the heroic, thinking
yeoman, who could do little wrong, and the classical elite,
who could do little right.

He celebrated the audience's

story while invigorating the agrarian and industrial
community and his own mythic, agrarian character.

Through

his rhetoric he revealed himself as a prophet of the cause
calling his troops in for the hierarchical upset.

Moreover,

and as Darsey (1997) notes, "The prophetic life as presented
by the prophet and his disciples becomes it own rhetoric..."
(p. 34) .

Ironically perhaps. Turner wanted his audience to

follow him in being a deeply educated and thinking anti160
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intellectual.

In final analysis, then, while Wayland could

not escape his academic status, Turner could and did, and
recanted his own mythic struggle within his inventive
choices in order to invite the populace to rise to their
perceived agrarian distinction.
From Hall's (1980) view point, we might speculate that
to enact Turner's story would have been itself a preferred
reading.

However, the negotiated reading might not have

enacted the story as Turner would have, but fused the
courses of study Turner discussed.

That is, a negotiated

reading might have put the vocational with the classical.
An oppositional reading, I think, would see the plan and
Turner’s rhetoric not as prudential longings for "the
people," but rather imprudent discursive practice and
political ideology that certainly placed a certain sect of
people over another.
Turner's mission in Illinois would not come to fruition
until 1871.

He was present for the laying of the

cornerstone of the new University Hall at the Illinois
Industrial University.

Though Henry (1961) explains that

the plan for this institution did not always exactly look
like Turner's idea,

"Jonathan Baldwin Turner is not only a

forebear of the land-grant movement but also of the
University of Illinois" (p. x ) .
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CHAPTER

SIX

JUSTIN SMITH MORRILL AND THE PASSAGE
OF THE LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT
INTRODUCTION
Justin Smith Morrill was born April 14, 1810, and died
on December 28, 1898.

He lived the ordinary life of a

country boy from Strafford, Vermont, picking up fragments of
education from the district school.

He spent two years at

Thetford Academy, but Morrill's school education ended at
the age of fourteen.
He was then hired to work as a clerk in a Strafford
store.

He spent two years under that contract, and then

worked for four years as a clerk in a Portland, Maine store.
Mercantilism seemed to be his calling.

After the end of

those four years, a native of Strafford made Morrill a
partner.

Morrill worked as a manager for fifteen years,

then retired with a modest fortune, bought a tract of land,
made it into a farm, built a house, married, and settled in
for the long haul.
However, in 1854, the Congressional representative from
the Strafford district declined re-election and many people
thought Morrill would make a fine candidate.
by a majority of fifty-nine votes.

He was elected

He spent the rest of his

years as a representative, then as a senator.

In his

Congressional life, he is best known for the Tariff Law of
1861, measures for constructing public buildings, and the
Land Grant Act.
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Morrill introduced the first land grant bill in the
House of Representative on December 14, 1857.

Though

Morrill desired that the Speaker of the House send the bill
to the Committee on Agriculture— Morrill was a member— it
went to the Committee on Public Lands.

This committee had

the bill for four months and then Representative Cobb of
Alabama, the chair, reported that it was a no-go on April
15, 1858.

True (1929) argues that the argument against the

bill was that it was unconstitutional.
On April 20, a pending motion to postpone consideration
of the bill allowed Morrill an opportunity to speak on the
matter.
bill.

He took this opportunity to offer a substitute
This substitute omitted the original reference to

Territories and offered a slight change in the way to price
the land that the federal government might grant.

On April

22, Morrill called for the previous question and the Speaker
accepted it, requiring a vote on the bill.

The House agreed

to Morrill's substitute as an amendment and passed it by a
vote of 105 to 100.

The Speaker referred Morrill's bill to

the committee on Public Lands in the Senate, chaired by
Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, a fellow republican, and it
passed in February of 1859.
There was much lobbying during the process and True
(1929) states that "Turner and his associates in Illinois
and elsewhere were active by correspondence"

(p. 103) .

Nevertheless, President Buchanan vetoed the bill.

As True

puts it, "The greatest hope that President Buchanan would
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sign the bill lay in his vote in Congress in 1827 in favor
of a bill to grant public lands for a deaf and dumb asylum
in Kentucky" (p. 103).

However, many Congressmen thought

that vote was an error and, apparently, Buchanan did too.
Although Morrill urged his troops on, the final vote had 105
for Morrill's bill and 94 against.

The veto stood.

While disappointed, those in favor of Morrill's bill
worked behind the scenes in order to promote it despite
Buchanan's stand.

For instance, the United States

Agricultural Society debated the issues at its meeting in
January of 1860, but, as True (1929) explains, a verbal
attack by one of its members on Buchanan prevented any hope
of the president changing his mind and offering support to a
new bill.

For another, the Illinois agricultural and

horticultural societies called a joint meeting on June 27,
I860, in order to generate a resolution to promote Morrill's
bill.

Turner chaired the committee that drafted the

resolution.
What is more, True (1929) reveals that Turner might
have personally asked Lincoln, before his presidential
nomination, to support the cause.

Legend has it that

Lincoln stated, "If I am elected I will sign your bill for
State universities"

(p. 104) .

Apparently, Stephen A.

Douglas, also a possible candidate at the time, likewise
unveiled to Turner that he would sign the bill.

Thus, if

Morrill introduced it again, after the election of 1860, the
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bill most likely would not have too much trouble getting
through the system.
After Lincoln's election, Morrill again introduced his
bill on December 16, 1861, but it did not work out.

Morrill

decided not to offer a substitute bill this time because
Senator Wade introduced a very similar bill in the Senate.
True (1929) argues that Wade and Morrill were in cahoots.
In the Senate, the bill went to the Committee on Public
Lands chaired by Senator Harlan of Iowa, a proponent of the
measure.

The debate in the Senate centered on the measure's

constitutionality, the amount of land granted and where, and
the pricing of the land.
May 16, 1862.

After two amendments, it passed on

The amendments focused on the amount of land

that Congress would locate in individual states, and the
number of acres they might allot to individual people.

The

final vote, with the amendments in place, stood at 32 to 7.
Morrill delivered an important speech on the matter on June
6, 1862.

The House called up the Senate bill on June 17 and

passed it by a vote of 90 to 25.

Lincoln signed the bill on

July 2.
While the political maneuverings certainly clear up
the constitutional and economic issues that were at the crux
of the Congressional debate, Morrill's two most lengthy
speeches on the measure, the one in 1858, and the one in
1862 before the calling up of the Senate bill, brought to
bare the most significant rhetorical strategies on which
Morrill depended.

What is more important for my purposes,
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these speeches also reveal much about Morrill1s
representation of prudence.
While the need for each speech grew out of particular
situations, taken together, I suggest Morrill had to meet
several challenges.

For one, he had to negotiate the

constitutionality of the bills.

Also, he had to secure an

attitude that all this was economically viable and
productive for the country.

Additionally, Morrill was

speaking, both times, during a vacillating historical
period.

When he presented his first speech, the political

stage was one of biting compromise, conflict between
antislavery and proslavery groups, weak presidential
leadership from James Buchanan, and constant constitutional
battles over the role of the federal government.

During his

second oration, the country was, of course, at Civil War.
Economically, both before and during the war, the industrial
revolution replaced communal agrarianism with commercial
individualism.

Linguistically, changes in demographics

continued to promote diverse styles of discourse.
In short, Morrill invented his speeches while Congress
was coming to terms with that bloody conflict, the role of
science and technology in American culture, the mode of
agrarian and industrial life and its impact on the character
of the nation, appropriate educational and intellectual
policies in a commercial, democratic society, and the
province of federal institutions.
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In this chapter I analyze both addresses because they
are very similar in their prudential stances and thus form a
more coherent illustration of Morrill's over-arching sense
of prudence.

In the first section of this chapter, I will

describe Morrill's speeches.

Second, I will interpret the

outlook of prudence he developed symbolically.
will examine Morrill's textual context.

Third, I

Finally, I will

offer the implications of Morrill's prudential way of
thinking and how it, in a way, rendered the process of
implementing the Morrill Act somewhat confusing.
SUMMARY
Morrill organized his first speech categorically.

He

began by establishing the importance of his bill to the
nation and the preponderance of thought and debate upon the
measure.

He pointed out, as Turner did, that agricultural

education had not received its fair share of federal aid.
He implored the House to make a change because America, as
an agricultural nation, was slipping.

He argued that the

propriety and happiness of a populated country depended upon
the division of land into small, manageable parcels and upon
the education of those who would own and till the soil.

The

following was the climax in this introductory part:
If it be true that the common mode of cultivating the
soil in all parts of our country is so defective as to
make the soil poorer year by year it is a most
deplorable fact, and a fact of national concern.
If we
are steadily impairing the natural productiveness of
the soil, it is a national waste, compensated only by
private robbery (Morrill, 1858, Congressional Globe, p.
1692).
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With this, he turned to discuss what he called a "national
waste."
Morrill moved to a discussion of the "facts" of waste.
As he had it, "These facts... establish, conclusively, that
in all parts of our country important elements in the soil
have been exhausted..."
facts was exhaustive.

(1858, p. 1692); and his list of
He used statistical examples of

agricultural loses, citing specific numbers from
agricultural journals, and including a table to take them
all in.

His point was that the quality of the soil and the

financial rewards potentially reaped were decreasing, and
Congress could combat this depreciation through the federal
act of establishing agricultural and mechanical
universities.

Along with the talk of "waste" Morrill also

discussed the progress of science and the lack of scientific
output for agriculturists.
Like Turner, Morrill (1858) discussed the class of
yeoman agrarians and mechanics, the rise of practical
education, and the ineffectiveness of classical education
for the working classes.

When agricultural and mechanical

universities existed with federal aid, then the "spurious
dogmas will be touched lightly with the spear of Ithuriel,
and no longer squat around the ears of weary plowmen"
1694).

(p.

The graduates of these new universities "would know

how to sustain American institutions with American vigor"
(p. 1694).

The heroic yeoman agrarian dwelled apart from

the professionals.

Morrill saw yeoman agrarians and
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mechanics as having a unique role and place in American
society.
Morrill turned to a very extensive declamation on
European agriculture and how America's productivity stacked
up against it.

He discussed agricultural progressivism in

Prussia, Saxony, Belgium, France, England, Scotland, Russia,
Spain, Italy, and Bohemia, all in the effort to make
American's federal support of agriculture look pretty awful.
Though he realized some European nations had committed
agricultural errors, Morrill (1858) explained, "Thus, we
behold the suffrages of all t.he wiser civilized nations in
favor of the measure contemplated by the bill under
consideration...If other nations advance, though we but
pause, we are distanced"

(p. 1695).

Morrill then focused on the importance of land-granting
and rebuked the argument that the federal government had no
constitutional authority to grant such land or to require
the states to use it for the sole purpose of creating
agricultural and mechanical universities.

Morrill (1858)

argued that everyone, if not directly, would indirectly reap
the benefits of this land grant.

Thus, "if the measure

shall in any degree increase the future profits of
cultivators, the value of all land, wherever it may be,
whether held in small or large quantities, will be
augmented"

(p. 1695, his emphasis) .

He also read from the

constitution in order to support the constitutionality of
his proposed law.

His own sense of prudence, in part,
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seemed to emerge explicitly when he placed his measure under
the auspicious argument of “prudent proprietorship."

As he

put it, "As a prudent proprietor, may we not do that which
will not only tend to raise the value of all land, whether
owned by individuals or by Government, but make agricultural
labor more profitable and more desirable as a pursuit in
life?"

(p. 1696) .

Additionally, he talked about previous

land grants and used past voices, like George Washington and
Thomas Jefferson, to further establish federal land
precedents.
Morrill ended his first speech by praising the enduring
legacy of Congress to give land for the general benefit of
the country and all of its inhabitants, but especially its
agrarians and mechanics. Using repetition, he announced what
the measure would do if passed.

Morrill (1858) stated that

it would do something "to enable the farmer to raise two
blades of grass instead of one; Something for every owner of
land; Something for all who desire to own land..." (p. 1696)
and the like.

Toward the very end of the speech Morrill

supplied a succinct summary of his arguments:
The persuasive argument of precedents; the example of
our worthiest rivals in Europe; the rejuvenation of
worn-out lands, which bring forth taxes only; the
petitions of farmers everywhere, yearning for 'a more
excellent way; ' philanthropy, supported by our own
highest interests— all these considerations impel us
for once to do something for agriculture worthy of its
national importance (p. 1697).
With that, Morrill revealed how much land the Land Office
had to dispose of and submitted his substitute bill.
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Morrill's second speech was very similar. It also
advanced categorically and he returned to the topics and
arguments used in the first speech.

In the beginning

section he argued that the new educational institutions
would perpetuate republicanism.

As Morrill (1862) put it,

"Just in itself, benevolent in its scope, demanded by the
wisest economy, it will add new securities to the perpetuity
of republican institutions" (Congressional Globe, p. 256).
He then discussed what happened to the first bill, and using
a sort of compliance gaining strategy of debt, Morrill
announced that he would soon resign from the House and would
like a favor in return.
Morrill also revealed in his introduction that he
thought that several issues ought to be put upon the table
because of the Civil War, but not this one.

"Instead of

being postponed, it is a measure that should have been
initiated at least a quarter of a century ago..." (p. 256).
This was so not only because it would have earlier befitted
the farmer and the agriculturist, but also because teaching
military tactics had become part of this second bill.
Morrill talked about the military dimensions of the new bill
and what the bill, as a whole, proposed:
This bill proposes to establish at least one college in
every State upon a sure and perpetual foundation,
accessible to all, but especially to the sons of toil,
where all the needful science for the practical
avocations of life shall be taught, where neither the
higher graces of classical studies nor that of military
drill...will not be entirely ignored, and where
agriculture, the foundation of all present and future
prosperity, may look for troops of earnest friends,
studying its familiar and recondite economies, and at
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last elevating it to that higher level where it may
fearlessly invoke comparison with the most advanced
standards of the world (p. 256) .
Morrill then moved to a more specific discussion of land.
Morrill discussed the steadily decreasing value of
public lands and how the legislature had, heretofore,
granted public lands.

From his vantage point, the

legislature had not been too wise in the process.

He (1862)

suggested that "grants for railroads and military bounties
have been made which such loose abundance as to destroy the
gifts and more than satisfy all demands..." (p. 257) .
Morrill continued to elaborate on the amount of land the
government had and had not granted and why, and then moved
to a discussion of the "facts" depicting the depletion of
the nation's soil.

He referred to his April 20, 1858,

speech and recanted his facts and numbers.
After recalling factual and statistical information
from his first speech, he again compared American
agriculture to European agriculture in order to illustrate
that the United States had, in large part, taken an
agricultural back seat to the rest of the civilized world.
Morrill (1862) said that America was

"in the rear of Europe,

and that will never be satisfactory"

(p. 258) . Then,

discussed practical education and how it

he

would propel

America to lead the world instead offollow.
Within the closing portion of his speech Morrill (1862)
discussed the westward expansion and the call for educated
expansioneers, the possible professors of the would-be
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practical institutions— those of practical value— and the
value of science. He also discussed practical education in
Europe and highlighted what his measure might do for the
United States.

Apart from repairing the commercial loses,

such a measure would "nurse patriotism" and the institutions
would "secure permanent usefulness and enduring honor to the
whole country"

(p. 259) .
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT

It is my conjecture that the basic notion of prudence
in the text, as far as specific political conduct goes,
grows out of Morrill's advocacy of federally aided,
agricultural and mechanical universities; and, these
universities would make the land more fertile and empower
the agrarian way of life.

This is fairly easy to see if one

considers how Morrill invoked "prudent proprietorship."
Symbolically, I suggest that Morrill's rhetoric actualized
his sense of prudence through the aesthetics of the agrarian
myth: using synecdoche and filiopiety in the process.

The

synecdoche Morrill used personified the United States and
its republican institutions through the symbol of the
mythical agrarian.

He also engaged in filiopiety, or the

use of past voices, like Washington and Jefferson, which
also helped enact his view of prudence and secured the
patriotic tone of the myth.

He therefore grounded his idea

of prudence in American heritage.

What is more, Morrill

also enacted prudence through commercial talk. Morrill's
prudential perspective existed in and through the language
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of both the agrarian myth and commercialism; these were both
performative conventions that Morrill apparently roused in
his inventional scheme. He upheld the idea of an agrarian
sacred thriftiness, but also wanted the agrarian to be a
commercial success.

Two competing traditions of prudence

commanded Morrill's rhetorical choices.
The Agrarian Mvth, Synecdoche, and Filiopiety
In the previous chapter I argued that the agrarian myth
was a rhetorical marker of Turner's sense of prudence.

In

so doing, Turner perpetuated certain themes of the agrarian
myth.

I contend that Morrill, too, depended on and borrowed

the mythic tradition to enact his prudential outlook.

The

agrarian myth was, foundationally, the romantic notion of
the powerful, political, ruling classes (Hofstadter, 1955).
Hofstadter reveals that the mythic story denoting sacred
agrarian values was a patchwork of themes living through the
speeches, writings, poems, songs, etc., of early American
culture.

I discussed some of the themes and the strong

tradition of the myth in the previous chapter, but
Hofstadter explains the myth more thoroughly and the
following quote might serve as a reminder:
Its hero was the yeoman farmer, its central conception
the notion that he is the ideal man and the ideal
citizen. Unstinted praise of the special virtues of
the farmer and the special values of rural life was
coupled with the assertion that agriculture, as a
calling uniquely productive and uniquely important to
society, had a special right to the concern and
protection of government. The yeoman, who owned a
small farm and worked it with the aid of his family,
was the incarnation of the simple, honest, independent,
healthy, happy human being. Because he lived in close
communion with beneficent nature, his life was believed
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to have a wholesomeness and integrity impossible for
the depraved populations of cities. His well-being was
not merely physical, it was moral; it was not merely
personal, it was the central source of civic virtue; it
was not merely secular but religious, for God had made
the land and called man to cultivate it (p. 24-25).
There were several instances in Morrill's two speeches that
helped perpetuate many of these themes and thus activated
the prudential values inherent within them.

Clearly,

Morrill appreciated the existence of the myth, and he
assumed that his audience was very familiar with it.
doing, his mythic dialogue acted as an enthymeme.

In so

As we

learned from Aristotle and Hariman (1991), prudence more
than often takes shape through enthymemes.
For instance, and as I mentioned above, early on in his
first speech Morrill argued that "prosperity and happiness"
of a populated nation depended "1.
land into small parcels.
proprietors of the soil"

2.

Upon the division of the

Upon the education of the

(1858, p. 1692).

To promote

agricultural education Morrill highlighted the importance of
the modest, self-sufficient farm.

Morrill was not talking

about the large plantations, but the small homesteads. He
was not talking about the classically educated dandy merely
managing a farm, but the "robust ranks" of sacred yeoman
agrarians (p. 1694).

Speaking of this mythic profession, he

said that
No other pursuit in life obtains this universal
tribute, that, whatever may be the present idol of
devotion, all classes and rank of men hope to reach
that estate first bestowed upon Adam, and become
proprietors of the soil as their ultimate earthly
paradise (p. 1694) .
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Continuing his praise of the agrarian and his myth, Morrill
explained,

"Many of the purest embellishments of literature

have been drawn from the field of the husbandman.

Gems, not

only of poesy and song, but of painting and sculpture, of
philosophy and eloquence, thus have their origin"

(p. 1694) .

Thus, he explicitly noted the myth's existence and its
performative configurations in order to activate its appeal.
Sustaining his sentiment, Morrill more fully
characterized what he saw as the mythic agrarian.

To

Morrill (1858), the agrarians were nfrugal... Thrift is their
cardinal virtue.
luxuries.

They do not produce, vend, nor consume

They hasten slowly, and go untouched of all

epidemical speculations"

(p. 1694).

However, Morrill

thought that the possibility of wealth attracted the farmers
to the city.

Thus, if Congress passed this agricultural

college bill perhaps it would curb the desire to leave the
farm for the city.

The passage of his bill would, in part,

"induce the farmer's sons and daughters to settle and
cluster around the old homesteads;"

it would "prevent the

dispersion of our population; " and it would "concentrate it
[the population] around the best lands of our country—
places hallowed by church spires, and mellowed by all the
influences of time— where the consumer will be placed at the
door of the producer;"

and it would also "increase the

loveliness of the land" (p. 1696-1697).
These passages indicate that Morrill, like Turner, was
certainly imitating traditions of rhetorical performance
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available within the performative culture of the era.
Specifically, Hofstadter (1955) points out that a
significant problem was the abandonment of the farm for the
city.

"For all the rhetoric of the pastoral tradition,"

Hofstadter concedes,

"nothing could keep the boys on the

farm, and nothing could conceal from the farm population
itself that continuous restless movement not merely to farms
farther west but to urban areas. East and West"

(p. 32) .

Part of Morrill's goal was a last stand to combat this run
away from the homestead.

In this, Morrill aligned himself

with the folklore propagated by farm journals of his times.
Hofstadter recants what he calls a "typical bit" of this
folklore:

"The great busy West has inducements, And has the

business mar t , But wealth is not made in a day, boys, Don't

be in a hurry to start!" (p. 32, his emphasis) .

And again,

"Better stay on the farm a while longer, Though profits come
in rather slow; Remember you've nothing to risk, boys--

Don't be in a hurry to go" (p. 33, his emphasis) .

Morrill's

conception of prudence emerged out of this popular sentiment
and rhetorical resource.
Additionally, at times, Morrill, like Turner, compared
the agrarian "career" to others.

Morrill (1862) explained

that
The business of agriculture is something thought to be
uninviting by those in other walks of life, and they
shun any investigations of the great truths which
underlie and surround it, as much as they would shun
instruction in the craft of a tinker, lest they should
some day be called upon to mend their neighbors' pot
(p.
257).
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Turner implied it, but Morrill made more concrete the claim
that many in America shunned agrarianism as an occupation,
even as the myth was popular.

Hofstadter (1955) explains

that the agrarian myth, alive within the formats revealed
above, told farmers that they were "innocent pastoral
victims of a conspiracy hatched in the distance"

(p. 35) .

Morrill seemed to have believed it was prudent to not only
remind his listeners of the values the myth enshrined, but
also to offer them an opportunity to help the so-called
victims of political and educational neglect.
While Morrill made these mythic assertions he used a
synecdoche and this helped illumine his prudential stance.
In Chapter Five I explained metonymy, but synecdoche is
different.

Hart (1997) says that synecdoche is "a kind of

rhetorical shorthand that provides a more interesting view
of commonly understood objects or ideas" (p. 151, his
emphasis).

He offers an example: "Wherever wood [a ship]

can swim, there I am sure to find this flag of England [the
British fleet]" (p. 151).

The "wood" stands in for a ship,

and the "flag of England" stands in for the whole British
fleet.

At the most elementary level, and as Burke (1950,

1969) declares, a synecdoche refers to a part of something
the captures the whole of something, or a whole of something
that captures a part.

Madsen (1993) argues that synecdoche

is synonymous with representation.

I contend that Morrill's

view of prudence, in part, emerged out of synecdochical
logic.

He used synecdoche so that the mythic yeoman
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agrarian and his mythic values stood in, or represented,
America, its institutions, and the character its citizens
ought to be enacting.
We witness synecdoche operating in the beginning of
Morrill's first speech when he personified the country as a
man.

Alerting his audience to the justness of his measure,

Morrill (1858) argued that the bill was "just politically,
just to all the States, and just, above,
ofour country" (p. 1692).

Not only

all, to the manhood

did Morrill personify

the country, but asserted that the lack of effective
husbandry certainly questioned this "manhood" :
It is our province, as a nation and as individuals, to
do well whatever we undertake.
The genius and skill of
our artists and artisans have been universally
commended. Our navel architecture is a subject of
national pride. Our engineers are doomed to no merely
local fame. Our agricultural implements are beyond the
reach of competition. Yet, while we may be in advance
of the civilized world in many of the useful arts, it
is a humiliating fact that we are far in the rear of
the best husbandry in Europe... (p. 1693).
Morrill was not merely cataloguing America's successes, but
pointing to the supreme importance of the yeoman agrarian as
a significant American symbol.

This pointing out was

important to Morrill's persuasive effort because it acted as
a prudential framework for Morrill's action claims.

If the

yeoman agrarian could not improve the soil and thus extend
the agrarian way of life, and the myth, then the country
would plummet.

Perhaps he regarded it as prudent to link

the country with the plight of the yeoman agrarian in order
to accent the national importance of this plight.
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In his second speech Morrill (1862) proposed:
Should no effort be made to arrest the deterioration
and spoliation of the soil in America, while all Europe
is wisely striving to teach her agriculturists the best
means of hoarding up capital in the lands on that side
of the Atlantic, it is easy to see that we are doomed
to be dwarfed in national importance, and not many
years can pass away before our ships will be laden with
grain not on their outward but homeward voyage. Then,
with cheap bread no longer peculiar to America, our
free institutions may be thought too dear by those of
whom even empires are not worthy— the men with hearts,
hands, and brains— vainly looking to our shores for
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (p. 258) .
Importantly, the phrase above was a further elaboration of
the synecdoche.

Whatever the condition was of the yeoman

agrarian, so too the condition of the country.

The yeoman

agrarian was the epitome of freedom, thrift and selfreliance, and Morrill wanted to make that representative
association with the United States, the country's
institutions, and citizens.

In another way, because of the

representation, the heroic agrarian was the representative
anecdote of Morrill's speech, his efforts on the bill’s
behalf, and the prudent action he was advocating for the
Congress.
Finally, Morrill also engaged in a type of filiopiety.
Webster's Dictionary (1988) defines filiopiety as "an often

excessive veneration of ancestors or tradition"

(p. 462).

Jasinski (1995) attests that the rhetorical practice was
common in mid-nineteenth century oratory (p. 459) .

For

instance, Morrill (1858) asserted his implicit sense of
prudence when he associated past and present political
actors with the pastoral tradition:
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Washington, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster, are more secure
of love and homage as farmers than even as men of
highest public renown; and Mount Vernon, Fort Hill,
Ashland, and Marshfield, the Meccas of America, prove
the ideal truth of the worlds of Pliny, that "the earth
took delight in being tilled by the hands of men
crowned with laurels and decorated with triumphant
honor" (p. 1694).
He also evoked the words of Washington and described how
Washington brought before Congress the subject of
agriculture in his first inaugural address.

In the quote,

Washington discussed the primary importance of agriculture
to the nation's welfare and that federal policies ought to
aid in the "cultivation of the soil" (p. 1694) .

Morrill

exclaimed that in Washington's voice was the "germ" of the
agricultural college project. Hence, we can say the same
thing about Morrill's idea of prudence.

"It cannot be

doubted that donations of land for agricultural colleges
would have received the approval of Washington"

(p. 1694) .

Maintaining the filiopiety, Morrill turned to Jefferson
in order to argue for the creation of public educational
institutions.

Morrill called forth Jefferson's prudential

thought in order to help him combat the constitutional
arguments against the bill, and thus, again, imply his own
sense of prudential political conduct.

Morrill discussed

how Jefferson promoted public institutions for the
dispersion of scientific advancement.

Morrill (1858)

submitted "that here the whole question of constitutional
power is covered, as well as a powerful argument suggested,
by Jefferson"

(p. 1696).

Morrill also mentioned, in

passing, Madison, Monroe, Adams, and Jackson.

He declared
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that "there can be no question that General Jackson and the
men who cooperated with him would have approved of grants of
land to all the States for the benefit of agricultural
colleges"

(p. 1696).

Apparently, Morrill thought the

political stances of these men were prudent. The founders
were prudent in as much as they desired to generate public
policy supporting the yeoman agrarian.

Thus, Morrill's

filiopiety, a sense of prudent discursive practice, mirrored
prudential political action.
Commercialism
The language of commercialism also marked Morrill's
conceptualization of prudence.

This type of talk not only

pointed to the commercial reality of the era, but it also
empowered the agrarian myth.

This commercialization denied

the agrarian myth he was telling.
After a long recitation of the loses of stock, sheep,
crops, tabacco, etc., Morrill (1858) contended that the
amount of money wasted was significant.

For instance, the

loss in Massachusetts was a million dollars on cereal grain
(p. 1693) .

There were loses in New York, in Alabama, in

Georgia, etc.

In an important paragraph Morrill highlighted

the country's agricultural, commercial slump:
My time will not permit a greater accumulation of
evidence on this point, although I have a cloud of
witnesses in reserve, nor is pointing out the nakedness
of land an agreeable duty. That leading fact, however,
of a wide-spread deterioration of the soil, stands out
too boldly to be denied... It follows, just in
proportion, that capital is disappearing, and that
labor receives a diminishing reward...(p. 1693).
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Morrill continued his commercial talk in the second
speech.

He implied that he agreed with the passage of the

Homestead Act— he seemingly thought that act was prudent—
and argued that the amount of public land still available
ought to be distributed using the same prudential outlook,
increasing the value of the land.

Morrill (1862) stated

that "these land colleges come in to aid in the plan of
improving, not only the new lands, but also the old, and
thereby extending the basis of taxation and revenue"

(p.

257) .
He extended his statistical information on the hog
crop, flax and hemp; a drastic loss here, a drastic loss
there.

The reparation, of course, began in Morrill's

agricultural and mechanical universities.

My point is that

Morrill's rhetorical effort revealed that he wanted to help
the farmer reach a respectable commercial status and assist
the country along to commercial success.

This was also

prudential reasoning for Morrill.
Morrill's commercial talk pointed to a recognition and
appreciation of the commercial reality of the mid-nineteenth
century.

As Hofstadter (1955) explains it, from 1815 to

1860 the self-reliant yeoman agrarian disappeared from the
world outside myth.

"The cash crop converted the yeoman

into a small entrepreneur, and the development of horsedrawn machinery made obsolete the simple old agrarian symbol
of the plow"

(p. 38).

The rhetoric of yeoman thrift made

way for the want of profit.

For instance, the call in the
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1860's Prairie Farmer was for division of labor to increase
profits.

Along with the myth came the "rage for business."

Along with the rhetoric of the sacred yeoman came an
"entrepreneurial zeal probably without precedent in history"
(p. 40) .

Moreover, Hofstadter exclaims that the "agrarian

sentiment sanctified labor in the soil and the simple life,
but the prevailing Calvinist atmosphere of rural life
implied that virtue was rewarded, after all, with success
and material goods" (p. 40) .

In short, the oratorical

culture of the day valorized the myth, but the
entrepreneurial spirit goaded the farmer to embark on a
journey not toward sacred self-sufficiency and thrift, but
toward material social standing and, consequently, wide
spread debt.
Morrill's commercial talk also pointed to the fiction
of the agrarian myth, and this fiction made the myth much
stronger.

The recognition of entrepreneurial zeal was also

an implicit denial of the agrarian myth, even as Morrill
indicated the myth's sacred aura.

Hofstadter (1955) says,

"Oddly enough, the agrarian myth came to be believed more
widely and tenaciously as it become more fictional"
The agrarian myth was a reflective appeal.

(p. 30) .

As Braden (1983)

says of any myth in a rhetorical context, it draws "upon
imagination, it strives to illicit what is pleasant,
soothing, and satisfying, and gains acceptance and strength
through repetition" (p. 75).

By pointing out the myth

Morrill energized its mythic charm, and he enlivened the
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memory of the myth in the minds of the hearers. However,
intentional or not, his commercial talk made the myth more
nostalgic.

Stated simply:

Morrill's sense of prudence, as

immersed in his rhetorical text, spawns out of the agrarian
myth, but also in its denial.
We should note, too, that it seems somewhat unusual
that Morrill would promote the mythic, somewhat innocent,
thrifty character of the yeoman agrarian, but also desire
the agrarian to become much more commercialized.
rhetoric was a paradox.

Morrill's

However, this contradiction points

to the inherent irony of Morrill's rhetoric and the myth he
embraced; and this irony is inherent in Morrill's
performative culture.

Burke (1993) says that irony is that

"type of vacillation which comes of realizing that the
traits which one is best equipped to develop are not the
traits best making for one's adaptation to his environment"
(p. 156).

The mythic agrarian could never survive in the

commercial culture of the mid-nineteenth century.

The irony

in the text re-fashioned the heroic agrarian into a business
person without tainting the persuasive identification the
myth provided.

Considering this cultural irony, Hofstadter

(1955) explains that
The triumph of commercial agriculture not only rendered
obsolete the objective conditions that had given to the
agrarian myth so much of its original force, but also
showed that the ideal implicit in the myth was
contesting the ground with another, even stronger
ideal— the notion of opportunity, of career, of the
self-made man" (pp. 39-40).
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Morrill also recognized the problem with land value.

True,

Morrill wanted to curb the hit and run style of farming
through his universities and the education it might afford,
but he ironically wanted to keep the old with the new; he
desired the "thrift" of the yeoman along with the spirit of
profit.
Hence, in light of Jasinski's (1997) perspective, we
can see that for Morrill a sense of prudence as a
performative tradition emerged out of the language of the
agrarian myth, but also out of commercial talk.

He tried to

awaken agrarian voices, and in a way perhaps he tried to
offer his own voice as a mythic one through symbolism.
However, Morrill, a stereotypical self-made person,
applauded a profession he never had.

He projected an

agrarian voice he could not legitimately call his own.

We

might also say that synecdoche and filiopiety framed
Morrill's rhetoric argumentatively and figuratively. And the
irony and confusion that resulted through his
agrarian/commercial representation of prudence still exists
today as we grapple with mythic stories that make our lives
meaningful, but also commercial realities that make our
lives financially profitable.
MORRILL'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT
Morrill generated a past, present, and future infused
with a temporal irony.

He longed to return to the

innocence, purity, and sacredness of the mythic past, but
also desired to progress toward the commercial future.
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His

prudential sense, tied to the language of myth and
commercialism, commanded a temporal confusion that pointed
to the fluid nature of the text's context, and the historic
circumstance that framed it.
The past became sacred and the agrarian myth a story o£
origin.

There were several passages that pointed to this

sacredness.

For one, Morrill (1858) said that agriculture

was the "the most useful of the earliest arts" (p. 1693).
He continued this thought by illustrating that
All history shows the tenacity with which habits
acquired in the cultivation of land cling to a people
from generation to generation.
In all ages farmers
have been stable, conservative, and reverent to
antiquity. The same plow as described three thousand
years ago at "Athens, the eye of Greece, mother of
arts, And eloquence" is still in use among the modern
Greeks. The habitant of Canada as much believes to-day
in the propriety of placing the yoke on to the horns of
the ox, in order to secure the entire strength of the
animal, as he did in the days when he owed allegiance
to the Grand Monarch.
The old Roman plow, sometimes
drawn, in the days of Nero, "by a wretched ass on the
one side, and an old woman on the other, " still retains
its place in Italy, and in parts of Spain and the south
of France.
If we turn to the descendants of the
Puritans, we shall find some of these yet kill their
pork and plant their corn in "the old of the moon."
In
all ages, and in all countries, the habits, as well as
the virtues of agriculturists, remain fixed (pp. 16941895, his emphasis).
Even as Morrill noted that it was difficult for
agriculturists to improve things, he associated

the

profession with Adam in order to declare the sanctity of the
steadfastness (p. 1694).

Thus, we can see Morrill's idea of

prudence developing through the temporal nod of the
agrarian, and through the process of taking his listeners
through this temporal journey.

His rhetoric transformed
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"immediate exigencies into recurring and symbolic ones"
(Hoban, 1980, p. 279).

Morrill called for a participation

with the myth through a temporal disjoiner.

The instances

in Morrill's speech that recalled the sacred past of the
agrarian become thresholds through which timelessness
afforded mythic participation.
In contrast to Morrill's mythic view of the past,
Morrill's view of the present and future were veryprogressive.

Morrill (1858) saw the present as a

contingency of agricultural errors, and thought that "the
great, irreversible law of American agriculture appears in
the constant and increasing diminution of agricultural
products, without any advance in prices"
(1862) also declared,

(p. 1693) .

Morrill

"By our mode, the earliest crops are

seldom sequentially equaled, and the last are apt to be the
worst"

(p. 258).

Again, from Morrill's perspective, America

was leaning toward doomsday.
Only commercial inclinations, private enterprise, and
science could seemingly remedy the woeful condition.
Morrill (1858) said that "the only thing we constantly dwell
upon with complacency is, that we surpass the stock from
which we sprang, and that we present our land better than we
found it.
1693).

But this is not beautiful unless true!"

(p.

Morrill (1862) thought that "the true system of

farming would seem to be to make the land more fertile than
it is in its natural state, and every succeeding crop better
than the last, " (p. 258) .

Science and technology were
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saviors.

"Merely practical men have looked at science as

though it were a goddess in the clouds, to be worshipped
only by fanatics and afar off, when it is really a handmaid,
beautiful, and busy everywhere at saving labor and capital"
(p. 259) .
Interestingly, when considering the present and future,
Morrill adhered to an Euramerican perspective of
temporality.

Many rhetorical scholars refer to this

progressive view of reality as "time's arrow."

Lake (1991)

explains that this metaphor assumes an irreversibility of
events and a linear march of time.

Rushing (1989b) reveals

that, when buying into this "time's arrow" metaphor, past
and present mistakes are "transitional moments" during which
the future already remedies those errors.

Thus, Morrill's

consistent praise of science became, itself, a prudential
solution to present and past agricultural problems.

Morrill

provided a litany of agricultural short-comings and
blunders, and the corresponding inevitable future doom.
Evidently, he did so in order to assert that science and
agricultural technology were the only effective antecedents
to successful, commercial agrarian culture.

Morrill further

developed his prudential viewpoint by asserting that science
would assist agrarians in their efforts to progress to a
commercially successful future.
Therefore, Morrill's textual context was temporally
ironic.

He praised the past and offered a threshold of

timelessness that allowed his listeners to reverse time in
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order to appreciate and participate in the agrarian myth. At
the same time, he denied that regression to assert an
irreversible march of agricultural error only halted by
techno-science distributed, of course, through his
agricultural colleges.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
Morrill's understanding of prudential political conduct
was, at the most basic level, that Congress ought to pass
the agricultural college bill.

In so doing. Congress would

prolong the agrarian myth while most other societal
indicators pointed to its demise.

A sense of prudential

discursive practice emerged out of the language of myth,
synecdoche and filiopiety.

Prudential discursive practice

also emerged out of commercial talk.

The commercial talk

not only recognized the commercial ideology of the day, but
also fictionalized the myth.

However, the myth's fiction,

while it made the myth more nostalgic, pointed to an irony
in Morrill's implicit prudential outlook and the inventional
framework that helped enact it symbolically.

Morrill's

rhetoric existed in and through the language of both sacred
myth and progressive commercialism.
Further, as Morrill and the performative traditions he
imitated helped develop a certain perspective on prudence,
they also helped create a temporal confusion.

While his

regression beckoned nostalgic participation and sacred
recognition, his progressive stance rejected this ebb.
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In

short, contradictory traditions of prudence branded
Morrill's performative choices.
It is my conjecture that Morrill's rhetorical
discourse, and the enactment of prudence that brought it
about symbolically framed the act and the perceptual
response to it.

While the bill eventually passed, the

rhetoric and prudential perspective that Morrill advocated
did not readily help the process, nor did it lead to a
coherent vision of what the measure might do, even if
Morrill wanted the states to decide how to appropriately
spend the money themselves.
I am not by any stretch of the imagination claiming
that the Morrill Land Grant Act was and is a failure.

I

suppose one could even say that Morrill's ambiguous prudence
gave the states an appropriate degree of freedom to do what
they wanted.

However, Lucas (1996) points out that, "In

fact, for several decades their careers as institutions of
higher learning were both precarious and uncertain"

(p. 62) .

Even more, the agricultural papers of Morrill's day did not
seem to offer too much enthusiasm for the measure.

Ross

(1942) explains that the "original law, while offering the
possibility of strengthening existing projects in industrial
education and of founding new ones, in itself assured
nothing"

(p. 66).

It did not, I suggest, because the way

Morrill talked about the measure allowed too much room for
divergent views.

Additionally, Ross says there was a doubt

that the states would even accept it.

Morrill's rhetoric,
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and his sense of prudence, revealed that "there was no
effective provision for federal direction and control of
state policy"

(p. 68).

In this, Morrill's rhetoric and the policy were kin to
the Homestead Act.

They were both policy actions extending

from the republican's 1860 platform.
explains,

As Rudolph (1962)

"In conjunction with the Homestead Act of the same

year, this [Morrill Act] parcel of legislation gave
political recognition to the yeoman farmer on the eve of his
displacement as the characteristic American"

(p. 250) .

Smith (1950) calls the Homestead Act the "agrarian utopia in
politics"

(p. 165).

In more detail, Smith contends that

...between 1856 and 1860 the homestead principle with
its utopian blueprint for developing the transMississippi region become official Republican
doctrine...It was a bid for votes that could not be
attracted to the antislavery cause. The platform of
1860... showed that the Republicans meant to capture the
myth of the garden and the symbol of the hardy yeoman,
and thus to command the imaginations of Northwestern
farmers (p. 168) .
However, this free-simple empire was not to be.

While the

measure passed in 1862, it was not awfully successful
(Hofstadter, 1955).

The framers of the Homestead Act and

the free-simple empire acted upon ideals spawning from the
agrarian myth, but these ideals or assumptions, says
Hofstadter,
passed"

"were out of date even before the act was

(p. 57).

Hofstadter (1955) thinks these framers trusted in
nature as abundant, the nonspeculative ideal of the yeoman,
the easy process of passing land to settlers without cost,
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and the native strength of the farmer to be self-sufficient.
However, these assumptions did not match up with the
Industrial Revolution well established by 1862, nor did it
mesh with the communications revolution that was on the
horizon.

It was "incongruous even with the natural

character of the plains, with their winds, sandstorms,
droughts, and grasshoppers"

(p. 57).

Hofstadter asserts

that the farmer was caught up in the "toil of cash-crop
commercial farming" (p. 57) .

Basically, the farmer was not

self-sufficient at all, but depended on the exchange value
of his products measured through supply and demand.
myth did not secure the agrarian's livelihood.

The

The agrarian

found hope only within a "commercial position, which in
turn, was dependent upon the vicissitudes of the world
market"

(p. 58).

These same assumptions affected Morrill's discourse.
In practice, he articulated a commercialism; in ideology, he
promoted an agrarian ideal.
wrought with irony.

His prudential scheme was

While some might call his irony

strategic, I do not think so, at least in his immediate
situation.

The bill passed, but it never really did what

Morrill wanted it to.
Hofstadter (1955) , in his explication of the populist
and progressive movements of the nineteenth century,
contends that the American farmer had a dual character.
Populist rhetoric derived from a "soft" side of the farmer's
existence and used traditional agrarian ideology.
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Yet, most

farm organizations since the populist decline in the late
nineteenth century talked in terms of a "hard" side.
"Agricultural improvements, business methods, and pressure
politics"

(p. 47) defined this hard side.

Morrill advocated

both sides and therefore produced a kind of agrarian
schizophrenia, or split in agrarian identity.

The act he

advocated, once enacted, failed to halt the tide of agrarian
discontent.

It did not provoke the children of farming

families to cluster around the old homestead.
went to the city.

They still

Morrill's act, and the conception of

prudence that brought it about, seemingly institutionalized
this agrarian schizophrenia.
Thus, Rudolph (1962) says that "the land-grant college
movement owed something both to those forces that were
destroying the agrarian orientation of American society and
to those sentiments that would seek to perpetuate the past
as an agrarian myth"

(p. 251) .

One could say that Morrill's

legislation was essentially a "romantic effort...to remain
philosophically agrarian..."

(p. 251) while, at the same

time, surrendering to the culture of profit.

Thus,

Morrill's irony alerts us to another implication of his
rhetoric.
Burke (1993) sees an often uneasy relationship between
what he calls the "Self," the individual agent, and the
"Non-Self," social institutions and the like.

There is

often, thinks Burke, a "maladjustment" between the Self and
Non-Self if the agent does not fit in with the scene.
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This

rift might be "righted through the surrender of Self" to the
Non-Self.

However, Burke argues that some writers, Marx for

instance, insisted "that we must change the Non-Self, or
must change the social institutions to fit our needs, rather
than changing our needs to fit the social institutions..."
(p. 156).

This relationship between Self and Non-Self often

leads to irony.

Burke elaborates on his notion of irony

when he calls it a "recognition of the fact that people
surrender only because they have to, along with the
recognition of the fact that one does not propose to accept
such ready forms of integration for himself"

(p. 156).

This

is also what I mean by saying that Morrill's prudence was
ironic.

Morrill's idea of prudence accommodated to the

commercial zeal of the day, while still projecting a bit of
agrarian audacity.

His irony potentially allowed his

audience to associate with the agrarian myth and
disassociate from commercialism; acting out a fervor for
profit all the while.
Moreover, from Hall's (1980) point of view, we might
say that the preferred reading was in putting the two
strains of prudence together.

However, because they seemed

incongruous, a negotiated reading perhaps tended to provoke
a dialectic between the two.

An oppositional reading,

perhaps, would read either one prudence or the other; or
resist the whole measure as a political ploy for the
republican agenda.

In any case, Morrill's rhetoric did not

have the influence he perhaps desired.

However, the public

195
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

institutions that resulted certainly changed the landscape
of American higher education.
While the state institutions, once established, did
certainly improve agricultural production, it also displaced
the yeoman agrarian.

However, perhaps that is not the stuff

to dwell on endlessly in my rhetorical way.

The Land Grant

colleges broadened the idea of public higher education.

For

the most part, they gave students of all classes and
interests options.
but end up a writer.

One could go to school to be a farmer,
One could go to school to be an

artist, but end up an engineer.

Ross (1942) puts this idea

nicely when he says that
Whatever the name, the real test of all the land-grant
institutions was their ability and disposition to
fulfill their peculiar mission in the new era, and it
was in ministering to the technical, social, and
political needs of the nation come of age that they
attained measurably to the vision of the true prophets
of the industrial movement in becoming real people's
colleges— with all their limitations a distinct native
product and the fullest expression of democracy in
higher education (p. 182).
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CHAPTER

SEVEN

CONCLUSION
REVIEW OF STUDY
The Morrill Act apportioned to each state thirtythousand acres per each senator and representative they had
in Congress under the 1860 census.

The law obligated states

to sell the land and use the interest from the receipts to
endow, support, and maintain a college of agriculture,
though not excluding scientific, classical, and military
studies.

The result of the law, though we are still

debating its value, brought about new vocational curricula,
extended higher education to the working classes, put
classical academics and vocational instruction under the
same roof, and most significantly, it democratized higher
education and thus carved out an intellectual and learned
niche for the practical, working citizenry.
The law did not come about without rhetorical effort
both for and against the general, democratic notions of the
measure.

The persuasive messages critical to the ultimate

passing of Morrill Act, working alone and together,
demonstrate the important role of prudence in the invention
of public argument.

Thus, I have sought to understand the

role of prudence in the texts I have analyzed and I have
indicated that prudence gives us both historical and
theoretical insight.

I will come along to those insights

shortly.

197
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I consider my project a continuation of the ongoing
historical interpretation of nineteenth century American
higher education.

Even more so, I consider my research an

addition to the discussion about nineteenth century
rhetorical discourse.

I also regard this study as a

contribution to the theoretical understanding of prudence.
Thus, I reviewed prudence from a theoretical perspective.

I

also reviewed several works of rhetorical criticism in my
literature review, each embarking from particular
understandings of theoretical prudence.

In so doing, my

point was to illustrate that critics have either thought of
prudence as too stable, or too polysemic.

My conception of

prudence appreciates the play of prudence between stability
and polysemy.

I see prudence as a dynamic performative

tradition, but also a unique sense of situational
appropriateness in performance.
Analytically, I appreciate both the instrumental mode
of critical analysis, but also the far-reaching, textual
play of multiplistic modes of prudential symbolism.
basic method has been textual criticism.

My

More specifically,

a hybrid of traditional instrumentalist, or intentionalist
interpretative practice, and an interpretative practice that
focuses on performative traditions in textual action.

In my

application, I first used Jasinski's (1997) understanding of
performative traditions, then, like Wilson (1998), I focused
on each text's textual context and how prudence emerged out
of that.

In short, Jasinski (1997) thinks that by
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decentering the hub of critical activity away form purpose
and agent to the text/context relationship, a critic can
better focus on the orchestration of cultural performative
traditions in textual action.

I also recognize the idea

that deviating away from the assumptions of instrumental
practice invigorates rhetorical scholarship.

It was my hope

that these two schemes of interpretation— Jasinski's and
Wilson's— would reveal interesting results when put
together.

Working in tandem, they recover a contextual

dialectic between the text and its immediate rhetorical
situation, and between the text and its broader cultural
grammar.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
I had several questions that I addressed:

1) Given the

rhetors I examine, what sense of prudence did they each
offer and how did they symbolically actualize or achieve
that notion of prudence?

Along the same lines, was such an

idea of prudence linked to any communal tradition(s) of
prudential thinking?

2) Considering the idea of textual

context, what vision of the past, present, and future did
each rhetor project, and what sense of prudence did that
develop?

3)

What was the effect of the implicit view of

prudence within each text— did it help or hinder the
rhetorician's persuasive efforts?
To answer my first question, Day and Kingsley suggested
that it was appropriate to hold tight to traditional
classical and literary pedagogy.

Metaphor tellingly
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developed this prudential idea.

The authors supplied

structural, light and dark, and nature metaphors to
encourage a certain way of seeing classical education, and
practical education.

The sacred/secular metaphors of

"taste" and "genius" also cultivated a notion of prudence.
These were metaphors with a long symbolic lineage, and used
by Yale’s former president Timothy Dwight.

Thus, while the

Yale Report was a secular, educational epideictic, the
authors engaged a homiletic tradition.

This helped to

project a sense that classical education was both secular
and sacred, and that Yale graduates would go on to establish
Dwight's vision of a godly society through poetic and
refined discursive practice.
Wayland asserted that Brown ought to democratize its
education in order to uplift the practical classes of
society.

He actualized his idea of prudence through the

discursive sentiments of individuality, self-reliance, and
commercialism; and his rhetoric of identification.
prudential ideals were conventional.

His

Wayland supplied a

tradition of prudence that perpetuated a political
imagination consonant with the perceived egalitarianism in
the age of Jackson.

Moreover, his idea of prudence emerged

out of his own design of moral philosophy and political
economy, both tied to Jacksonian democracy.

In light of his

discourse on individuality and self-reliance, Wayland
consequently made himself out to be a kind Jacksonian
outsider, fighting the good fight, on behalf of working
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people he really could not relate to.

Wayland volunteered

himself, both politically and discursively, as a shining
example of individualism for his democratic audience.

He

also shaped a sense of prudent conduct for the Brown
corporation.
Turner's basic claim was that the yeoman agrarians
ought rise up and invent their own educational scheme.

He

achieved his representation of prudence symbolically through
the aesthetics of, first, metonymy in as much as Turner
generated a seemingly natural, antithetical relationship
between the professional class and the working class.
Second, Turner activated his prudence through antiintellectualism.

Finally, Turner's prudence primarily

existed in and through the language of myth.

These

rhetorical appeals were also traditions living within the
oratorical culture of Turner's day.

Turner perpetuated

ideas of societal structure propelled by Calhoun, but Turner
wanted to re-do the hierarchy.

Turner enlisted the

Jeffersonian ideal of a natural aristocracy.

Further,

Turner performed a middling style of discourse that
resounded an anti-intellectual sentiment, and a humble style
that was in vogue.

His use of the agrarian myth had a long

symbolic lineage.
Morrill's idea of prudence resembled Turner's .

The

basic notion of practical political conduct Morrill advanced
was the founding of federally aided, agricultural and
mechanical universities.

I suggest that this general
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conceptualization of prudent conduct issued from the
agrarian myth's symbolism.

However, different from Turner,

Morrill's created his slant on the myth using synecdoche and
filiopiety.
However, Morrill also enacted prudence through the
language of commercialism.

Morrill's commercial talk

pointed to a recognition of the commercial zeal of his day,
but it also, intentionally or not, pointed to the fiction of
the myth.

It generated nostalgia.

It also indicated the

irony implicit in the agrarian myth, and in the culture
Morrill lived in and through.
I have already pointed to the strength of the agrarian
myth at that time.

Filiopiety, as Jasinski (1997) argued,

was also a very popular sentiment.

Commercialism, too, was

immensely strong during Morrill's era.

The rage for

business and entrepreneurial zeal was commonplace.

In

brief, a conception of prudence linked to the agrarian myth,
and discursive strategies that activated it, were
conventional.

Also, a sense of prudence linked to

commercialism, and the commercial talk that brought it
about, was traditional.

In short, Morrill's vision of

prudence was actually two competing visions put together.
The irony that resulted indicated an ironic tension in the
broader, oratorical culture.
In the effort of answering my second general question,
I contend that Day and Kingsley constructed the past,
antiquity, as an era of beauty and perfection; ancient
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language was God's language.

The present was a struggle

between the beauty of past treasures and the "business” or
"practical" character of their contemporary America.

The

future, if students studied past treasures, would be bright.
Yale and its students would deny a brilliant future if they
ignored the past.

This vision perpetuated Dwight's

political ideal and promoted the post-Puritan notion of a
"godly government."
Much different from Day and Kingsley, Wayland created a
temporal narrative that painted the past as a time of
warranted mis-understanding and error.

Wayland illustrated

what he saw as the present through repeated comments about
the "progress" of the nation, and in his rendering of Brown
as an educational embarrassment.

His future took form in

his arguments about what might happen if the corporation
heeded his proposals.

If the corporation conceded to

Wayland's policy requests it would result in money for Brown
and uplift the middling and lower classes that, then, would
help enact Wayland's prudential way of thinking.

Wayland's

historical narration framed the role of American college
education and the specific role of the practical classes
within the unfolding of American history.

Wayland seemingly

accepted that average American citizens longed to live up to
a cultural ideal of materialism and self-determination; they
longed to live out the myth of the self-made American.
Turner narrated a heroic myth as his understanding of
reality.

He unveiled the past as controlled by classicist
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fools.

While places like Yale praised the ancients as

worthy, these ancients really only produced confusion.
thought too much and talked too much.

They

Thus, Turner saw the

present as a caste system controlled by these classically
educated fools perpetuating the trifles and confusions of
ancient, pedantic ideals.

Turner's proposal for the future,

then, was to re-work the caste system.

His future, like his

myth, was a story. We can see that Turner's story was
basically that the agrarian farmer and industrialist, living
within a caste-system controlled by classically learned,
professional dolts, needed to re-do the American castesystem, with the aid of practical education, in order to
promote an educational order aloof from political and
ecclesiastical control.
Morrill's past was sacred and the agrarian myth a story
of origin.

This illustration of the past as mythic and

sacred indicated, also, Morrill's sense of prudence.

Mythic

time partly developed this representation of prudence.

As

the agrarians looked to the mythic past, so too did
Morrill's symbolic overture ask his audience to do the same.
Different from his mythic view of the past, Morrill's view
of the present and the future were very progressive.

He saw

the present as a vast file of agricultural and political
errors that both devalued land and the labor of it.
Regardless, he also saw the present as an era of scientific
progress— this would be the future remedy to the agrarian's
woes.

Morrill adhered to an Euramerican perspective of
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temporality in this regard.

He bought into "time's arrow."

In short, Morrill's textual context was temporally ironic.
He praised the past and offered a threshold of timelessness
that allowed his listeners to appreciate and participate in
the agrarian myth.

However, he denied that regression

because his view of the present and future asserted the
necessity of progression and that techno-science was the
remedy for the excessive march of agricultural blunders and
lost profits.

Thus, the overall effect of his textual

context and the sense of prudence it helped project was
irony and confusion.
Finally, to answer the third general question, placed
within the broad context of nineteenth century rhetorical
culture, Day and Kingsley's idea of prudence was both
successful and not so successful.
label,

Again, I realize the

"successful", is problematic.

Nevertheless, when we

consider the different readings Hall (1980) suggests are
available to any audience member it makes more sense.

What

I mean is that a preferred reading, if such a reading
emerges, illustrates a sense of success.

Hence, Day and

Kingsley were successful because their rhetoric captured and
perpetuated the privileged role of the classically educated
person in an oratorical, evangelical society.
Significantly, the sense of prudence that the Yale Report
clung to and developed also helped Day and Kingsley advance
their sense of prudence to many denominational schools in
the West and, for the most part, staved off any major
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philosophical change for conservative colleges for many
years.

Yet, they also alienated practical education and

made it difficult to believe that there was any other road
to thorough education or godliness other than classical
education.

Thus, their representation of prudence was also

unsuccessful because oppositional readings existed as well.
Like Day and Kingsley, Wayland was both successful and
unsuccessful.

I suggest that Wayland's prudential outlook

and the way he enacted it through his rhetoric helped a
broad, cultural persuasive effort.

Wayland's sense of

prudence aided his persuasive pursuit to democratize higher
education in America because he borrowed it from an
immensely popular public sentiment.

While for the most part

the faculty of Brown dismissed the report, as did many
conservatives in the higher education scene, the general
public seem to have accepted Wayland's idea of prudence.
Turner's enactment of prudence and rhetoric was
important and, in a sense, successful because Morrill
imitated it.

While Morrill offered his own slant on the

agrarian myth in his own speeches, it is my conjecture that
Turner's idea of prudence still lived within Morrill's
efforts.

More specifically, Morrill, like Turner, promoted

the symbolism of labor and the garden to afford the
agrarian, in part, a mode of prudent conduct.
Morrill's rhetorical discourse is problematic because,
while the bill did pass, the rhetoric and prudential
perspective that Morrill implied did not readily help the
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process, nor did it lead to a coherent vision of what the
measure might do.

In practice, Morrill praised the zeal for

commercialism; in ideology, he promoted an agrarian ideal.
Morrill advocated two sides of agrarian identity: the
traditional, mythic side, and the commercial, business side.
He therefore produced a kind of agrarian schizophrenia.

The

act he advocated failed to block the tide of agrarian
discontent.

It did not halt the desire to leave the farm

for the city.

Morrill's act, and the notion of prudence

that brought it about, seemingly institutionalized this
agrarian schizophrenia.

It contributed to the decline of a

myth it tried to perpetuate.
IMPLICATIONS
It now comes time in my project to theorize about my
findings.

In order to do that I want to first consider my

project from historical/pedagogical vantage point.

Second,

I will speculate about the role of prudence by thinking
about it in relation to several of the basic rhetorical
canons and other important rhetorical concepts like the
rhetorical agent, purpose, and audience.
We can see from a historical perspective how certain
representations of prudence inhibited or facilitated certain
ways of thinking about pedagogy.

In fact, I suggest that

the changes occurring within nineteenth century American
higher education were generally a struggle between diverging
conceptions of prudence in rhetorical action.

The Morrill
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Act emerged out of a contest between divergent expressions
of prudence.
For instance, the Yale Report and its representation of
prudence helped facilitate neoclassical elitism, yet
alienated classical pedagogy from mainstream democratic
ideals.

It inhibited a sense of legitimacy for practical,

vocational pedagogical plans.

However, Wayland's rhetoric

and the style of prudence attached to it antagonized
conservative educators and this idea illustrates the
persuasiveness of his prudential outlook outside of the
scene.

Wayland's enactment of prudence facilitated future

educational progressives through its discursive resource,
but it inhibited his immediate task.
progress at Brown.

He made little lasting

Thus, we can speculate that inside the

pedagogical scene, the idea that literary education was
sacred still persisted.

The change could not come from

within.
Turner’s embodiment of prudence facilitated his
progressive ideas because he wanted to invent a totally new
pedagogical system.

He legitimized practical, vocation

education, but his notion of prudence inhibited the fusion
between vocational and classical studies; a fusion we are
still having trouble with.
However, Morrill's understanding of prudence, tied to
both Wayland's and Turner's, legitimized every and any
pedagogical adventure.

As I mentioned earlier, the debate

about the historical and pedagogical value of the Morrill
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Act is ongoing.

Ross (1942) reveals that the measure often

invites "superlative encomiums of the measure as the
'greatest act in the history of higher education'" (p. 67).
Lucas (1996) disagrees when he reveals what he sees as the
present-day outcome of Morrill's law.

He says that today

"one comes to the university to learn how to become a
sanitation engineer, an information specialist, a financial
analyst, a health-service coordinator. ..and so on ad
nauseam..."

(p. 67).

I insist that the way Morrill talked

about his measure helped lead to this contemporary state of
things.

The Morrill Act opened the wedge that led to

excessive vocationalism.

Morrill's speeches were

significant moments of irony that illustrated a notion of
pedagogical accommodation to cultural, commercial longings,
while also romanticizing about the non-commercial.

In

short, Morrill, through his irony, surely made the
implementation of his political practice difficult, but his
way of pluralizing the agrarian character also facilitated a
schizophrenia in higher education itself.
What I mean is that Morrill's rhetoric authorized
plural voices within the walls of American higher education.
I would not dare say that plurality is a bad thing.
However, it does confuse things.

Look at most every

administrative justification for any contemporary
college/university course.

Within those justifications are

usually voices of communitarianism, individualism with a
technical slant, and populism.

The voices mix together in a
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contemporary pedagogical stew; they are all part of the
recipe and the product cannot exist without them.

Burke

(1969) says that
True irony, humble irony, is based upon a sense of
fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him
[her] , is indebted to him [her] , is not merely outside
him [her] as an observer but contains him [her] within,
being consubstantial with him (p. 514, his emphasis) .
And these voices do not come and go, but exist always,
rising in intensity at certain historical moments, and then
fading, but to rise again.
This study also gives us several indications of how
rhetoric and prudence work together theoretically.

One way

prudence and rhetoric interact is through the process of
invention.

Rhetorical invention is the process of coming to

terms with the most persuasive strategies given the
opportunities and limitations of a situation at hand and the
communal, linguistic resources available to the rhetor.
Traditionally,

the product of rhetorical invention is a

rhetorical performance: persuasive discourse in action.

I

have argued that prudence orchestrates the process of
invention.
Hariman's
me well here.

(1991) idea of prudence as performance serves
Again, he thinks that prudence is a

performative virtue that rests in one's ability to master
the nuances of rhetorical art, and perform a rhetorical
script dramatically in order to move an audience.

Prudence

is not an explicit plan one can break off or separate from
the performance of rhetoric.

Prudence lives only in and
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through the creative endeavor of rhetorical discourse.
Prudence lives in and through the stylistic and
argumentative forces of a persuasive effort.

Therefore,

invention also lives only within rhetorical action.

The

rules for creative practice exist within the practice; or,
at least, resources for invention are most readily found
through observation of persuasive art.

Hariman says that

"prudence becomes a master code for successful performance
within a community, and the use of prudence as a norm
becomes a mean for maintaining the community's traditional
alignment of its social practices"

(p. 29) .

The point, I

think, is that invention is not a scientific process.

Even

though we have our text books and our hand books, invention
as a creative, innovative endeavor springs from immersion in
a rhetorical community.
This does not mean that rhetoric cannot be subversive,
but that the potentiality for rhetorical success is guided
from communal norms of prudent thinking, even while there
are many different norms of implicit prudence.

For

instance, the potentiality for Wayland's rhetorical success
lived within the communal norms of Jacksonian individualism
and commercialism. These were cultural discourses Wayland's
persuasive effort originated from and contributed to.
This study also says something about the relationship
between prudence and rhetorical organization or form.

To

Burke (1931, 1968), rhetorical or artistic form leads an
audience from one part of the performance to the next.
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The

rhetor generates situational variables in a sort of plot
moving forward to some end.

The audience, then, begins to

expect some happening and becomes aroused and persuaded
through that expectation.

Swartz (1996) says that "in

experiencing an expectation,

[an audience member] grows to

identify with either the persuader or the ends of the
communication" (p. 315) .

Echoing Burke, Swartz also says

that form helps define conditions of aesthetic or normative
values within a culture.
grows out of form.

My point is that prudence often

A sense of prudence promotes a certain

expectation of outcome, in discourse and in political
action, that ignites that notion of prudence to constantly
be rediscovered in the process of invention.
We see in my study that prudence often emerged out of
mythic form.

When a speaker energized the agrarian myth

through speech, the mythic sentiments invigorated a pre
political narrative, the society that embraced the mythic
symbols, and the individuals that perceived that they
participated in that society and story.
this was Turner's speech.
story.

The best example of

His textual context was a mythic

Again, his story was that the agrarian and working

industrialist, living within a caste-system controlled by
the classically learned, needed to re-make the American
caste-system, with the aid of vocational education, in order
to promote an educational order detached from political and
ecclesiastical control.

This was a hero's plot.

Turner

used it as an inventional resource and contributed to its
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persuasiveness.

To live out the expectation would certainly

be, at least in Turner's mind, prudent.
Additionally, my study forces us to consider the
relationship between prudence, style and politics.

Hariman

(1992) links politics with style:
Style becomes an analytical category for understanding
a social reality; in order to understand the social
reality of politics, we can consider how political
action involves acting according to a particular
political style.
From this perspective, political
events are produced within a social setting through
conventions of artistic composition depending upon
aesthetic reactions for persuasive effect (p. 151, his
emphasis).
The understanding of a certain political style depends on an
understanding of decorum within that political scene.
Again, decorum and prudence are similar.

Where decorum

accounts for situational obligation, prudence accounts for
the representation of how one comes to terms with those
obligations.

A notion of decorum assumes a certain style,

and a representation of prudence enacts that style.

Thus,

we can speculate that prudence is, in part, a type of style.
To Hariman (1992) , the courtly style of political
action and power took shape through explicit norms of
decorum, like the performance of hierarchy,
ceremonies, and the like.

self-conscious

Day and Kingsley supplied an

embodiment of prudence that was somewhat courtly.

The

authors used refined speech to promote a refined type of
pedagogy. They performed hierarchy through their metaphors
and used conventions of address developed socially through
Dwight's discourses.

Wayland's style was different, it was
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a bit more "middling," as Cmiel (1990) might say. Turner's
style was middling.

Morrill's style was too.

However, both

Turner and Morrill gave slight impressions of a technical
style. Turner's style was particularly interesting because
he performed what I have called an anti-intellectualism in
order to shed himself of his classical roots.

Morrill tried

to adhere to this style, but had to adhere to the decorum of
Congress.

It might be that pedagogical change must

discursively take shape through a subversion of stylistic
norms in light of its conservative scene.
to be kind.

Turner was cruel

His rhetoric was prudent for his particular

occasion, but certainly some might perceive it as imprudent
within the expanded scene of mid-nineteenth century American
higher education.

Thus, I suppose we can say that a sense

of imprudence is often strategic stylistically, though one
runs the risk of alienating particular audiences in that
process.

Wayland exhibited this idea as well.

This study of prudence also pursues a richer
understanding of the complicated relationship between a
rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical situation, and
between the persuasive text and its broader cultural
context.

As mentioned earlier, Jasinski (1997) recovers

Wicheln's (1925) bifurcated sense of rhetorical context.

On

the one hand, there is an impression that audience and
occasion bind rhetoric through certain "exigencies" and
situational "constraints"

(Bitzer, 1968).

This first sense

of context "functions as a prison cell that contains
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advocate and text" (Jasinski, 1997, p. 199).
is another, broader view of context.

However, there

This widened, cultural

sense of context saturates the text "as the result of
organic process of emergence and development" (p. 200) .
There is, then, a specific rhetorical situation, but also a
cultural context through which a text is not necessarily
inhibited by the hyper-particular, but the wave of
intellectual, institutional, political, religious, and
economic forces that take shape through linguistic effort.
This linguistic context lives in and through textual
performance.

Jasinski's point is that there is

intentionality in a text, but also contextual manifestations
of a broader cultural grammar embedded in that text, but not
necessarily out of authorial purpose.
Hence, culture and situation bifurcate prudence.

We

can get an idea of a hyper-particularized sense prudence,
but also a cultural, traditional conceptualization of
prudence manifested in the rhetoric's broader symbolism.
Thus, while traditionalists see prudence as particularized,
we might speculate that there are two sets of prudence:
"situational prudence" and "cultural prudence".

My point is

that a rhetor might have a specific idea of prudence in mind
for the situation, but a reader might pick up another,
perhaps an opposed sense of prudence within that discourse.
I agree with Wilson (1998) that the textual context is
certainly not the same as the rhetorical situation, but I
also think that the temporal movement within the text
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illustrates how the rhetor or rhetors see the practical
wisdom of a particularized political or pedagogical policy.
Yet, the performance of prudence, though it is a coveted and
contested space, depends on a traditional, cultural idea of
prudence.

A cultural representation of prudence necessarily

resides within the text, even as a rhetor might subvert it
for a particularized rhetorical goal.
We can also theorize that, in light of Morrill, some
modes of prudence within rhetoric might be more open than
others.

Again, Morrill used synecdoche, filiopiety, and the

agrarian myth as rhetorical resources for persuasive ends.
Implied within those symbolic gestures was an idea of
prudence.

However, at the same time,

Morrill supplied a

conception of prudence linked to the commercialism of his
day.

This confused things.

It generated an irony.

I

realize that irony can be strategic, but we can speculate
that if there are two competing understandings or styles of
prudence within a text, then it is doubtful if the rhetor
can be overly successful because the interpretation is too
open.

That is to say that even while interpretations of

prudence are always open, some rhetorical discourses open
themselves up more than others.
We can also better speculate about the role of the
rhetorical agent from a theoretical/historical perspective.
Again, during the first few decades of the nineteenth
century, the mainstay of the neo-classical rhetorical
culture helped create a communitarian ethos. Day and
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Kingsley's rhetoric exemplified this.

Nevertheless, the

process of building moral consensus through rhetoric gave
way to the orator building up his or her own identity.
Wayland illustrated this, so did Turner.

The public arena

became a place to promote an individualized personality.
My dissertation thus illustrates the relationship between
authorial ideas of prudence and communal conceptions of
prudence.

We can see in my texts a move away from a refined

style of speech and communal ethos, toward an
individualistic ethos through a search for pedagogical
autonomy.

Again, this change also illustrated the

variability of prudence.

In short, ethos is tied to

prudence, and both are tied to communal notions of selfness.
When can also speculate about the role of prudence on
the nature of rhetorical purpose.

I suggest that embedded

in any rhetorical message is a "prudential purpose, " and in
line with Jasinski (1997), it does not necessarily have to
be intentional.

We can, in a way, remove the agent to

highlight a prudential purpose, apart from a specific,
policy outcome, in order to interpret a perception of
prudential conduct and appropriate discursive conduct that
the rhetoric implies and/or explicates.

An audience member

might interpret an idea of prudence the author has not
intended from a cultural, traditional stand-point.
Therefore, a cultural sense of prudence seems to be more
polysemic than a situational sense of prudence, but it is
never fully so .
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Hence, we can say the there is also a strong
relationship between prudence and an audience.
prudence is pretty much up for grabs.
(1998) charges, a contested space.

Again,

It is, as Wilson

Audiences, or specific

audience members, can read prudence from a preferred
reading, a negotiated, or even an oppositional.

But even as

rhetors try to "fix" prudence within the discourse, there
are always communal notions of prudences that audience
members can cling to despite the rhetoric they have
received.

Hence, I think this idea is a bit different, and

an elaboration on Wilson's thinking.
THE PROBLEM WITH PRUDENCE
The real problem with prudence is that it is a concept
that does not allow itself to be put on a specific shelf, in
a particular file, in a unique scheme.
prudence does.

Prudence is as

Because of the nature of the dissertation as

a learning process, I want here to offer my own thoughts, my
final conclusions about the nature of prudence and its
impact on rhetoric and nineteenth century American higher
education.

To do so, I will ask several important

questions, but try, in my humble way, to answer them.
First, is understanding prudence from an academic
stance important?

My answer is, of course, yes.

I outlined

why I think my study is important in my first chapter, but I
missed something.

If we comb through any contemporary

newspaper we can find "prudence" all over the place.
even in our popular media.

A character on the popular
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It is

television series,

"Saturday Night Live," made the word

famous when he constantly mimicked former president George
Bush in the late 1980's and early 90's.
"It wouldn’t be prudent."

The famous line:

It seems that, in its

contemporary usage, to be imprudent means to be
unaccountable, not informed, and the like.

Much like the

contemporary use of the word "rhetoric, " the term "prudence"
or "imprudent" is apparently another mindless "catch word"
in a political environment over-populated with such "catch
words."

Rhetorical scholars need to re-introduce a more

sophisticated way of thinking about words and discourse to
the general political process.
Next, does prudence exist before discourse?
is yes and no.

My answer

I do not think that an idea of prudence

exists without a mode of prudence already articulated, if
only implicitly, in a rhetorical community.

However, an

audience cannot deem a discourse prudent until it exists.
The process, if it is a process, is cyclical and
interactive.
Third, is prudence just an interpretation done by an
audience?

Where is prudence?

This question echoes the

previous question, and it is a difficult one to answer.

I

think that prudence is both a strategic endeavor, but also
up for grabs by an audience.

A rhetor wants to be prudent;

even if being imprudent is prudent.

Often times doing what

is not appropriate is appropriate and strategic.

Thus, a

rhetor always attempts to be prudent, but the rhetor's
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prudence has a double life.

It is prudent, in some way, to

the speaker, but an audience must also scrutinize that
prudence.
Another question:

Are speakers conscious of prudence?

I would never be so arrogant as to explicitly state that I
can delve into the mind of a speaker.

However, I would

speculate, in line with by previous paragraph, that a rhetor
attempts to be prudent.

The rhetor might not call it

"prudence," but nonetheless, I would suggest there is always
an urge in a speaker to do something that will result in
rhetorical success.

However, I do not think that, for

example. Day and Kingsley thought to themselves,

"Gee, it

would be prudent to use Dwight’s discursive elements of
'taste' and 'genius 1 here."
Is there a difference between prudent discourse and
prudent action and behavior?

My answer is y e s .

Throughout

my dissertation I have attempted to illustrate that
discursive practice and political action are closely
aligned.

One must talk the talk to walk the walk.

However,

I do think that one can have a prudent action in mind, but
be imprudent in discursive practice, or vice versa.
Another thing that I must ask myself to consider is the
relationship between "common sense" and prudence.
the same thing?

Perhaps.

Are they

There is a sense that prudence is

not a "book smart" concept, but a "street smart" process.
However, both "common sense" and "prudence" are communal to
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the extent that they depend on popular opinion or resolve to
give them life.
Also:
this?

What is the role of rhetorical imitation in all

As "common sense" has it, imitation is the best form

of flattery.

Thus, imitation illustrates a reception of

discursive practice and/or political action as prudent.

I

doubt a rhetor would imitate something he or she found
imprudent.
Finally, what is the role of prudence and rhetoric on
historical and contemporary higher education?
important question.

This is an

I have argued that the struggle over

nineteenth century higher education was struggle between
norms or prudence.

I think struggles of prudence are

foundational to cultural change and new discursive
practices.

What emerged in Morrill's rhetoric were plural

voices of prudence.

This opened a wedge.

voices of pedagogical prudence.

We have a synthetic, almost

pastiche mode of higher education.
Burke, this is all processive.

We have now many

However, in line with

Again, periods of history do

not come and go, but shine, and do not shine so brightly.
Burke (1969) thinks that what rises inevitably falls, but
comes back later.
517) .

This is his "over-all ironic formula"

(p.

The voices we have in contemporary American higher

education are in dialectic.

We can, even now in the first

year of 2000, see that the more well-rounded, thoroughly
educated graduates are the types employers prize.

Perhaps

Day and Kingsley's communitarianism is once again intense.
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FUTURE RESEARCH
More research on rhetoric, prudence, and nineteenth
century higher education must take place to better equip
ourselves to think about the Morrill Act and its historical
and contemporary consequences from a rhetorical perspective.
Further, we also need to improve our understanding of
prudence and rhetoric theoretically.

I suggest three

specific modes of future research.
First, I would suggest that rhetorical scholars focus
on other texts that provide information about the prudence
of both classical and practical education during this early
period of American higher education.

For instance, a

scholar could study specific educational plans from the
agricultural presses.

These plans might include the ones

from the People's College, the State Agricultural College in
New York, the Michigan Agricultural College, the Farmer's
High School in Pennsylvania, to mention just a few.

Apart

from specific pedagogical plans, one might study the
prudence of classical and practical education by analyzing
the ongoing debates in the journals of that era.

One could

analyze the debates in, for instance, the Rural Ne w Yorker ,
The Country Gentleman , the American Agriculturist , or the
New England Farmer, again, to mention just a few.

Second, one could study the specific state plans for
utilizing the money reaped from the land grant after the
Civil War.

Ross (1942) bolsters the point I made about

Morrill's prudential conflict when he says that "The
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possibilities of this plan of national aid [the Morrill Act]
were only to be manifested in the course of time as the
states utilized it in accord with their particular
conditions and needs"

(p. 67).

The state debates,

therefore, on how to manage the process would be very
interesting to analyze.
Third, in accordance with Lucas (1996), I propose that
contemporary pedagogical perspectives about curriculum have
roots in some of the basic ideas of the Land Grant movement,
and specifically in Morrill's ironic sense of prudence.

It

would be interesting to analyze contemporary persuasive
messages that call for certain pedagogical policies and
compare them to historical ones.
Apart from these three ideas, trying out the
implications I have supplied from a theoretical and
methodological stance would improve the way we theorize
about prudence, rhetoric, and interpret both historic and
contemporary pedagogical schemes.
Understanding the role of prudence in rhetorical
discourse, no matter the method, is important.

Certainly,

it is significant in the understanding of political and
cultural change, but also understanding pedagogical change.
The focus on prudence, rhetoric and persuasive pedagogical
messages will help us more fully understand how we talk
about pedagogy, how we enact that pedagogy, and how we
transform pedagogical perspectives.
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